Essays in Equilibrium Search Theory by Kircher, Philipp
Essays in
Equilibrium Search Theory
Inaugural-Dissertation
zur Erlangung des Grades eines Doktors
der Wirtschafts- und Gesellschaftswissenschaften
durch die
Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakulta¨t
der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita¨t
Bonn
vorgelegt von
Philipp Kircher
aus Plettenberg.
Tag der Promotion: 5. Juli 2006
Dekan: Prof. Dr. Johannes Ko¨ndgen
Erstreferent: Prof. Dr. Georg No¨ldeke
Zweitreferent: Prof. Andrew Postlewaite, Ph.D.
Tag der mu¨ndlichen Pru¨fung: 5. Juli 2006
Diese Dissertation ist auf dem Hochschulschriftenserver der ULB Bonn http://hss.ulb.uni-
bonn.de/diss online elektronisch publiziert.
ii
to my parents
iii
iv
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to Georg No¨ldeke for his advice during many discussions and his support for my plans
and ambitions. His style of managing a chair, his interaction with students and scholars and his way
of doing research are in many respects exemplary for me.
The interaction with Andrew Postlewaite has taught me a lot about the meaning of economic re-
search, and I am thankful for his support throughout my studies. I learned a lot during our collabo-
ration which led to the third chapter of this thesis. I also thank George Mailath for his involvement
in many of the discussions.
Manolis Galenianos has not only been a good friend, but our joint research has been a fruitful,
sometimes agonizing but usually fun and inspiring activity. Chapter One of this thesis owes to this
enterprise. I enjoyed the many long debates and his great hospitality during my frequent returns to
Philadelphia.
Ken Burdett and Randy Wright have been extremely supportive. Their interaction with students
and their curiosity for the work of others have been a very rewarding experience for me. I also
enjoyed the many discussions with Jan Eeckhout.
Stephan Lauermann’s challenging questions and comments have been a stimulus for many debates.
The discussions with Sandra Ludwig have been very enriching. The friendship with Jorge Gallardo-
Garcia and Daniel Velasques-Nunez made Philadelphia a temporary home for me.
At the University of Bonn I thank Benny Moldovanu and Urs Schweizer for their continuing support.
I acknowledge the financial support of the Bonn Graduate School of Economics and the European
Recovery Program.
I am glad about the friendship with graduate students in Bonn and Philadelphia that made life
enjoyable, interesting and fun. I thank Braz Camargo, Thomas Gall, Felix Marklein, Wolfram
Merzyn, Timofiy Myolovanov, Arnim Speck and Ludo Visschers for proof-reading and comments.
Finally, I owe much to my family and friends, without whom I would not have gone so far, and who
have put up with all the negative sides of grad student life that I levied on them.
v
vi
Contents
Introduction 1
I.1 A Brief Review of Search Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
I.2 Chapter Summaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1 Directed Search with Multiple Job Applications 13
1.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.1.1 Environment and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.1.2 Outcomes and Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.1.3 A Preliminary Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
1.2 A Special Case: N = 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.1 Worker Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.2 Characterization of Firm Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.2.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3 The General Case: N ≥ 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3.1 Worker Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3.2 Firm Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4 Further Equilibrium Properties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.1 Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.2 The Empirical Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.1 Free Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5.2 Endogenous Number of Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.5.3 The Dynamic Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6 Directed vs. Random Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
vii
1.7 Conclusion of Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2 Efficiency of Simultaneous Directed Search with Recall 43
2.1 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.1.1 Environment and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.1.2 Expected Payoffs and Equilibrium Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2 Equilibrium Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2.1 Workers’ Search Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2.2 Firms’ Wage Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.2.3 Equilibrium Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3 Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3.1 Search Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3.2 Entry efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3.3 Application Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.4 Generalization to N > 2 applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.4.1 Extended Setup and Main Result . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.4.2 Convergence to the Competitive Outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.5 Discussion and Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.1 Discussion of Main Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.5.2 Relation to the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
2.5.3 Conclusion of Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3 Strategic Firms and Endogenous Consumer Emulation 79
3.1 The model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2 Optimal Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.1 Consumer Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.2 Consumers’ stationary behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.2.3 Firms’ behavior . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2.4 Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.3 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.3.1 Social Interaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3.2 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
3.3.3 Conclusion of Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
viii
Appendix 109
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
A.3 Appendix to Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
References 145
ix
x
List of Figures
1.1 Workers’ application behavior. IC-H and IC-L are the workers’ indifference curves for ‘high’
and ‘low’ applications. Linearity is only used for illustration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.2 Firms’ equilibrium behavior. IP-H and IP-L are the isoprofit curves for high and low wage
firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.3 Equilibrium wage dispersion for N = 15 and b = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.4 Sum of firms for b = 1 and various N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Wage densities with random search, for N = 15 and b = 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Equilibrium behavior. IC1 and IC2: Worker’s indifference curve for the low and high wage,
respectively. IP1 and IP2: Isoprofit curves for low and high wage firms. . . . . . . . . . 61
2.2 Inefficiencies at a unique market wage. Areas A and B indicate mutual benefits for both
workers and firms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
A.1 f(x) for x ≥ 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A.2 f(a2
2d
) + f( a2
2(1−d) ) for d ∈ [0, 1]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
A.3 f ′(x)x2 for x ∈ [0, a2]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
xi
xii
Introduction
Market participants often lack knowledge about product characteristics or about the actions
of other market participants. This introduces frictions into the trading process, and econo-
mists have long realized that these have to be treated seriously in order to understand some
important phenomena that we observe in actual market interactions.
The idea that frictions are important in real life markets goes back to the observation that
seemingly identical factor inputs receive very different remuneration. Prices for goods and
wages for labor of apparently identical quality vary substantially, and it has been a challenge
for economists to explain the observed variation and its properties.1 The realization that
frictions are important and of substantial magnitude has prompted the question whether
markets still operate (second best) efficiently given the frictions. This question has received
substantial attention as it determines whether policy interventions might be warranted on
the grounds of efficiency improvements. To analyze markets with frictions we face the
question of how agents cope with the frictions, which is at the heart of all search models.
Since dispersion of factor prices, efficiency concerns and adaptation to market frictions
present central themes also in this thesis, we will briefly expand on each of these.
1. In the context of the labor market Stigler (1962) argued that labor of similar quality
obtains very different salaries. Later studies support this view in the sense that a large
fraction of the variation in wages remains unexplained even if one controls for observed and
unobserved worker heterogeneity.2 Competitive models imply the law of one price (or one
wage, respectively), and therefore labor economists have pursued alternative models that
explicitly account for market frictions in order to explain the observed variations in wages.3
1For evidence on prices see Stigler (1961) and the subsequent literature on price dispersion. For wages
see the next paragraph.
2See for example Abowd, Kramatz, and Margolis (1999) and further references in Chapter 1.
3For example, the model by Burdett and Mortensen’s (1998) has received strong popularity. See the next
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2. Unemployment is a sign of frictions and one of the major issues in welfare economics.
While some of it might be attributed to labor market interventions by the government or
cartelized labor bargaining, early economists have already argued that there is no full em-
ployment even if economic activity is relatively unrestricted. Friedman (1968) and Phelps
(1967) point out that the unemployed might neither waste time nor leisurely consume so-
ciety’s resources, but rather exert effort to overcome the market’s frictions. Only because
the unemployed undertake the productive activity of “search” do they find opportunities to
become employed and are able to re-enter the workforce. Friedman and Phelps promoted
the view that there exists a “natural rate” of unemployment which efficiently allocates re-
sources in a frictional economy; and monetary policy interventions cannot improve long-run
efficiency. This has spawned a long literature about the market’s ability to allocate resources
efficiently given the frictional forces that drive unemployment, which requires models that
can explicitly account for these frictions.
3. The presence of frictions affects all agents in the economy, and they will take this
into account in their decision-making. This naturally leads to equilibrium search models
where both sides of the market adjust their actions optimally to the frictions and to the
behavior of the other agents. If all information in the market is common knowledge, each
individual’s search strategy is a function of this information and his knowledge of the other
agents’ equilibrium strategies. If imperfect information is the source of the frictions and
some agents have private information, then individual strategies will also condition on the
observed behavior of others because this entails valuable information. The idea that agents
learn form one another goes back at least to Nelson (1970) who argues that consumers’ search
activities are guided by the information obtained from others. When private information is
important, then also information transmission between agents is likely to be of importance
and should be accounted for in the theoretical analysis.4,5
section for further references. For an estimation approach see, e.g., van den Berg and Ridders (1998).
4Imperfect information and its transmission between economic agents has been important in the analysis
of such mundane problems as the adoption of one of various competing kinds of technology as well as in the
study of more fundamental problems such as bank runs and speculative attacks against currency regimes.
See Chamley (2004) for an overview of the literature.
5We will illustrate the relevance of private information and observability in the context of a consumer
product market. The labor markets that we analyze do not feature private information and information
transmission is not an issue.
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The following three chapters of this thesis reconsider the points just raised in the context of
specific economic environments. Chapter One presents a novel model of the labor market
that features wage dispersion among homogenous workers. The shape of the wage density is
downward sloping, which conforms more closely with stylized facts than the predictions of
“standard” models of wage dispersion.6 The model is simple: Firms compete for labor by
posting their wage, and workers then decide where to apply. The novel feature is that workers
can apply to multiple firms within one period and therefore face a strategic simultaneous
choice problem. Since casual observation suggests that people indeed send many applications
at once at the beginning of their search, the understanding of the consequences of such
behavior might be interesting in its own right.
Chapter Two considers efficiency properties in a setup similar to Chapter One. The equi-
librium interaction in Chapter One as well as in some related work is inefficient, in contrast
to the large literature that considers a single application for each worker. In accordance
with other work, our analysis in Chapter One entails a simplifying assumption about the
way that a firm can fill its vacancy. Chapter Two is concerned with the question whether
the inefficiency is due to an inherent problem of the simultaneous choice among multiple
alternatives, or whether it is an artifact of this simplified assumption. We naturally extend
the setup to allow firms to contact all their applicants in order to fill their job (which was re-
stricted in Chapter One) and find that this achieves an allocation which is efficient given the
frictions. This confirms the hypothesis that the natural rate of unemployment is efficient,
and extends positive efficiency results from models with a single application to the setup
where agents can choose their intensity of search by varying the number of applications they
send.7
While the first chapters deal only with public information, chapter three considers a private
information setting in which learning from the actions of others is important. Models of
social learning mainly focus on situations where each consumer has only a single decision in
his life. We embed social learning into a standard repeated search environment of a consumer
6Burdett and Mortensen (1998) is arguably the current “standard” model in the analysis of wage disper-
sion. It predicts an increasing an convex shape. We will see that this is a feature that is common in partially
directed search models.
7In contrast to Chapter One, we manage to introduce the number of applications as the choice variable
for the worker and analyze the efficiency of that choice together with free entry of firms and minimization of
the frictions in the market.
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product market in which agents have a natural incentive to learn from the behavior of others.
We allow for heterogeneity among consumers and strategic actions by the firms. This allows
predictions regarding the group that will “lead” the market and regarding the way firms
treat their various consumers.
All chapters share the following principles: They all consider equilibrium models in which
both sides of the market act strategically. Agents act optimally given the frictions, the
other agents’ strategies and the observable information. Second, all chapters feature search
intensity as a choice variable. The class of directed search models on which the first two
chapters are based already have the appealing feature that market frictions are explicitly
modeled. It therefore lends itself to the explicit introduction of search intensity, which is
simply a choice about the number of applications. In the third chapter we want to allow
different consumers to consume with different frequencies, and we want to incorporate the
feature that more attractive products are consumed more frequently. We deploy a novel
model of search intensity, which is based on a trade-off between an outside option and
market consumption coupled with a taste shock that changes the attractiveness of per
period consumption. Despite this feature the derivation of the optimal search strategy
remains surprisingly simple. Third, all chapters allow for some choice about whom to meet
as a potential trading partner, and therefore they differ from the classical random search
approach in which both sides of the market meet purely randomly. In the first two chapters
workers decide on the identity of the firm to which they apply based on its wage offer. In
the last chapter people condition their search process on what they observe from others.
This thesis is aimed at studying the interaction between search intensity and non-random
search in an equilibrium setting. We believe that these are important elements in many
markets, and we hope to shed additional light on their interplay through our theoretical
analysis.
I.1 A Brief Review of Search Theory
To illustrate how this thesis relates to developments in search theory, we present a short
review here. It will be brief because each chapter is intended to be readable as a self-
contained unit, and we want to avoid too much repetition. For a thorough review of search
theoretic models see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (2005).
The developments in search theory were spawned by observations like dispersion of prices for
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identical goods or factor inputs (e.g. Stigler (1961, 1962)), the observations of a correlation
between unemployment and vacancies (Beveridge, 1944) and between unemployment and
inflation (Phillips, 1958). While the question of efficiency was early on taken up by monetary
economists like Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967), they had little theory to back up the
ideas. Models that evolved thereafter were not so much concerned with monetary influences
but rather with the aim to include unemployment in equilibrium models at all and to analyze
the resulting properties.
Initial models that analyzed behavior in a search environment were partial equilibrium mod-
els which only focused on the behavior of one individual agent. They considered sequential
search, where the agent meets different options (e.g. jobs that pay different wages) and in
the end takes one of the options he has met. Waiting longer, i.e. meeting more options, is
costly either due to a fixed cost of waiting or due to discounting. DeGroot (1970), McCall
(1965) and Weitzman (1978) develop optimal stopping rules for such environments. Stigler
(1961) and Chade and Smith (2005) propose optimal algorithms for simultaneous choice
problems.
Insights derived from the partial models received criticism (Rothschild, 1974) because they
neglect the other side of the market. Therefore later models integrated the sequential search
models in an equilibrium framework in which both sides of the market optimize. These
models are known as random search models. They assume that if a worker meets a vacant
firm, this firm is simply a random draw from the set of all vacant firms. Early on Diamond
(1971) considered such a framework under the assumption that firms make take-it-or-leave-it
wage offers, and established that firms can extract monopoly profits in such a market because
switching costs provide them with local market power. In a model with identical workers his
insights imply that workers receive none of the surplus even though there are many employers
present that want to hire, which is known as the Diamond Paradox. Subsequent models
assumed Nash bargaining between workers and firms, which implies that workers receive
some rents (see e.g. Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982a,1982b), Pissarides (1984)). This
approach to labor markets has been used to investigate many questions from unemployment
insurance to business cycle fluctuations. For the understanding of this thesis two important
results emerge: First, these models still do not yield any dispersion of wages if workers
and firms are assumed to be identical. Second, these models are generally not constrained
efficient given the frictions. This has been highlighted, e.g., by Hosios (1990) and implies
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that fiscal or monetary interventions might have scope to improve the allocation of economic
resources.
To introduce wage dispersion two roads have been successfully explored. The first and
more immediate is to relax the assumption of homogeneity. Albrecht and Axell (1984)
and Reinganum (1979) analyze variants of this. If one wants to stay in the paradigm of
homogenous workers and homogeneous firms, attractive models of wage dispersion have
been surprisingly hard to generate. Burdett and Judd (1983) and Butters (1977) clarify the
crucial point to generate such dispersion: workers have to be able to see multiple employment
options simultaneously. If some workers see only one option, but some see multiple options,
then firms that offer low wages can only hire those workers that do not have a better option
but make a high profit per hired worker. Firms that offer high wages attract many workers
but make less profit per hired worker. In equilibrium this balances such that all firms make
identical profit. For this logic it is crucial that not all workers have two offers, because if
they did the firms would all compete in a Bertrand style. Burdett and Mortensen (1998)
translate the idea of multiple options into a sequential search setup in which workers can also
search on the job. Meetings are still random and firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers. Low
wage offers are accepted only by unemployed workers who do not have alternative options,
while high wage offers are also accepted by workers who have a job but with low pay, and
firms can again make equal profits despite wage dispersion.8 Acemog˘lu and Shimer (2000)
explore a setup similar to Burdett and Judd (1983) and show that the logic still applies even
if firms are capacity constrained and can only hire a single worker.9 Gautier and Moraga-
Gonza´lez (2005) show that with capacity constraints all workers may see and apply to two
options and still wage dispersion obtains. Bertrand competition will not occur since firms
cannot always hire all applicants, and therefore some applicants are left with only the low
option, which gives the low wage firms the chance to hire.
The models just discussed can be considered random search because the options available
are drawn at random and only reflect a small subset of the available offers. This implies an
increasing and convex shape of the wage distribution in all of these models, which conflicts
with empirical findings.10 These models do feature a part of non-random (or directed) search
8On-the-job-search overturns the Diamond Paradox.
9The paper also has additional insights on technology dispersion.
10Mortensen (2003) discusses stylized facts, which point at a distribution that is skewed with a long right
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in the sense that workers can chose non-randomly between their available options. Hence,
we refer to these models either as partially random or partially directed search.
The final generation of models reviewed here extends the scope of the information that is
available to the searching agents by allowing workers to see all wage offers in the market. In
so called directed search models each firm is capacity constrained (i.e. has a single job to fill)
and can publicly post the wage it will pay. The workers can see all wage announcements and
decide to which firm to apply. If more than one worker applies, the firm picks one of them
and offers the job to him. This setup was proposed e.g. by Montgomery (1991), Peters
(1991) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). Two elements distinguish this environment
from the previous ones: Wage competition is global because each worker can see all the
offers, and there are no chance moves that introduce randomness. Thus, the frictions do
not stem from randomness in the environment, but arise as a consequence of the type of
equilibrium that is considered. It is assumed that workers cannot coordinate, which is
modeled as a restriction to symmetric strategies. In a larger market it therefore cannot be
an equilibrium that all workers apply to the same firm: If they did, all but one of them would
remain unemployed. As a consequence of this, the subgame perfect symmetric equilibrium
involves randomization. This implies that sometimes too many workers apply for a single
job and some of them remain unemployed, while some vacancies might not receive any
application and remain vacant. The restriction to symmetric strategies therefore embeds
the frictions. Despite the miscoordination the optimality of the symmetric strategy implies
that workers apply to higher wage offers more frequently. Hence, firms can improve their
hiring probability by increasing the wage. In a large market the individual agent has no
market power, and due to the competitive element these models are also called competitive
search.11
Two features of directed (or competitive) search models are worth highlighting. First, Moen
(1997) and others show that the equilibria in such a setup are efficient given the frictions. He
can relate his result back to Hosios (1990) and show that the condition that is generally not
tail.
11Competitive search refers more broadly to models in which market makers set up the wage and the
meeting probabilities in a competitive way, but the meeting probabilities have to satisfy the consistency
conditions of a given matching function, which might be more general than the one that comes out of the
game just specified. Moen (1997) uses such a setup. Shimer (1996) shows how this can be interpreted for a
specific matching function in light of the physical structure presented here.
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met by random search models with Nash bargaining is met in this setup. The models provide
a clear extensive form for the market interaction in which unemployment can be interpreted
and show that the competitive forces in this environment lead to an allocation that cannot be
Pareto improved by monetary or fiscal policy (unless the frictions are eliminated). Second,
these models do not feature wage dispersion when restricted to homogenous workers and
homogenous firms. This is shown e.g. in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) and Moen (1997),
and is due to the fact that the models restrict attention to a setting where each worker can
only apply to a single firm in any given period.12 The only exceptions are Delacroix and
Shi (forthcoming) and Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming). The former model
directed on-the-job search and obtain wage dispersion with a discrete number of wages.
They are able to characterize the transition of a worker’s wage income over time, yet the
model’s tractability is limited and discussion of the shape of dispersion or the efficiency of
the model is omitted. The latter are the first to consider a setup with multiple applications
per worker and integrate Chade and Smith (2005) into an equilibrium framework. They
provide workers with bargaining power if the worker obtains two or more job offers, which
leads to a single market wage.13 Wage dispersion only arises through bargaining. They
are the first to consider a directed search model that features inefficiencies beyond those
that are unavoidable parts of the frictions, i.e., the competitive element does not guide the
market towards efficiency.
I.2 Chapter Summaries
In this section we briefly outline the equilibrium models that we analyze in the following
chapters, present our main findings and relate them to the literature mentioned in the
previous section.
InChapter One we develop an equilibrium directed search model of the labor market where
12Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) only solve for equilibria in which firms offer one wage. In a finite economy
such as theirs uniqueness results are difficult. For an appropriate limit game it can easily be shown that
only a unique wage can arise. Convergence results by Peters (2000) establish that wages will be close to
this unique wage when the finite market is sufficiently large. For Moen (1997) uniqueness follows out of the
optimality. In Moen (1997) the model is not phrased in terms of applications, but the job arrival rates do
not allow more than one choice at any given time.
13Since they only solve for equilibria with a single wage, there might be other equilibria as well.
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workers can simultaneously apply for multiple jobs. The main result is that all equilibria
exhibit wage dispersion despite the fact that workers and firms are homogeneous. Wage
dispersion is driven by the simultaneity of the application choice. Risk-neutral workers
apply for both ‘safe’ and ‘risky’ jobs. The former yield a high probability of a job offer, but
for low pay, and act as a fallback option; the latter provide higher potential payoff, but are
harder to get. Consistent with stylized facts, the density of posted wages is decreasing and
high wage firms receive more applications per vacancy. Unlike most directed search models,
the equilibria are not constrained efficient.
Chapter One integrates Chade and Smith (2005) into an equilibrium framework. In contrast
to Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) we do not assume a final stage of bargaining,
which requires us to pursue the choice problem of the worker in a setting where he is really
confronted with a set of different wages. The workers’ choice problem provides a lot of
structure and we can show that the market separates into some smaller “micro-segments”
that operate similar to Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). Within each segment one wage is
offered, which implies many wages across the various market segments. Our novel results on
the shape of wage dispersion is derived from two simple assumptions: Firms can compete for
labor, and workers apply to several firms. We are able to show clearly why partially directed
search yields an unrealistic increasing and convex shape for the wage density, whereas our
directed search setup results in a decreasing distribution.
In Chapter Two we analyze the properties of a directed search labor market in which
workers choose how many applications to send simultaneously after observing the firms’
wage offers. The number of applications can be interpreted as an explicit form of search
intensity. Since workers might reject some job offers in favor of better ones, we allow rejected
firms to contact (“recall”) other applicants by applying the deferred acceptance algorithm
to the endogenous network. The equilibrium is generically unique, all workers choose to
send the same number of applications, and firms offer a discrete number of wages. The
equilibrium is constrained efficient given the workers’ lack of coordination: entry of firms,
number of applications, and number of matches are efficient. Wage dispersion is necessary
for the market to achieve constrained efficiency despite homogeneity of workers and firms.
For small application costs the equilibrium outcome converges to the unconstrained efficient
competitive outcome.
Chapter Two reconsiders the case of multiple applications, but now the number of applica-
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tions is a choice and firms can contact additional workers after a rejection. Our efficiency
result reverses the negative results on efficiency obtained by Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman
(forthcoming) and in Chapter One. The positive efficiency properties established by Moen
(1997) are recovered. We are able to clarify the property that is important for efficiency.
Of key importance is a tight link between firms’ and workers’ expected payoffs. This link is
present in one application models and in the case of recall, but fails without recall. While
other models have looked at entry of firms and sorting in the market as the margins of effi-
ciency, we introduce a new margin by additionally analyzing the workers’ choice regarding
the number of applications. Our convergence result establishes the close connection between
competitive search equilibria and classical Walrasian markets with perfect competition.
In Chapter Three we consider a search model of a consumer product market in which
information is private and agents can learn from the actions of others. Consumers and
firms are heterogenous and act strategically. Consumers search for high qualities among a
large set of firms, and can condition their choices on observed actions of other consumers.
When they can identify consumers who are more likely to have found a high quality firm,
uninformed individuals will optimally emulate those consumers. One group of consumers
arises endogenously as “leaders” who are being emulated. Follow-on sales induce firms to
give preferential treatment to these lead consumers, which reinforces their learning.
Chapter Three extends the standard random search environment in which each agent
collects information only through personal experience by introducing observability of other
agents’ actions. While agents naturally have an incentive to learn from other players actions,
information transmission is not considered in most random search models. The models that
do consider social learning are usually restricted to environments in which agents make
one-time choices (see e.g. Banerjee (1992) or Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)).14 The main
contribution to the social learning literature is the introduction of consumer heterogeneity
and the firms’ ability to interact strategically. Consumer heterogeneity allows us to analyze
who obtains the leadership role in the market, and the firms’ decisions provide an important
feedback in the learning process. We show that the decisions of the firms and endogenous
leadership status interact in an important manner.15
14Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) analyze repeat purchases in a boundedly rational setting. Their decision
rule is such that the model can be reinterpreted as a setting in which agents only consume once when born,
and newborn uninformed consumers enter the market with some private knowledge of one firm.
15Chapter One and two abstract from heterogeneities in order to isolate the effect of frictions on dispersion
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Before moving to the main body of this treatise, a brief word on the use of the first person
plural may be in order. Chapter One has been developed in collaboration with Manolis
Galenianos, while Chapter Three owes to the collaboration with Andrew Postlewaite.16 The
use of the plural in the second chapter and in the Introduction are due to the well-published
advice by Thomson (1999, p. 180) to use this form even for single-authored publications in
economic theory.
The next three chapters each present one idea as a self-contained unit.
and efficiency. Chapter Three introduces heterogeneities because they importantly interact with the social
learning aspect.
16The joint work with Manolis Galenianos has been presented and circulated under the title “Directed
Search with Multiple Job Applications”. The joint work with Andrew Postlewaite has been presented and
circulated under the titles “Why do the rich get more for what they pay?” and “Why are the wealthy treated
so well?”.
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Chapter 1
Directed Search with Multiple Job
Applications
“What accounts for pay differentials among workers” is a classic question in economics.
Empirical research has documented that a large part of wage variation cannot be explained
by productivity differences. For instance, Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) find that
observable worker characteristics can explain only 30% of wage differentials. Controlling for
firm characteristics or unobserved worker heterogeneity helps account for part of the other
70 percent, but a substantial residual remains, suggesting that a model with search frictions
might be a useful way to think about this issue.1
Prominent examples of random search models that generate equilibrium wage dispersion
include Burdett and Judd (1983), Albrecht and Axell (1984), and Burdett and Mortensen
(1998).2 We propose a new model of wage dispersion with homogeneous workers and firms,
based not on random but on directed search, and one additional feature that we think is
1Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) can account for about half of the residual variation when control-
ling for unobserved worker heterogeneity. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) estimate a model with observed
and unobserved worker heterogeneity as well as productivity heterogeneity in firms and conclude that “the
contribution of market imperfections to wage dispersion is typically around 50 [percent].” In a similar exer-
cise, van den Berg and Ridder (1998) report that “search frictions explain about 20 [percent] of the variation
in observable wage offers.”
2Note that in the introduction of this thesis we classified some papers as (partially) random or (partially)
directed. For the purpose of separating clearly the forces that come from any form randomness, we stick
with the first convention and will omit the qualifier as all models considered here that are not completely
directed but feature wage dispersion are partially random.
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an important characteristic of the search process: job seekers can apply for several jobs at
the same time. In random search models, workers looking for employment do not know the
wages offered by different firms. In directed search they observe the wages posted by all
firms before deciding where to apply. However, they do not know how many other workers
apply to the same firm and, since firms have a limited number of vacancies, they may get
rationed. Nevertheless, the equilibria of these models are usually constrained efficient.3
So far, most research in the area has focused on workers applying for one job at a time, which
results in a unique equilibrium with a single wage (at least when agents are homogeneous).
In this paper, workers apply for N jobs simultaneously, which yields very different results.
Despite the assumption of homogeneity, all equilibria exhibit wage dispersion. Even though
workers are risk neutral, they care about the probability of success of each job application
because their payoffs only depend on the most attractive offer they receive. The resulting
portfolio choice problem is the driving force for dispersion. Furthermore, equilibria are
not constrained efficient. Two predictions of our model, that are consistent with stylized
facts, are of particular interest since they are not typically found in random search models:
the density of posted wages is declining,4 and firms that post higher wages receive more
applicants on average.5 It is worth emphasizing that these results are not due to comlex
modelling assumptions, but obtain for a simple and intuitive view of the labor market:
Firms compete for labor by publicly announcing their wage, and workers then decide to
which firms to apply.
The intuition behind the main result of dispersion is quite straightforward. A worker faces
a portfolio choice problem when deciding where to send each of his N applications, since
the probability of getting a job is different at different wage levels. This occurs because
higher paying firms attract more applicants on average and hence an application to such
a firm succeeds with lower probability. Loosely speaking, a worker’s optimal strategy is
3One of the reasons why models of directed search have become more popular is that they provide a more
explicit explanation of the matching process and wage determination than random search models. Rogerson,
Shimer, and Wright (2005) discuss this point in their recent survey of search-theoretic labor models.
4In contrast, the Burdett-Mortensen model delivers a wage density that is upward sloping. While this
can be fixed by extending the framework, it is often said to be a failing of the basic model (see Mortensen
(2003)).
5Holzer, Katz, and Kruger (1991) provide evidence for this point. Note that in random search models
firms cannot influence the inflow of workers since their wage is not observed until after they meet a worker.
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to apply to jobs that offer different levels of risk and payoff. Some applications are sent
to ‘safe’ wages that guarantee a high probability of getting a job, but for low pay. Since
this provides insurance, it is optimal to take on more risk with the other applications. As
a result, he also applies to firms where the probability of getting the job is lower but the
potential payoff is high.
The willingness of workers to send each application to a separate wage level creates an
incentive for firms to post different wages. It turns out that in any equilibrium exactly
N wages are posted, and every worker applies once to each distinct wage. From the firms’
perspective, the lower margins of high wages are balanced with a higher probability of filling
a vacancy, leading to the same expected profits. It is important to reiterate, however, that
this intuition fails in the single application case. The incentive for firms to post different
wages arises only because every worker applies to multiple jobs.
Well-known papers on directed search include Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), Shimer
(1996, 2005), Moen (1997), Julien, Kennes, and King (2000), Burdett, Shi, and Wright
(2001) and Shi (2002). Delacroix and Shi (forthcoming) develop a directed search model
with on-the-job search, which shares some features with our model since employed workers
can take on more risk when looking for jobs. Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (forthcoming)
is the only other directed search paper where workers apply to multiple jobs simultaneously.
The authors make different assumptions and they reach very different results as will be
discussed in the conclusions.6 Chade and Smith (2005) solve a portfolio choice problem
that is similar to ours, but in a very different partial equilibrium context.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model, states the
main theorem, and proves a straightforward initial result. Section 3 discusses the special
case of two applications, which provides many of the important insights. The following
section extends the results to an arbitrary (but finite) number of applications. Section 5
evaluates the efficiency of the equilibrium and the empirical distribution of wages. Section 6
introduces important but straightforward extensions such as free entry, endogenous choice of
the number of applications, and a dynamic labor setting. Section 7 compares the distribution
of wages that results from random and directed search and section 8 concludes.
6The basic difference is that, in this paper, firms commit to the wages they post, while Albrecht, Gautier,
and Vroman (forthcoming) assume that firms making job offers to the same worker engage in Bertrand
competition.
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1.1 The Model
In this section we introduce the main features of the model, and define outcomes, payoffs,
and equilibrium. At the end we state the main theorem and prove a preliminary result.
1.1.1 Environment and Strategies
There are continua of measure b workers and measure 1 firms with one vacancy each. All
workers and all firms are identical, risk neutral, and they produce one unit when matched
and zero otherwise. The utility of an employed worker is equal to his wage and the profits of
a firm that employs a worker at wage w are given by 1−w. The matching process has four
distinct stages. Firms start by posting (and committing to) wages. Then, workers observe
all postings and send out N applications. Firms follow by making a job offer to one of
the applicants they have received, if any. Last, workers that get one or more offers choose
which job to accept. If a firm’s chosen applicant rejects the job offer then the firm remains
unmatched.7 Firms therefore compete for workers in two separate stages: they want to
attract at least one applicant in the second stage and they try to keep that applicant in the
last stage; we label these ‘ex ante’ and ‘ex post’ competition, respectively.
As is common in the directed search literature, trading frictions are introduced by focusing
attention on symmetric mixed strategies for workers. The assumption is that, since the
market is large, workers cannot coordinate their search and hence they all use the same
strategy. For simplicity, we also assume that their strategies are anonymous, i.e. all firms
that post the same wage are treated identically by workers. This assumption, however, is
not necessary: it is possible to let workers condition on the firms’ names (say, a real number
in [0,1]) but this would clutter the exposition without changing the results. Last, the firms
also follow anonymous strategies, meaning that they treat all workers the same in the event
that they receive multiple applicants. This is the standard environment in the directed
search literature, such as Peters (1991) or Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), except for the
innocuous assumption of the anonymity of workers’ strategies, and the key difference that
we allow multiple applications.
7Chapter 2 relaxes this assumption and allows the recall of all applicants in the case a firm’s offer is
rejected. Though the matching process is quite different, the unique equilibrium exhibits an N -point distrib-
ution of posted wages suggesting that the qualitative features of our model are robust. However, constrained
efficiency is recovered in chapter 2. See section 1.4.1 for further discussion.
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Before describing the actual strategies, observe that the last two stages of the game can
be solved immediately. In the fourth stage, workers with multiple job offers choose the
highest wage, and randomize with equal probabilities in the case of a tie. In the third stage,
firms with many applicants choose one at random. Therefore we only need to consider
the strategies for the first two stages. A strategy for the firm is a wage w that it posts
in the beginning of the game. Workers observe all the wages and decide where to apply.
Denote the distribution of posted wages by F and note that, due to anonymity, the workers’
strategies can be summarized by the wages to which the applications are sent. Therefore, a
pure strategy for a worker is an N -tuple of wages to which he applies and a mixed strategy
is a randomization over different N -tuples. We denote the workers’ strategy by G(F ), which
is a mapping from the posted wages to the set of all cumulative distribution functions on
[0, 1]N .
1.1.2 Outcomes and Equilibrium
We define q(w) to be the probability that a firm posting w receives at least one application
and ψ(w) to be the conditional probability that a worker who has applied to such a firm
accepts a different job offer (i.e. the probability that the firm does not get the worker).
Let p(w) be the probability that a worker applying to wage w gets an offer and W be the
support of the posted wages (i.e., W ≡ suppF ). When a wage is not posted by any firm
(w /∈ W), we have p(w) = 0. Last, we define the value of an individual application to some
wage w to be p(w) w. Given any N -tuple w = (w1, w2, ..., wN ) chosen by the worker, we
assume without loss of generality that wN ≥ wN−1 ≥ ... ≥ w1 for the remainder of the
paper.
The expected profits of a firm that posts w and the expected utility of a worker who applies
to w are given by
pi(w) = q(w) (1− ψ(w)) (1− w) (1.1)
U(w) = p(wN ) wN + (1− p(wN )) p(wN−1) wN−1
+...+
N∏
i=2
(1− p(wi)) p(w1) w1. (1.2)
The expected profits are equal to the probability that at least one applicant appears times
the retention probability times (1− w). A worker gets utility wN from his highest applica-
tion, which is successful with probability p(wN ). With the complementary probability that
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application fails and with probability p(wN−1) he receives wN−1. And so on.
On W, both p(w) and q(w) depend on the average queue length at w, which is denoted by
λ(w). Intuitively, the queue length is the number of applications divided by the number of
firms at a particular wage rate. Formally it is defined by the integral equation∫ w
0
λ(w˜) dF (w˜) = b Gˆ(w), (1.3)
where Gˆ(w) is the expected number of applications that a single worker sends to wages no
greater than w.8 The right hand side of equation (1.3) gives the number of applications that
are sent up to wage w by all workers, while the left hand side gives the number of firms
that post a wage up to w multiplied by the average number of applications they receive.
When a worker applies for a wage w he randomizes over all firms offering that wage rate
due to anonymity. As a result, the number of applications received by a firm posting w is
random and follows a Poisson distribution with mean λ(w).9 Therefore the probability that
a firm posting w receives at least one application is q(w) = 1 − e−λ(w) and the probability
that a worker who applies to such a firm gets an offer is p(w) = (1 − e−λ(w))/λ(w), where
p(w) = 1 when λ(w) = 0.10
In order to evaluate ψ(w) for some w ∈ W we need to find the probability that, after applying
to w, a worker takes a different job. Let Rj(wj , w−j) be the probability that a worker who
applies to (wj , w−j) accepts the job posting wj if made an offer. This occurs if the worker
has no offer that is strictly higher and if wj is picked in the case of a tie after randomizing.
The indexes of applications can be relabeled so that higher indexes are given preference
when tied. This means that Rj(wj , w−j) =
∏
k>j(1 − p(wk)) and we can integrate over all
possible wages where workers apply to.11 Letting Pr[j|w] be the conditional probability
that a worker who applied to w ∈ W did so with his jth application and Gj(w−j |w) be the
8If Gi(w) is the marginal distribution of wi, then Gˆ(w) =
∑N
i=1Gi(w).
9Suppose that n applications are sent at random to m firms. The number of applications received by a
firm follows a binomial distribution with probability 1/m and sample size n. As n,m→∞ keeping n/m = λ
the distribution converges to a Poisson distribution with mean λ.
10Notice that the anonymity of the worker strategies is not a necessary condition for this point to hold.
Symmetry and optimality clearly imply that firms with the same wage must have the same expected queue
length. Poisson matching follows.
11The relabeling is without loss of generality since the randomization can occur before the applications are
actually sent.
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conditional distribution over the other applications, given that the jth application was sent
to wage w, ψ(w) is given by
ψ(w) = 1−
N∑
j=1
Pr[j|w]
∫
Rj(w,w−j) dGj(w−j |w). (1.4)
So far λ(w) and ψ(w) have been defined for wages on the support of F , meaning that
the workers’ optimization problem can be solved for a given distribution of posted wages.
However, off the equilibrium path payoffs need to be evaluated in order to solve the firms’
problem, and this requires that λ(w) and ψ(w) are well defined on the full domain [0,1].
That is, a firm needs to know the queue length and the retention probability it will face at
any wage. Therefore, although no one is actually applying to wages that are not posted,
the queue lengths at such wages could be positive since they represent how many workers
would apply there if these wage were offered; and similarly for ψ(w). The problem is that
when w /∈ W, λ(w) and ψ(w) are not pinned down by equations (1.3) and (1.4), as both F
and G have zero density at those wages.
To get around this issue we define λ and ψ as if ‘many’ firms post every wage in [0,1] so
that the reaction of workers can be meaningfully evaluated. We introduce a fraction of
noise firms of measure ² that post a wage at random from a full support distribution, F˜ .
Equivalently, one can interpret it as a mistake that firms make with probability ². Given a
candidate F , the distribution of posted wages becomes F²(w) = (1− ²) F (w) + ² F˜ (w) and
the game can be analyzed from the second stage onwards. Let G(F²) denote a best response
of workers to F². The outcomes λ² and ψ² can be calculated in the entire domain [0,1] using
F², G(F²), and equations (1.3) and (1.4). As ²→ 0 the perturbed distribution converges to
F , and we define λ(w) = lim²→0 λ²(w) and ψ(w) = lim²→0 ψ²(w) for all w ∈ [0, 1]. Noise
firms are simply a means to evaluate the profits a firm would obtain when deviating, and
none of our results depend on the exact choice of F˜ .12
12Two different approaches have been taken to solve the same problem in the N = 1 case. The market
utility approach, used in Shimer (1996, 2005), Moen (1997), Acemog˘lu and Shimer (1999), posits that workers
respond to deviations by firms so that they are indifferent between applying anywhere. In our framework this
approach yields identical result, but it is less appealing due to the complexity of specifying indifferences over
sets of wages. Peters (2000) and Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001), on the other hand, solve for the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium of the finite model and then take the limit of that equilibrium as the number of
agents goes to infinity. While arguably the correct (or most reasonable) approach, with multiple applications
this is intractable because the probability of success of each application is correlated (see Albrecht, Gautier,
Tan, and Vroman (2004)).
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Last, we should note that the refinement described above is not the trembling hand equilib-
rium refinement since we do not take the limit of equilibria of perturbed games. However,
we prove at the end of the next section that the equilibria we find are indeed trembling hand
perfect (or, the equivalent in a continuum economy). The reason we do not work directly
with that, more common, refinement is that characterizing a perturbed equilibrium involves
some complicated technicalities that do not add to the exposition and are hence relegated
to the appendix.
We can now define an equilibrium, given a distribution with full support F˜ .
Definition 1 An equilibrium is a set of strategies {F,G} such that
1. pi(w) ≥ pi(w′) for all w ∈ W and w′ ∈ [0, 1].
2. U(w) ≥ U(w′) for all w ∈ suppG(F ) and w′ ∈ [0, 1]N .
The first condition captures the profit maximization by firms and the second one ensures
that workers best respond.
We now state the main theorem of this paper.
Theorem 1.1.1 An equilibrium always exists and it is unique when N = 2. N different
wages are posted by firms and every worker sends one application to each distinct wage. The
number of firms that post a given wage is decreasing with the wage. The equilibria are not
constrained efficient.
1.1.3 A Preliminary Result
The next lemma will be useful in the following sections. Let w be the lowest posted wage
that receives some applications with positive probability, i.e. w = inf{w ∈ W|λ(w) > 0}.
Lemma 1 Given any distribution of posted wages, worker optimization implies that λ(w)
is continuous and strictly increasing on (w, 1] ∩W.
Proof: Recall that the probability of getting a job is given by p(w) = (1− e−λ(w))/λ(w) for
w ∈ W. If λ(w) is not strictly increasing there exist w,w′ ∈ W such that w > w′, p(w) ≥
p(w′), and λ(w′) > 0. A worker who applies to w′ with positive probability can profitably
deviate by switching to w since the wage is higher and the probability of getting an offer
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is at least as high. Therefore λ(w) is strictly increasing above any posted wage that has a
positive expected queue length, and hence on (w, 1]∩W. Suppose that λ(w) is discontinuous
at some wˆ ∈ [w, 1]∩W. Then the probability of getting a job offer is also discontinuous at wˆ
and a worker applying in a neighborhood of that wage has an obvious profitable deviation.
QED
The properties described in the lemma are very natural. The expected number of applicants
increases with the wage that a firm posts, which also implies that the probability of getting
an offer for that job is strictly decreasing. λ(w) is continuous because the workers’ best
response to the offered wages ‘smooths out’ any discontinuities of F : even if a positive
measure of firms post a particular wage, the workers respond by sending a positive measure
of their applications to that wage and hence the queue length does not jump. Furthermore,
these results hold for any perturbation and hence they hold for the unperturbed game as
well. This means that the queue length that a firm expects is continuously increasing in the
wage, regardless of whether that wage is posted or not. Last, any noise distribution with
full support leads to monotonicity and continuity which are the main points of the lemma.
1.2 A Special Case: N = 2
We now look at the special case where workers send only two applications which provides
many of the main insights. The case of a general N is discussed in the next section. We start
by solving for the best response of workers given an arbitrary distribution of posted wages.
We then characterize the wages that firms post. Finally, the existence and uniqueness of
equilibrium is proved.
1.2.1 Worker Optimization
We first find the best response of workers for an arbitrary distribution of posted wages.
The posted distribution could be the result of a perturbation but in that case the subscript
² is omitted to keep notation simple. When a worker decides where to apply he faces a
menu of wage and probability pairs from which to choose. The queue length, and hence
the probability of success, is determined by the distribution of posted wages, F , and the
strategy that other workers use to apply for jobs, G(F ). The worker solves
max
(w2,w1)∈[0,1]2
p(w2) w2 + (1− p(w2)) p(w1) w1, (1.5)
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where w2 ≥ w1 by convention. Differentiability of p(w) is not guaranteed so the problem
cannot be solved by taking the first order conditions. We show that we can separately eval-
uate the low wage application and then solve for the high wage application even though this
is still a simultaneous choice problem. That is, the problem admits a convenient recursive
solution.
The low wage application is exercised only if w2 fails, which means that the optimal choice
for w1 has to solve
max
w∈[0,1]
p(w) w. (1.6)
Let u1 denote this maximum value. Given that a worker sends his low wage application to a
particular w1 that solves (1.6), his optimal choice for the high wage application is a solution
to
max
w≥w1
p(w) w + (1− p(w)) u1. (1.7)
Let u2 denote the highest utility a worker can receive when sending two applications. Since
every worker optimizes, all wages receiving low applications offer the same value u1, and all
pairs of wages where workers apply give the same total utility u2.13 Furthermore, no one
applies to wages below u1 because the value of these openings is too low.
The next step is to show that the two problems can actually be solved independently of
each other. Let w¯ be the highest wage that offers u1, i.e. w¯ = max{w ∈ W|p(w) w = u1}.14
The first proposition follows.
Proposition 1 Given any distribution of posted wages, workers optimize only if w1 ≤ w¯ ≤
w2 holds for every pair (w1, w2) where they apply.
Proof: Suppose this is not true. Since w1 ≤ w2 the only other possibilities are w¯ < w1 or
w2 < w¯. By construction w1 > w¯ implies that p(w1) w1 < u1 which cannot be optimal. If
w2 < w¯ then a worker can deviate and send his high wage application to w¯ instead of w2.
This deviation is profitable because
p(w¯) w¯ + (1− p(w¯)) p(w1) w1 − [p(w2) w2 + (1− p(w2)) p(w1) w1] =
[p(w¯) w¯ − p(w2) w2] + [p(w2)− p(w¯)] p(w1) w1 > 0. (1.8)
13It is not hard to see that a pair of wages is a solution to (1.5) if and only if it solves (1.6) and (1.7).
14The maximum is well defined since λ(w) is continuous and W is a closed set.
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The first term of (1.8) is non-negative since w¯ provides the highest possible value by defin-
ition. The second term is strictly positive because w¯ > w2 ⇒ p(w¯) < p(w2), by lemma 1.
QED
This result has several implications. The workers are indifferent about which combination
of posted wages they apply to as long as they are on opposite sides of w¯. As a result, all
wages below w¯ (and above u1) offer the same value, u1, since every worker sends his low
application there; similarly, all wages above w¯ offer u2 when paired with a low wage. These
results hold for any perturbed distribution of wages and hence they hold in the limit as
² → 0. Recalling that λ(w) is continuous in w and that p(w) = (1 − e−λ(w))/λ(w), the
following conditions uniquely define the queue length:15
p(w) w = u1, ∀ w ∈ [u1, w¯] (1.9)
p(w) w + (1− p(w)) u1 = u2, ∀ w ∈ [w¯, 1]. (1.10)
These observations are illustrated in figure 1.1. The high indifference curve, IC-H, traces
the wage and queue length pairs where workers are willing to send a high wage application,
while IC-L is the indifference curve for the low wage applications. The two curves intersect
at w¯ where workers are indifferent about whether they apply with a ‘high’ or a ‘low’ appli-
cation. The equilibrium queue length for any wage is given by the upper envelope of the
two indifference curves: if λ(w) is any lower at some wage w, then workers at other wages
could apply to w and move to a higher indifference curve (note that utility increases in the
southeast direction). In other words, the queue length is ‘bid up’ to IC-H for w > w¯ and
IC-L for w < w¯. Hence the dashed line is the indifference curve that firms anticipate.
Note that while the total utility of any pair of wages is always equal to u2, wages that are
strictly above w¯ give value that is strictly lower than u1. Workers nevertheless apply there
which may appear to be counterintuitive at first sight: if a worker can apply to wages that
offer value u1, why would he choose some wage with a strictly lower individual value? The
answer is that the return to failure in the high wage application is not zero: it is equal
to the value that the next application brings in, as can be seen in equation (1.10). As a
result, when the worker chooses where to send his high wage application he faces a tradeoff
between the value that he can get from that particular application and the probability of
15We previously assumed that p(w) = 0 for w /∈ W. Here we are implicitly defining p(w) = (1 −
e−λ(w))/λ(w) for all w, which simplifies the notation of the firm’s problem and does not change the workers’
behavior since workers are indifferent between wages under this specification.
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IC-H: p(w) w+ (1-p(w)) u1 = u2
IC-L: p(w) w = u1
Figure 1.1: Workers’ application behavior. IC-H and IC-L are the workers’ indifference curves for ‘high’ and
‘low’ applications. Linearity is only used for illustration.
exercising his fallback option, i.e. the low wage application. Since the low wage provides
with insurance against the possible failure of w2, it is profitable for the worker to try a
risky application that has high returns conditional on success (i.e., the wage is high) and
also offers a high chance of continuing to the next application. Therefore, the low wage
application goes to a relatively ‘safe’ region and the high application is sent to a ‘risky’
part of the wage distribution.16
The next result proves that any equilibrium exhibits wage dispersion.
Proposition 2 There does not exist an equilibrium in which only one wage is posted.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
The main intuition of the proof is straightforward. When a single wage is posted, workers are
indifferent about which firm to work for and hence they randomize when receiving multiple
job offers. A deviant firm that posts a slightly higher wage hires its preferred applicant
16This is an important difference between our paper and other papers on directed search with wage
dispersion in which the value of sending an application is always the same for identical workers. They
restrict attention to one application, which assumes away any active portfolio choice by the worker which
drives our results.
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for sure even when that worker receives other offers (the deviant firm also has a slightly
higher expected queue length). This deviation raises profits since the increase in the hiring
probability is discrete, while the increase in the wage can be arbitrarily small. Note that
it is the ex post competition among firms that precludes the possibility of a single wage
equilibrium.
1.2.2 Characterization of Firm Optimization
We now turn to the analysis of the first stage of the model. We prove that exactly two
wages are posted in equilibrium and we characterize them.
When posting a wage, firms solve
max
w∈[0,1]
q(w) (1− ψ(w)) (1− w), (1.11)
taking the equilibrium objects {w¯, u1, u2} as given. The probability that a firm receives
at least one applicant, q(w), depends on the average queue length according to q(w) =
1−e−λ(w). Whether a wage is above or below the cutoff w¯ determines the type of application
it receives (high or low). This helps evaluate the probability of losing a worker after making
an offer, ψ(w). We label the firms that attract high (low) wage applications as high (low)
wage firms. The next proposition states the result of the maximization which is proved in
the appendix. A discussion follows to provide intuition about the main points.
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, all high wage firms post w¯ and all low wage firms post
wˆ1 ∈ (u1, w¯) which is derived by the first order conditions.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
The reason why all firms of a particular type post the same wage is not surprising: condi-
tional on attracting a particular type of applications, firms compete with each other in the
same way as in the one application case (e.g. Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001)), subject to
some additional boundary conditions. As a result there is a unique solution to each of their
profit maximization problems and two distinct wages are posted, (w∗1, w∗2).
To examine this in some more detail note that workers never reject an offer by a high wage
firm since these firms are the applicants’ best alternative. Therefore ψ(w) = 0 and the
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maximization problem of high wage firms is given by
max
w∈[w¯,1]
[1 − e−λ(w)] (1− w) (1.12)
s.t. p(w) w + (1− p(w)) u1 = u2. (1.13)
When profits are equalized across the two types of firms, the point of tangency between
the isoprofit curve of the high wage firms and the high indifference curve of workers, wˆ2,
always occurs at a wage which is below w¯, as illustrated in figure 1.2. This means that in
any equilibrium the high wage firms would like to post as close to wˆ2 as possible without
moving in the low application area, and therefore they post at their lower boundary and
w∗2 = w¯.
The retention probability of low wage firms can now be calculated. When a low wage firm
makes a job offer, it loses its applicant only if he is successful in his high wage application
which occurs with probability p(w¯). As a result, low wage firms solve
max
w∈[0,w¯]
[1− e−λ(w)] [1 − p(w¯)] (1− w) (1.14)
s.t. p(w) w = u1. (1.15)
Since the retention probability enters the maximization problem as a constant, it has no
marginal effect on the choice of low wage firms. Proposition (2) ensures that in equilibrium
low wage firms cannot be posting w¯. As a result their profit maximizing wage occurs at the
point of tangency between their isoprofit curve and the low indifference curve of workers, i.e.
w∗1 = wˆ1. Last, note that figure 1.2 does not include the retention probability ψ(·) which is
constant but different for the two types, and the difference in ψ(·) allows for equal profits
even though the isoprofit curves do not intersect.
It is now easy to see that the density of posted wages is falling. Each wage receives one
application per worker so λ(w∗i ) = b/di where di is the fraction of firms posting w
∗
i . d1 > d2
follows from the fact that the queue length is increasing with the wage rate. This result is
driven by the fact that workers ‘want’ their high wage application to be risky (or, the queue
length to be high). If this is not the case, a worker would be better off by not applying to
the low wage and instead sending both applications to the high wage.
1.2.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
Turning to the existence of equilibrium, we need to find the ‘correct’ fraction of firms to post
each wage so that profits are equalized across types of firms. More formally, an equilibrium
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Figure 1.2: Firms’ equilibrium behavior. IP-H and IP-L are the isoprofit curves for high and low wage firms.
exists if there is {d1, d2} such that d1+ d2 = 1 and there is no profitable deviation when w∗i
is posted by di firms. Furthermore, the equilibrium is unique when there is a single pair of
di’s that satisfies the two conditions above.
Proposition 4 An equilibrium exists and it is unique.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
At this point it should be remarked that the full support of F˜ is the only property of the
trembling distribution that is used in solving the model. As a result, the unique equilib-
rium that was constructed survives any choice of F˜ . Furthermore, using the trebling hand
refinement leads to the identical equilibrium set, as the following proposition proves.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium is the unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium of this
game.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
1.3 The General Case: N ≥ 2
We turn to the model with a general N . The analysis mirrors the one of section 3 and we
prove that all results generalize, except for uniqueness. We provide computational evidence
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for uniqueness at the end of the section. Figure 1.3 illustrates the distribution of posted
and received wages for an economy with equal number of workers and firms and N = 15.
Properties of the distribution of received wages are discussed in the next section.
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Figure 1.3: Equilibrium wage dispersion for N = 15 and b = 1.
1.3.1 Worker Optimization
Let Wi be the support of wi for all i, i.e. Wi is the set of wages that receive the ith
application of workers. As before, the utility of the lowest i applications has to be the same
in any N -tuple of wages which defines the following recursive relationship
ui = p(wi) wi + (1− p(wi)) ui−1, ∀ wi ∈ Wi, i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}, (1.16)
where u0 ≡ 0. Note that ui > ui−1 since wi ≥ wi−1. Moreover, ui is the highest possible
utility a worker can get from i applications when his fallback option is ui−1. Let w¯i be the
highest wage that provides with total utility equal to ui when the fallback option is ui−1, i.e
w¯i = max{w|p(w) w + (1− p(w)) ui−1 = ui}. Also, let w¯0 be the lowest wage that receives
applications with positive probability. We now generalize proposition (1).
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Proposition 6 When workers send N applications optimally, w ∈ Wi implies that w ∈
[w¯i−1, w¯i] for i ∈ {1, 2, ...N}.
Proof: The proof is by induction. It is sufficient to show that the following property holds
for all i: w < w¯i ⇒ w /∈ Wk for k ≥ i + 1. The initial step for i = 1 was proved in the
previous section, where w¯1 = w¯. We assume that the property holds for i−1 and show that
a contradiction is reached if it does not hold for i. In other words, if w < w¯i−1 ⇒ w ∈ Wi−1
holds, then there is no w˜ ∈ Wi+1 such that w˜ < w¯i (if w˜ ∈ Wk for k > i + 1 the same
argument goes through). Define v(w, ui−1) = p(w) w + (1− p(w)) ui−1 to be the utility of
applying to a particular wage w when the fallback option is ui−1. We want to show that
v(w¯i, ui) > v(w˜, ui) for all w˜ < w¯i. Note that
v(w˜, ui−1) = p(w˜) w˜ + (1− p(w˜)) ui−1
≤ p(w¯i) w¯i + (1− p(w¯i)) ui−1 = v(w¯i, ui−1),
since the second line is the optimal choice when ui−1 is the fallback option and hence it
provides with the maximum level of utility. Replacing ui−1 with ui in both lines above we
get the terms to be compared. Since w¯i > w˜ ⇒ (1 − p(w¯i)) > (1 − p(w˜)) the second term
increases by more and the inequality becomes strict which proves the result. QED
An implication of the proposition is that when a worker applies to a firm of type i he receives
the posted wage w if he is successful in his application or ui−1 if he is unsuccessful. Therefore
the queue lengths facing the firms attracting the ith application are given by the following
equation:
p(w) w + (1− p(w)) ui−1 = ui, ∀ w ∈ [w¯i−1, w¯i] (1.17)
which is a straight generalization of equations (1.9) and (1.10).
1.3.2 Firm Optimization
We now turn to the first stage of the model. For the remainder of the paper firms that
receive the ith lowest application of workers are referred to as type i firms. The profit
maximization problem of each type of firm is solved and profits are then equalized across
types.
When posting a wage, firms take as given the cutoffs {w¯k}Nk=0 and the equilibrium utility lev-
els {uk}Nk=1, which determine the utility provided to workers for their lowest k applications.
29
A firm of type i solves the following profit maximization problem:
max
w∈[w¯i−1,w¯i]
q(w) [1− ψ(w)] (1− w), (1.18)
where the queue lengths are determined by equations (1.17).
Proposition 7 In equilibrium, all type i firms post the same wage w∗i = w¯i−1 for i ≥ 2.
All type 1 firms post wˆ1 which it is determined by the first order conditions.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
The logic of the proof is similar to the one of proposition (3). The solution to the problem of
type N firms is shown to be w¯N−1. This means that ψ(w) = p(w¯N−1) for type N − 1 firms
and the solution to their profit maximizing problem is w¯N−2. This implies that ψ(w) =
(1 − p(w¯N−1)) (1 − p(w¯N−2)) for type N − 3 firms and so on. In general, the retention
probability of a type i firms is 1 − ψ(w) = ∏Nn=i+1(1 − p(w∗n)) ≡ 1 − ψi. Given ψi, the
maximization problem for a type i firm becomes
max
w∈[w¯i−1,w¯i]
q(w) (1 − ψi) (1− w) (1.19)
s.t. p(w) w + (1 − p(w)) ui−1 = ui, (1.20)
and the solution lies at the lower boundary for all i ≥ 2. Finally, it should be noted that
the density of posted wages is falling for the same reasons as in section 3.
1.3.3 Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium
The next proposition establishes the existence of an equilibrium. We then provide some
computational evidence for uniqueness. As in the previous section, we show that there is a
sequence {d1, d2, ..., dN} such that d1+d2+ ...+dN = 1 and there is no profitable deviation
when wage w∗i is posted by exactly di firms.
Proposition 8 An equilibrium exists for any N .
Proof: See the appendix. QED
While existence of an equilibrium is assured, uniqueness is not. In particular, there may be
more than one sequence of dis that satisfies the above conditions. In the event of multiplicity,
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all equilibria have the same qualitative characteristics (e.g. d1 > d2 > ... > dN ) but the
actual wages that are posted are different.
To perform the computational exercise that gives evidence of uniqueness we need some
additional notation. Given an arbitrary number of type one firms d1 and some worker-firm
ratio b, we can find unique d2, d3,..., dn such that profits between firms is equalized when di
firms offer wage wi. For consistency, these fractions have to add to one in any equilibrium.
That is, the sum Sb(d1) := d1 + d2 + ...+ dN has to equal one. Multiplicity can only occur
if there exists d′1 6= d1 with Sb(d1) = Sb(d′1) = 1. Clearly, if the sum Sb(d1) is strictly
increasing in d1, such a multiplicity is not possible. What might be more surprising is the
fact that Sb(d1) is strictly increasing implies also that Sb′(d1) is strictly increasing for any
b′ > 0, i.e. for any market tightness the equilibrium is unique. Based on this we can show
Lemma 2 The equilibrium is unique for any b > 0 if Sb∗(d1) is strictly increasing in d1 for
some b∗.
Proof: See the appendix. Q.E.D.
Figure 1.4 shows that Sb(d1) is strictly increasing for b = 1 under various N . Graphs for
other N look similar, which suggests that the equilibrium is unique.
1.4 Further Equilibrium Properties
In this section we investigate the efficiency properties of the matching process and the
empirical distribution implied by the model.
1.4.1 Efficiency
The criterion for constrained efficiency is whether the output (equivalently, the number of
matches) is maximized conditional on the matching frictions, given the worker-firm ratio b.
The main result is that constrained efficiency does not obtain.
To maximize the number of matches it is convenient to look at the probability that a worker
finds a job.17 It was shown in the earlier sections that in equilibrium workers send each
17Alternatively we could calculate the probability that a firm hires. This is somewhat more complicated
though, because there are two different ways for the firm to remain vacant: it may receive no applications or
its chosen applicant may accept a different job. This is also the reason why we cannot apply standard proofs
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Figure 1.4: Sum of firms for b = 1 and various N .
of their N applications to a different group of firms, which was identified by its distinct
wage. Since wages are irrelevant for efficiency purposes we label the firms posting wi as
group i. Also, we simplify notation by having pi = p(wi) and λi = λ(wi) = b/di. Letting
d = (d1, d2, ..., dN ) be the vector of the fraction of firms within each group, the total number
of matches is given by b m(d) where m(d) ≡ 1 −∏Ni=1 (1 − pi) is the probability that a
particular worker receives a job offer. The planner has to decide how many firms to allocate
to each group in order to maximize output or, equivalently, to maximize m(d).
An immediate necessary condition for optimality (which fails) is that the probability of a
match cannot be increased by reallocating firms between any two groups. This condition
follows directly from observing that m(d) = 1− (1− pk) (1− pl)
∏
i6=k,l (1− pi), given any
two groups of firms, k and l. Therefore, an equilibrium is constrained efficient only if dk
and dl minimize (1− pk) (1− pl), which is equivalent to
max
dk,dl≥0
(pk + pl − pk pl) (1.21)
s.t. dk + dl = 1−
∑
i6=k,l
di.
that rely on minimizing the number of firms that do not receive applications as this neglects the second
aspect.
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This problem is identical to the case of two applications where the worker-firm ratio is given
by b/(1 −∑i6=k,l di). Therefore, we consider the N = 2 case for an arbitrary b, letting d
be the fraction of firms in the first group and 1− d the fraction in the second group. The
planner has to decide the optimal value of d.
Proposition 9 When N = 2 the number of matches is maximized only if d = 1/2 or
d ∈ {0, 1}.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
The proposition shows that it may be optimal for workers to send only one application
due to congestion. In that event the planner’s solution is to place all firms in one group
(d ∈ {0, 1}). If it is optimal to send two applications, then the number of firms should be
equal in both groups. As a result, all groups should have equal size when N applications
are sent. However, we know that in equilibrium the number of firms posting the lower
wages is larger and hence this efficiency condition is never met. Moreover, since the lack of
efficiency arises from the matching process it carries over even if the number of applications
is endogenized or if the ratio of workers to firms is determined by free entry subject to a
fixed cost.
It is worthwhile to mention that efficiency does obtain in the usual directed search environ-
ment with one application. The reason is that firms can price the arrival rate (in essence,
the queue length) of workers through the wages they post.18 When workers send multiple
applications firms care about the probability of retaining a worker, as well as the arrival rate
of applicants. The arrival rate can still be priced using the posted wage, but the probability
of retaining a worker does not depend on how many applications a firm has received: if
a firm’s chosen applicant has a better offer, the firm remains idle regardless of how many
other workers it attracted. Therefore, the arrival rate of applicants does not change the
probability of hiring at the second stage, once at least one worker has applied. Since the
firm can only influence the arrival rate of workers but not the retention probability, it cannot
fully price its hiring probability and hence efficiency does not obtain.
In preview of chapter 2 we already note that constrained efficiency is restored when firms can
recall all the applicants they receive, in an otherwise similar model. In that environment,
18See Mortensen and Wright (2002) for a discussion.
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the second phase of the hiring process also depends on the queue length since a firm can offer
the job to all the applicants it receives, until one of them accepts (or all of them reject it).
Nevertheless, if firms can only recall up to a certain (finite) number of applicants, the queue
length will only partially influence the retention probability. Hence it is our conjecture that
efficiency fails when recall is imperfect. Therefore, we believe that our inefficiency result
can be seen as a general feature of limited recall.
1.4.2 The Empirical Distribution
As already noted, the density of posted wages is decreasing. The density of received wages,
however, need not be decreasing as higher wages are accepted more often. The following
proposition summarizes our findings.
Proposition 10 The distribution of accepted wages is decreasing when the ratio of workers
to firms is large enough.
Proof: See the appendix. QED
1.5 Extensions
The main insights developed above carry over when we allow for free entry, for endogenous
decisions concerning the number of applications, and for a dynamic labor market interaction.
This section discusses each case in turn.
1.5.1 Free Entry
Consider a large number of potential firms, each of which can pay a fixed cost K < 1
to enter the labor market. The number of applications that each worker sends is fixed
at N . Let Π(b) denote the equilibrium profits of firms when the worker-firm ratio is b.
If there are multiple equilibria, this object is a correspondence. It is easy to see that
limb→∞Π(b) = 1, limb→0Π(b) = 0, and that Π(b) is continuous in its argument (or, upper-
hemicontinuous if it is a correspondence). Therefore, there is some b∗ > 0 such that the
equilibrium profits are exactly equal toK. When the equilibrium is unique, b∗ is also unique.
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1.5.2 Endogenous Number of Applications
We introduce a cost per application c and endogenize the number of applications that a
worker sends. As earlier, attention is restricted to symmetric equilibria where every worker
sends the same number of applications in expectation. Two separate issues are investigated.
First, it is shown that the equilibria described in the previous sections are robust to the
introduction of application costs. We then discuss the equilibria that can arise for an
arbitrary value of c.
To analyze the first issue, recall that ui is the maximum payoff a worker receives when
applying i times. To determine the marginal benefit of the ith application note that in
equilibrium for i ≥ 2
ui = pi w∗i + (1− pi) ui−1 (1.22)
ui−1 = pi w∗i + (1− pi) ui−2, (1.23)
where the first expression holds by the definition of ui and the second holds because w∗i =
w¯i−1 and hence w∗i ∈ Wi−1. Subtracting (1.23) from (1.22), the marginal benefit of the ith
application is given by ui − ui−1 = (1 − pi) (ui−1 − ui−2) =
∏i
j=2(1 − pj) u1. Clearly, the
marginal benefit of an additional application is decreasing in i and therefore uN−uN−1 > c is
a sufficient condition for workers to send at least N applications. Moreover, since uN−uN−1
is strictly positive, the equilibrium does not unravel with the introduction of small costs of
search.19
The next step is to ensure that no worker applies more than N times. It is easy to see that
a worker who contemplates sending N + 1 applications will send his additional application
to the highest wage, w∗N . His utility from applying N + 1 times is therefore given by
uN+1 = pN w∗N+(1−pN ) uN which means that the marginal benefit of the extra application
is uN+1 − uN = (1 − pN ) (uN − uN−1). As a result, if that quantity is lower than c the
worker sends at most N applications. Summing up, an equilibrium where workers apply
exactly N times can be supported when the cost parameter lies in the set [(1− pN ) (uN −
uN−1), uN − uN−1].
We now turn to the case of determiningN for an arbitrary c. One possibility is that all work-
ers send the same number of applications and they have no incentive to deviate. However,
it is also possible that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in the number of applications
19This is not the case in other labor models, e.g. Albrecht and Axell (1984).
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that workers send. In particular, a worker may prefer to send N + 1 applications when all
other workers apply N times, while preferring to send N applications when everyone applies
N+1 times. As a result, an equilibrium in the (now endogenous) number of applications has
to involve some randomization in the number of applications: some proportion of workers
α applies N + 1 times while the rest only apply N times, where α is chosen so that both
types of workers receive the same ex ante utility.20 It is worth noting that an equilibrium
where workers randomize over how many times to apply looks very much like the one we
have already developed. N +1 wages are posted and it is only the workers who send N +1
applications that apply to the highest wage, w∗N+1. The characterization of equilibria is
identical to the previous sections, except for the fact the possibility that the highest wage
does not lie on the lower constraint. Numerical simulations suggest that an equilibrium can
be supported for any possible cost per application, though there may be multiplicity.
1.5.3 The Dynamic Version
So far we assumed that workers and firms that are not matched remain idle. We now show
that the analysis can be generalized to an infinite horizon dynamic setting where agents that
remain unmatched can try to match again in the following period. The labor market opens
every period with firms posting wages and workers sending N applications. We restrict
attention to stationary strategies so that only N and b matter in each period. Matching
proceeds as in the static model and the agents that are matched leave the market. In the
beginning of every period, matches formed earlier are exogenously dissolved with probability
δ and the agents reenter the market. If a job survives, the surplus is split according to the
wage with which the match was consummated. Workers and firms have a common discount
factor β. The total number of workers is fixed and there is free entry of firms at cost K,
which determines the worker-firm ratio every period. We are interested in steady state
equilibria where the number of, and value to, unmatched agents remains constant from
period to period.
Let W (w) be the value to a worker of being employed at wage w and let L be the value of
being unemployed. Furthermore, let J(w) be the value to a firm of employing a worker at
w and let V be the value of a vacancy. The value of a match at w for workers and firms,
20It is relatively straightforward to show that the number of applications that workers send in equilibrium
can only be one apart. This is due to the decreasing returns of additional applications.
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respectively, is then given by
W (w) = w + β [(1− δ) W (w) + δ L] (1.24)
J(w) = 1− w + β [(1− δ) J(w) + δ V ], (1.25)
where it is now straightforward to solve for W (w) and J(w) as a function of the values of
being unmatched, L and V .
To determine L and V we need to consider the maximization problem of workers and firms
that are unmatched at the start of the period. This is similar to the static case, except
for the fact that if they do not match they can try again in the following period. Abusing
notation a little, the value to a worker of applying to w and to a firm of posting w is
L(w) = p(wN ) W (wN ) + (1− p(wN )) W (wN−1) + ...
+
N∏
i=2
(1− p(wi)) p(w1) W (w1) +
N∏
i=1
(1− p(wi)) β L (1.26)
V (w) = q(w) (1− ψ(w)) J(w) + [1− q(w) (1− ψ(w))] V −K, (1.27)
where L(w) = L for all N -tuples w where workers apply and V (w) = V for all w posted by
firms. Note that next period’s values are the same to the current ones due to stationarity.
Combining the two sets of equations and noting that free entry implies V = 0 we get
L(w) =
1
κ
{p(wN ) wN + ...+
N∏
i=2
(1− p(wi)) p(w1) w1
+[δ + (1− δ) (1− β)
N∏
i=1
(1− p(wi))] β L}
V (w) =
1
κ
q(w) (1− ψ(w)) (1− w),
where κ = 1 − β (1 − δ). This problem is the same as in the static environment, with the
exception that the workers have a strictly positive outside option if all of their applications
fail. It is therefore easy to prove that all the characterization results of the previous sections
hold and that existence is guaranteed when taking into account the (endogenous) outside
option of workers. Last, the equilibrium ratio of workers to firms in the unmatched market
is pinned down by the restriction on stationary environments.
1.6 Directed vs. Random Search
We have established that the density of posted wages is downward sloping, and the density
of accepted wages shares this feature under certain parameter restrictions. In this section
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we argue that the directedness of the application process is crucial for this result. Directed
search breaks the tight link between the profit margin and the distribution of wages which
is what leads to an increasing wage profile in random search models. We use a random
search version of our model to illustrate this point, though a similar argument can be made
for other random search models such as Burdett and Mortensen (1998), Burdett and Judd
(1983) and the basic version of Acemog˘lu and Shimer (2000).
Consider a version of the model where search is random rather than directed. Firms post
wages but they cannot communicate them to workers. Therefore, workers apply to N firms
at random, firms choose one applicant to make a job offer at the posted wage, and workers
with multiple offers choose which job to accept. In other words, there is ex post but not
ex ante competition among firms. This environment is examined in Gautier and Moraga-
Gonza´les (2005) and it leads to wage dispersion, since posting a higher wage results in hiring
a worker who has additional offers with greater probability.
Denote the probability that a worker gets an offer by p¯, and the probability that a firm has
at least one applicant by q¯. Note that since the arrival rate of workers is independent of the
posted wage, these outcomes do not depend on the wage but only on b.
Let F be the distribution of posted wages and first consider the N = 2 case. The probability
that a firm hires a worker is given by q¯ [1− p¯+ p¯ F (w)]. The first term is the probability that
at least one worker applies, while the second term is the probability that this worker has
no other offer or his other offer is for a lower wage. Equal profits imply that the following
condition has to hold for all w ∈ suppF :
q¯ (1− p¯+ p¯ F (w)) (1− w) = Π
⇔ q¯ (1− p¯+ p¯ F (w)) = Π
1− w,
where 1− w is the margin of the firm and Π denotes the equilibrium level of profits. Note
that Π/(1−w) is a strictly convex function of w and that F (w) is the only non-constant on
the left hand side of the equation above. As a result, equal profits imply that the distribution
of posted wages has to be strictly convex.
The intuition behind this result is that when moving upwards on the support of F , the
percentage decrease in the margin becomes larger at an increasing rate. For profits to remain
constant, this requires an equivalent increase in the probability of hiring. In a random search
environment, a higher wage firm increases its hiring probability only by getting more workers
who might have different offers, i.e. only the ex post competition margin improves. This
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means that, when moving to the top of the distribution, a firm needs to ‘overtake’ an
increasing number of competing firms or, in other words, the distribution of wages needs to
be convex. The same reasoning holds for arbitrary N , in which case the profits are given by
q¯ (1− p¯− p¯ F (w))N−1 (1− w) (see Gautier and Moraga-Gonza´les (2005)).
Figure 1.5 shows the wage density under random search for N = 15 and equal number of
workers and firms, which allows a comparison with figure 1.3 for directed search.
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Figure 1.5: Wage densities with random search, for N = 15 and b = 1.
In a directed search environment a decreasing wage profile is possible due to the presence of
ex ante competition: the ability of firms to attract more applicants by posting a higher wage
gives an additional channel through which they increase the probability of hiring. Therefore,
high wage firms need not ‘overtake’ as many of their competitors to guarantee equal profits.
1.7 Conclusion of Chapter 1
We develop a directed search model where workers apply simultaneously for N jobs. We
show existence, prove uniqueness for the case of N = 2 and present computational evidence
suggesting that the equilibrium is unique for any N . All equilibria exhibit wage dispersion,
with firms posting N different wages and workers sending one application to each distinct
wage. The main distinguishing feature of our model is that dispersion is driven by the
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portfolio choice that workers face. The matching process is a source of inefficiency because
the higher paying firms enjoy higher probability of hiring a worker.
This model delivers some potentially testable predictions. In line with stylized facts, the
density of posted wages is decreasing, as does the density of received wages for suitable
parameter values. Firms that post high wages receive more applications per vacancy than
lower-wage firms. When a firm offers its position to an applicant, the applicant does not
necessarily accept, but higher wage offers are accepted with greater probability. While
the aspect of wage dispersion has been repeatedly examined in the literature, the last two
implications have not received much attention.
To our knowledge, the only other directed search model where workers can simultaneously
apply for multiple jobs is Albrecht, Gautier, and Vroman (forthcoming). Their set-up is
similar to ours, except for a crucial assumption: in their model, when two or more firms make
an offer to the same applicant the potential employers engage in Bertrand competition for the
worker and hence he ends up receiving the full surplus of the match. The unique equilibrium
has all firms posting the reservation value of workers, with some workers receiving their
marginal product due to Bertrand competition, regardless of the number of applications
that workers send. The low offered wage arises because a high wage is costly if the worker
only has a single offer, but it does not yield any advantage if the worker receives multiple
offers. For the worker it is not that important to achieve a high paying job, but to achieve
two jobs.
In our model firms commit to their wage posting. Therefore a higher wage yields an advan-
tage even if the worker gets multiple offers, as long as the other offers are lower. Also, the
worker cannot secure a high wage by applying to two low wage jobs. While ex-post bidding
clearly arises in some markets, we think that our assumption of wage posting captures the
operation of many real life labor markets well. In many situations Bertrand competition
may not even be feasible. If alternative offers are hard to verify, workers have an incentive
to invent alternative offers to raise their wage. More importantly, if firms really fear com-
petition, they will attempt to make their offers non-verifiable to other firms to avoid this
kind of Bertrand competition. We therefore pursue the assumption of posting rather than
ex-post bidding,21 and we think that the novel results warrant the analysis.
21In this assessment we follow the predominant opinion in the literature. See e.g. Acemog˘lu and Shimer
(2000), Burdett and Judd (1983), Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Delacroix and Shi (forthcoming).
40
We should mention that our model can be easily extended in a number of ways. This
paper shows how to incorporate entry decisions of firms and choices regarding the number
of applications by workers, and discusses a discrete time infinite horizon setting, all of which
retain the structure developed in the baseline model. Other potentially interesting extensions
include firm and worker heterogeneity, and risk aversion. Note that the homogeneity of
firms was not used when analyzing workers’ optimization and, therefore, those results carry
over in the case of productivity differentials among firms. The firms’ optimization problem
will be different, of course, and we conjecture that since more productive firms place a
premium in hiring they will post higher wages. Similarly, in the case of observable worker
heterogeneity each firm posts a menu of type-specific wages, and we conjecture that each
type of workers has its own set of utility levels and cutoffs. Moderate risk aversion of workers
can be easily accommodated in our framework by replacing w with a concave function ν(w)
when specifying the worker’s utility, leaving the worker’s problem virtually unchanged and
affecting the firms only through a modified constraint. In conclusion, we believe that this
model provides a suitable structure to address further questions of economic interest.
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Chapter 2
Efficiency of Simultaneous Directed
Search with Recall
While unemployment is generally viewed as an undesirable phenomenon, scholars have
pointed out its productive purpose in the allocation of labor in markets with frictions.
The productive activity that people pursue during unemployment is usually called “search”.
The idea that the market achieves a natural rate of unemployment that efficiently (given the
frictions) allocates the productive resources in the economy goes back at least to Friedman
(1968) and Phelps (1967), and has been debated since.
Initial equilibrium models that investigated this contention are Diamond (1982), Mortensen
(1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984, 1985). They assumed that only a fraction of workers
and firms can meet, that those meetings are random draws, and that wages are set by
Nash bargaining. In general they do not support the view that the market achieves the
optimal allocation given the frictions.1 Efficiency fails essentially because cannot compete
to increase their matching probability, but instead wages are determined non-competitively
after meeting a worker.
The next generation of equilibrium search models allowed firms to directly compete for
labor by publicly posting their wage offers.2 Workers observe the offers and decide where
to apply. Frictions arise because firms only have a single vacancy, and workers are assumed
to use identical application strategies. Since it cannot be optimal for all workers to apply
1See also Hosios (1990). A notable exception is Lucas and Prescott (1974), who set up a very different
equilibrium search model that does exhibit efficiency.
2For an overview of both generations of models see Rogerson, Shimer and Wright (forthcoming).
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for the same job, the equilibrium requires a mixed strategy in which workers randomize and
sometimes miscoordinate. This means that some jobs happen to attract many applicants,
while others attract few or none. Nevertheless, higher wages induce (or “direct”) workers
to apply there with higher probability. In this class of directed search models, also known
as competitive search models, Moen (1997), Mortensen and Wright (2002), Shi (2002) and
Shimer (1996, 2005) show in various degrees of generality that the market interaction is
efficient given the frictions in the market, providing theoretical support for the efficiency of
the natural rate of unemployment.
These results are obtained under the restrictive assumption that each worker only sends a
single application.3 One application does not necessarily lead to employment, and work-
ers have a natural incentive to apply to multiple firms to improve immediate employment
prospects. Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) and chapter 1 of this thesis intro-
duce multiple applications per worker. Surprisingly, the competitive forces do not lead the
market to constrained efficiency even under the specification of homogenous workers and
firms. In the former model, entry of firms is too large compared to the level of unemploy-
ment. In the latter, wage dispersion precludes an efficient allocation of workers to firms.
In both models the number of applications may be too large, i.e. decreasing the number
of applications per worker would improve employment. In their main analysis both papers
assume that a firm can only propose its job to one applicant, and if the applicant rejects
it in favor of a better alternative, the firm remains vacant independent of the number of
additional applications it received. Failure of constrained efficiency might be due to this
assumption. Or it could result from an inherent externality of multiple applications that
cannot be reflected in market wages and therefore distorts various margins of efficiency.
This analysis presented here has two purposes. First and most importantly, it explores an
alternative assumption on the assignment of workers to firms once wages are announced
and applications sent. The aim is to investigate the resulting equilibrium properties, and to
analyze whether the failure of efficiency in the above models is due to the assumption about
the assignment or whether it poses a deeper challenge for the efficiency in directed search
3In some competitive search models like Moen (1997) and Mortensen and Wright (2002) agents choose
markets rather than firms. The market structure is not clearly spelled out, rather some reduced form arrival
rates are assumed. Nevertheless, this implicitly limits the setup to sequential search and rules out any
simultaneous choice. Shimer (1996) shows how this can be recast in a model in which agents apply to
individual firms with a single application.
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economies. Second, it models the number of applications as a choice for the worker so that
the endogenous number of applications can be interpreted as a measure of search intensity,
the efficiency of which can then be assessed.4
While the second aim requires analytical attention, the first provides a conceptual challenge.
Once wages are set and applications are sent, who should work for whom? Here we interpret
the applications as links in a network between workers and firms, and we assume a stable
matching given the network and the announced wages. This entails that in the final matching
no vacant firm has an applicant that is employed at a lower wage. This specification is based
on the idea that employers can call up their applicants sequentially. If an applicant accepts,
the employer is momentarily happy and stops making additional proposals. Yet if a better
job is proposed to the applicant later on, he can accept the better job and reject the earlier
offer. Rejected firms continue to contact (“recall”) remaining applicants and propose their
jobs to them. That is, we apply a version of Gale and Shapley’s (1962) deferred acceptance
algorithm.5
Apart from these additions, our model uses the standard directed search setup with ho-
mogenous workers and firms. Firms decide whether to enter the market, and if they do
so they publicly post a wage commitment for their single vacancy. Workers observe these
wages and decide how many applications to send and where to send them, where we retain
the standard assumption of symmetric strategies that creates the market frictions. Then
workers and firms are matched as explained above. In the (generically) unique equilibrium
all workers choose to send the same number of applications, and the number of wages offered
in equilibrium is equal to the number of applications each worker sends.
The equilibrium is constrained efficient given the workers’ coordination problem. We distin-
guish three components of efficiency. Search efficiency : for a given number of applications
and a given number of firms the number of matches is constrained optimal. Equilibrium
wage dispersion is essential for this feature. Entry efficiency : the division of the match
surplus is such that the constrained optimal number of firms enter. Application efficiency :
the number of applications that workers send is constrained efficient despite the negative
4Both Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) and the model presented in chapter 1 suggest to
model search costs. Yet their is comparatively little analysis provided on it.
5In a finite economy the process converges in finite time and high wage firms clearly hire before lower
wage firms do. For the continuum case see the appendix.
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externality of an additional application on other workers. All externalities are reflected in
the market wages. Finally we show that for vanishing application costs the equilibrium
converges to the unconstrained efficient outcome of a frictionless Walrasian economy.
In contrast to the inefficiencies in models without recall, constrained efficiency obtains here.
This is due to a commonality between workers and firms. Firms only care about applicants
who do not obtain better offers. We call these applicants effective. Workers also only care
about rival applicants that are effective, as the others do not compete for the job. As we will
see, this commonality implies that raising the wage induces more effective applicants, and
firms can “price” their applications optimally. Without recall, firms still only care about
effective applicants but workers care about all rival applicants because any applicant who
receives a job proposal precludes others from obtaining the job (even if he rejects it and
in the end works at another firm). This lack of commonality between workers and firms
prevents efficient pricing. A wage raise induces more applications, but potentially only
from people that have an easier time getting other jobs, which can even mean less effective
applicants. We discuss the different implications with and without recall in section 2.5.2.
Note that this issue has not occurred in the prior literature because a single application
allows the worker no alternative, and all applications are effective by assumption.
Our analysis also shows that wage dispersion is not merely a sign of frictions, but rather an
optimal response to these frictions (even though agents are homogenous).6 The constrained
efficient allocation in the market requires different hiring probabilities among firms, as dif-
ferent hiring probabilities can reduce those instances in which one worker does not get a
job because it is occupied by another worker while this other worker could take another
job elsewhere. The market wages internalize this externality, and preferred jobs are endoge-
nously harder get than back-up (non-preferred) jobs.7 The paper also adds to the literature
on asymptotic efficiency of search markets by showing convergence to the unconstrained
6For homogenous workers and firms such an efficiency role is novel. Models in this area include Acemog˘lu
and Shimer (2000); Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming); Burdett and Judd (1983); Burdett and
Mortensen (1998); Butters (1977); Delacroix and Shi (2005); Gautier and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2005). See also
Chapter 1 of this thesis.
7From the firms’ point of view one can interpret wage dispersion as different prices for a differentiated
good, despite the homogeneity of labor. Wage announcements ”buy” applications, not labor, and higher
priority applications (those where the worker sends his other applications to less attractive firms) are worth
more to a firm than low priory applications (where the other applications are sent to more attractive firms).
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efficient outcome in a simultaneous search environment.8
To my knowledge this is the first attempt to integrate the two-sided strategic considerations
of a frictional search environment with stability concepts used in matching markets.9 The
paper draws on three strands of literature. We use insights from the directed search literature
(e.g. Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)) to model the frictions and information flows in the
market. With multiple applications workers face a simultaneous portfolio choice. For this
type of problem Chade and Smith (2004) consider an individual agent’s choice and chapter
1 of this thesis derives implications in an equilibrium framework. To model recall we apply
insights from the two-sided matching literature (Gale and Shapley, 1962) to the network
that formed in the search process in earlier stages. Section 2.5 provides further discussion.
In the following, we first present the model. Section 3 then characterizes the equilibrium.
Section 4 analyzes efficiency. Notation and exposition remain much more tractable when we
consider at most two applications per worker, therefore sections 2 to 4 are restricted to this
case. Section 5 lifts this restriction and, additionally, discusses convergence for vanishing
application costs. Section 6 discusses the main modeling assumptions, additional literature,
and concludes. Omitted proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2.1 The Model
2.1.1 Environment and Strategies
There is a measure 1 of workers and a large measure V of potential firms. The measure
v of active firms is determined by free entry. Each active firm is capacity-constrained and
can only employ a single worker, each worker can only work for a single firm. A vacant
firm has a productivity normalized to zero, a firm that employs a worker has a productivity
normalized to one but has to pay the wage bill. All agents are risk neutral. Firms maximize
expected profits. Workers maximize expected wage payments.
8Asymptotic efficiency has been established in sequential search e.g. in Gale (1987). For an overview
and quite general specifications see Mortensen and Wright (2002) and Lauermann (2005). In simultaneous
search, Acemog˘lu and Shimer (2000) and Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) present limit results,
yet converge to some constrained efficient outcomes of a still frictional economies.
9Gautier and Moraga-Gonza´lez (2005) present a three player example with a similar concept in an envi-
ronment where wages are unobservable. Their main analysis of a large market assumes no recall, and also
exhibits inefficiencies.
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The game has three stages. First, potential entrants can become active by paying a setup
cost K < 1, and active firms publicly post a wage. Next, workers observe all posted wages.
Each worker decides on the number i ∈ {0, 1, 2} of applications he wants to send at cost
c(i), where c(0) = 0 and the marginal costs ci = c(i) − c(i − 1) are assumed to be weakly
increasing. The worker also decides on the i active firms to which he applies. In the final
stage workers and firms are matched, the posted wage is paid and matched pairs start
production.
For the matching we have a large number T of subperiods in mind. In each of them a
(currently) unmatched firm can make an offer. Workers accept the most attractive offer,
but are able to reject offers they accepted earlier in favor of later but better offers. In the
next substage those firms that got rejected have another chance to make an offer. Matches
become final in period T . In the appendix we discuss properties of this matching process
under the assumptions of symmetric and anonymous strategies and analyze convergence
for T →∞. For the remainder of this paper we will consider the resulting limit allocation.
Since workers prefer higher offers over lower offers, the stability of the limit matching implies
that for almost all agents in the economy matching occurs as if higher wage firms move first.
That is, we can intuitively think about the following much simpler algorithm: Out of the
firms with the highest wage, select one at random. If it has at least one applicant, select one
of its applicants at random, match both and remove them from the market. Otherwise only
the firm is removed and stays unmatched. Repeat the process with the remaining agents in
the economy. This insight will guide the specification of the relevant matching probabilities
in the next subsection.10,11
The notion of a large, anonymous market is captured by the assumption that agents’ equi-
librium strategies are symmetric and anonymous. This standard assumption of the directed
search literature implies that all firms use the same entry, posting and hiring strategy, and
10Hiring precedence of higher wage firms yields a stable allocation on the network. It is also applied in
Burlow and Levin (forthcoming). The matching resembles the process used to assign interns to hospitals in
the United States. See sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 for details.
11In the matching literature agents usually have strict preferences over the other market side. We could
incorporate this by assuming that agents draw at random a preference list over those agents they are linked
to, and these preferences are lexicographically subordinate to money. This would remove the arbitrariness
of the matchings, still the matching probabilities would be unchanged (only the order at which firms are to
make proposals would now be appropriately tied to the realization of the preference lists to achieve stability).
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do not condition their strategy on the identity of the worker. All workers use the same
application strategies, and do not condition on the firms identity.12 The symmetry of the
workers’ application strategies usually requires mixed strategies which create the market
frictions: sometimes multiple workers apply for the same job, and sometimes none apply at
all.
A pure strategy for a firm is its entry decision e ∈ {Enter,Out} and a wage offer w ∈ [0, 1].
A mixed strategy for a firm is a probability φ of playing Enter and a cumulative distribution
function F on [0, 1]. Throughout the paper we adopt the law of large numbers convention,
which for instance implies that F is also the realized distribution of wage offers and v = φV
is the realized measure of active firms. A worker observes the distribution of posted wages
and decides on the number of applications i ∈ {0, 1, 2} that he wants to send. If i = 1 he
also decides on a wage w ∈ [0, 1] to which he applies; if i = 2 he decides on a wage tuple
(w1, w2) ∈ [0, 1]2. This fully characterizes his strategy given the anonymity assumption,
which implies that he randomizes equally over the firms that offer the same wage. A mixed
strategy for a worker is a tuple γ = (γ0, γ1, γ2), where γi is the probability of sending i
applications, and a tuple G = (G1, G2), where Gi is a cumulative distribution function
over [0, 1]i which describes the way the worker sends his i applications.13 If i = 2 we will
throughout assume that w1 ≤ w2, and will denote by G2j (w˜) the marginal distribution over
wj and by G2j (w˜|w) the conditional distribution over wj when wi = w, i ∈ {1, 2}/{j}.
2.1.2 Expected Payoffs and Equilibrium Definition
To describe the expected payoffs under mixed strategies, let η(w) denote the probability that
a firm that posts wage w hires a worker. Let p(w) be the probability that an application to
wage w yields an offer sometime during the matching stage. These are endogenous objects,
yet once they are defined, the profit of a firm posting wage w - omitting entry costs - is
pi(w) = η(w)(1− w). (2.1)
12These assumptions are discussed in section 6. We should note that we could purify the firms’ posting
strategy and relax anonymity of the workers’ strategies.
13 It will be convenient to assume that each combination in the support of the randomization of workers
and firms is chosen by a continuum of agents in order to apply the law of large numbers convention. We
assume the set of agents to be sufficiently large.
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The profits comprise the margin 1 − w if a worker is hired, multiplied by the probability
η(w) of hiring.
The utility of a worker who sends no applications is U0 = 0. A worker who applies with one
application to wage w obtains utility U1(w) = p(w)w − c(1), i.e. the expected profit minus
the cost of the application. A worker who applies to wages (w1, w2) with w1 ≤ w2 obtains
utility
U2(w1, w2) = p(w2)w2 + (1− p(w2))p(w1)w1 − c(2). (2.2)
The worker’s utility is given by the wage w2 if he is made an offer at that wage, which
happens with probability p(w2). With the complementary probability 1−p(w2) he does not
receive an offer at the high wage and his utility is w1 if he gets an offer for his low wage
application, which happens with probability p(w1). He always incurs the cost for the two
applications.
When agents randomize over wages, their payoff is determined by appropriately averaging
the payoffs at individual wages.
We will now relate η(·) and p(·) to the strategies (φ, F ) and (γ,G). We will first determine
the payoffs under the assumption that all firms and workers follow this strategy profile. We
will then consider individual deviations from this profile. In the following we will talk about
the offer set V, which refers to the support of the wage offer distribution F , and about the
application set W, which refers to the support of G1 if γ1 > 0 joint with the union of the
support of G21 and G
2
2 if γ2 > 0.
We first consider wages that are in the offer and in the application set. Let λ(w) denote
the ratio of applications per firms at wage w. It is characterized by the following mass
balance:14
γ1G
1(w) + γ2G21(w) + γ2G
2
2(w) = v
∫ w
0
λ(w˜) dF (w˜) ∀w ∈ [0, 1]. (2.3)
The left hand side denotes the expected mass of applications that are sent to wages up to w.
It is given by the probability that workers who send one application send it below w, and
the probability that workers who send two applications send either their low or their high
application below w. It is the inflow of applications to wages up to w. These are dispersed
14We define λ(·) on R+ ∪ {∞} to account for the case that a negligable fraction of firms might (non-
optimally) receive a mass of applications.
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over the firms that offer wages up to wage w. This outflow is specified on the right hand
side. It is given by the ratio of applications per firm multiplied with the number of firms,
aggregated over all relevant wages. We refer to λ as the gross queue length.
The crucial observation is that not all applications are ”effective” in the sense that the firm
can hire the applicant. The applicant cannot be hired if he receives a strictly better offer,
or has already received a weakly better offer. Denote the fraction of applications that are
unavailable for hiring by ψ(w). Then the ratio of effective applications per firm is given by
µ(w) = (1− ψ(w))λ(w). (2.4)
We call µ(w) the effective queue length at w.
The probability that a firm with wage w has at least one effective application is given by
1 − e−µ(w). This is due to the anonymity of the workers strategy, which leads to random
assignment of applications to firms at a given wage. In a finite economy this implies that
the number of effective applications is binomially distributed; for a large economy this is
approximated by the Poisson distribution under which the probability that a firm receives
no effective application is e−µ(w). If the firm receives at least one effective application it will
be able to fill its vacancy, because when it successively makes offers it will eventually make
an offer to this application and become matched. Therefore the hiring probability for a firm
is
η(w) = 1− e−µ(w). (2.5)
Now consider the probability of a worker to receive an offer at wage w. His competitors for
a job are only those applications that are effective, since for all others the workers decline
even if they are made an offer. Each individual worker calculates his acceptance probability
by considering his own application effective (because he considers the case where he is
unsuccessful at better wages) but realizes that only a fraction of the other applications will
be effective. Given that there are 1−e−µ(w) matches per firm and µ(w) effective applications
per firm, the probability of an effective application to yield a match is given by15
p(w) =
1− e−µ(w)
µ(w)
, (2.6)
with the convention that p(w) = 1 if µ(w) = 0.
15For a careful but intuitive derivation of (2.5) and (2.6) as the limit for a finite but large economy see
Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
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Finally, consider the probability ψ(w) that an offer does not lead to a match because the
sender receives and accepts a different offer. ψ(·) is trivially zero if workers send only one
application, i.e. if γ2 = 0. Otherwise, consider some application sent to wage w, and let
Gˆ(w˜|w) denote the probability that the sender had a second application and sent it to a
wage weakly lower then w˜.16 Similarly, let gˆ(w|w) denote the probability that the sender
sent a second application to w, i.e. gˆ(w|w) = Gˆ(w|w)− limw˜↗w Gˆ(w˜|w). Then ψ(w) is given
by
ψ(w) =
∫ 1
w˜>w
p(w˜)dGˆ(w˜|w) + p(w)
2
gˆ(w|w). (2.7)
That is, ψ(w) is the average probability that a worker sends two applications and the other
application was strictly higher and successful. If the other application was sent to the same
wage, the probability that it was successful is p(w), and in this case the unconditional
probability for each firm to make the offer first is 1/2. The system defined by (2.4), (2.6)
and (2.7) is recursive: At the highest offered wage the probabilities p(w), η(w) and ψ(w)
can be determined, and are then used to evaluate the corresponding terms at lower wages.
To round off the specification, briefly consider the case of a wage in the offer set that is not
in the application set. In this case nobody applies, and we specify λ(w) = µ(w) = 0. We
interpret the polar case of wages in the application but not in the offer set as free disposal
of applications without the chance of receiving an offer. This covers all possibilities in the
support of the workers and/or firms randomization, and their average ex-ante payoffs can
be calculated.
Now consider deviations. For a firm, any wage in the offer set can be evaluated as described
above as it arises as a possible realization of F . Yet for a deviation to wages w /∈ V the firm
has to form a belief about the workers reaction. This problem is common in the directed
search literature, and the most common approach is to assume that the queue length at the
deviant is exactly such that workers are indifferent between applying and not applying. If it
were higher workers should adjust by applying less; if it were lower they should apply more.
We will call the highest utility a worker can obtain at wages in the offer set as the Market
Utility. Let U∗i = supw∈Vi Ui(w) denote the highest utility a worker can get by sending i
16There are γ1dG
1(w) single applications, γ2dG
2
1(w) low applications and γ2dG
2
2(w) high applica-
tions at w, adding to a total measure T (w) = γ1dG
1(w) + γ2dG
2
1(w) + γ2dG
2
2(w). Then Gˆ(w˜|w) =∑2
j=1[γ2dG
2
j (w)/T (w)]G
2
−j(w˜|w), where −j ∈ {1, 2}/{j}.
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applications. Then we can define the Market Utility as U∗ = max{U0, U∗1 , U∗2 }.
Now consider some wage w /∈ V and assume the queue length were µ(w) ∈ [0,∞], which
defines p(w) as in (2.6). A worker who applies there with one application can at best get
U1(w). A worker who sends two applications and applies there with his low application
can at best get Uˆ1,l(w) = supw˜∈V U(w, w˜). Applying with the high application he can get
Uˆ2,h(w) = supw˜∈V U(w˜, w). Let Uˆ(w) = max{U1(w), Uˆ2,l(w), Uˆ2,h(w)}. We will assume
Definition 2 (Market Utility Assumption)
For any w /∈ V, µ(w) > 0 if and only if U∗ = Uˆ(w).
It states that workers are indifferent between obtaining the Market Utility and applying to
the not-offered wage (possibly combined with the most attractive offered wage).17 Only if the
wage is too low it is not possible to adjust the effective queue length to obtain indifference, in
which case the effective queue length is set to zero because nobody would apply there. While
the arguments presented here have only intuitively appealed to ”reasonable” responses of
workers to deviating wage offers, papers by Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) and Peters (1997,
2000) rigorously establish equivalence of the Market Utility Assumption and the subgame
perfect response in (a limit of) finite economies in which workers send one application.
Firms also have to evaluate the profit of entering if φ = 0, i.e. no other firm enters. Assume
some firm enters and offers a wage. In the same spirit of subgame perfection, workers either
do not apply at all because the wage is too low, or they drive the queue length down to a level
where they are indifferent between applying or not applying. Anticipating this response,
the firm will enter if it can find a profitable wage offer. Formally, we assume
Definition 3 (Entry Assumption)
φ > 0 if there exist w ∈ [0, 1] and µ(w) ∈ R+ such that U1(w) = c1 and pi(w) > K.
Finally, consider the deviation of an individual worker. All other workers still use their
mixed strategy. The competition for each job is therefore unchanged, and he still obtains
payoff Ui(w) when he applies to wages in the application set. Wages w ∈ V\W yield an
offer for sure. Other wages cannot provide profitable deviation even if they are offered by
some (possibly deviating) firm when the worker’s belief about the other workers’ behavior
corresponds to the belief summarized in the Market Utility Assumption.
17Inspection of the worker’s problem in section 2.2.1 reveals that even if both wages are not in the offer
set it is impossible to obtain a utility above U∗, given this assumption.
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We define an equilibrium as follows.
Definition 4 (Equilibrium) An equilibrium is a tuple {φ, F,γ,G} of strategies for the
agents such that there exists pi∗, U∗ and µ(·) and
1. (a) pi(w) = pi∗ ≥ pi(w′) for all w ∈ V and w′ ∈ [0, 1] if φ > 0.
(b) pi∗ = K if φ > 0.
2. (a) Ui(w) ≥ Ui(w′) for all w ∈ suppGi and w′ ∈ [0, 1]i, if γi > 0.
(b) U∗i = U
∗ if γi > 0.
3. µ(·) conforms to (2.3) - (2.7) and the Market Utility and Entry Assumptions hold.
Condition 1 a) and b) specify profit maximization and free entry.18 Condition 2 a) implies
that workers who send i applications send them optimally given the wage offer distribution
and the behavior of other workers. Condition 2 b) ensures that workers send out the optimal
number of applications. Condition 3 reiterates the determination of the effective queue
length. The distinction between a) and b) allows the discussion of an exogenous number of
applications and/or exogenous number of firms using the appropriate subset of conditions.
While the exposition uses the terminology of a game, the definition resembles a competitive
equilibrium with a somewhat non-standard feasibility constraint that embeds the frictions.
2.2 Equilibrium Characterization
In this section we characterize the equilibrium properties of the model and show
Summary 2.2.1 An equilibrium exists. Generically the following holds: The equilibrium
is unique; all workers send the same number of applications; the number of offered wages
equals the number of applications; each worker applies with one application to each wage.
We will proceed in three subsections: First we analyze the workers’ search behavior given a
distribution of wages and given the number of applications. Then we analyze the distribution
of wages that firms will optimally set. Finally, we characterize equilibrium play.
18To ensure that entry implies zero profits it is sufficient to assume that V > 1/K.
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2.2.1 Workers’ Search Decision
To analyze the workers’ search decisions, first consider a single worker who observes all wages
and - given the strategy of the other workers - knows the probability of success at each wage.
That is, he knows all pairs (w, p(w)). Equilibrium condition 2a) implies that each wage to
which workers apply has to be optimal. For a worker with i = 1 the application choice is
trivial. An application to w′ is optimal if and only if p(w′)w′ = u1 ≡ maxw∈[0,1] p(w)w, i.e.
he chooses a wage with the highest expected return u1. For a worker with i = 2 the analysis
is slightly more involved. Let w¯ be the highest wage out of all wages that deliver u1, i.e.
w¯ = sup{w ∈ [0, 1]|p(w)w = u1}.
Lemma 3 Assume that an optimal choice for a worker with i = 2 exists. The optimal
choice involves sending one application to a wage weakly below w¯ and one application to a
wage weakly above w¯.
Proof: The worker maximizes
max
(w1,w2)∈[0,1]2
p(w2)w2 + (1− p(w2))p(w1)w1. (2.8)
Note that we have set up problem (2.8) without the restriction that w1 ≤ w2. Nevertheless
it is immediate that a worker who has the choice between two wages will always accept the
higher over the lower. Therefore any solution to (2.8) has w1 ≤ w2.19
Next, note that w1 is only exercised if w2 failed. (2.8) immediately implies that for w1 only
the expected return p(w)w is important, and his optimal decision resembles that of workers
with a single application. I.e. he chooses w1 such that
p(w1)w1 = u1. (2.9)
Taking this into account, any high wage w2 is optimal if it fulfills
p(w2)w2 + (1− p(w2))u1 = u2, (2.10)
where u2 ≡ supw∈[0,1] p(w)w + (1 − p(w))u1. Clearly any combination of w1 and w2 that
satisfies (2.9) and (2.10) solves the maximization problem (2.8). Since we know that any
19Assume a worker would choose (w1, w2). By (2.8) he gets U(w1, w2) = p(w2)w2 + (1 − p(w2))p(w1)w1.
Now assume he reversed the order to get U(w2, w1) = p(w1)w1+(1−p(w1))p(w2)w2. U(w1, w2) ≥ U(w2, w1)
if and only if w2 ≥ w1.
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solution to the latter problem has w2 ≥ w1, it has to hold that the highest low wage
associated with (2.9) has to be weakly lower than the lowest high wage associated with
(2.10). The highest low wage is given by w¯. Q.E.D.
At high wages the worker takes into account the possibility of obtaining a low wage offer.
He is willing to accept a lower expected pay (p(w2)w2 < u1) in return for a high upside
potential if he gets a job (high w2), because if he does not get the good job the low wage
application acts as a form of insurance.20 Since all workers face the same maximization
problem we obtain
Proposition 11 Any equilibrium with γ1 + γ2 > 0 fulfills the following conditions for the
effective queue length:
p(w) = 1 ∀ w ∈ [0, u1] (2.11)
p(w)w = u1 ∀ w ∈ [u1, w¯] (2.12)
p(w)w + (1− p(w))u1 = u2 ∀ w ∈ [w¯, 1], (2.13)
for some tuple (u1, u2, w¯). It holds that u1 = maxw∈V p(w)w and
i) for γ2 > 0, u2 = maxw∈V p(w)w + (1− p(w))u1 and w¯ = u21/(2u1 − u2).
ii) for γ2 = 0, if u21/(u1 + c2) ∈ (0, 1) then w¯ = u21/(u1 + c2) and u2 = u1 + c2, otherwise
w¯ = 1.
Low wages do not receive applications, wages in the intermediate range receive the low
applications that workers are only willing to send if (2.9) is fulfilled, and high wages receive
high applications under condition (2.10). We should note that even if workers do not send
high wage applications, i.e. γ2 = 0, the queue lengths at high wages might be determined by
(2.10). If a deviant posts a high wage, the Market Utility Assumption specifies that workers
are indifferent. If the second application is quite costly, indifference implies that the workers
are indifferent between sending their single application to the deviant or to the offered wage.
Yet if the second application is not very costly, it might be optimal to continue to send the
single application to some offered wage but to send an additional application to the deviant.
20See Chade and Smith (2004) and also chapter 1 for more discussion of the tradeoffs under simultaneous
search.
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Indifference then implies that the marginal benefit of the additional application is zero, i.e.
u2 − u1 − c2 = 0, which then determines u2 and governs the queue length at high wages.
2.2.2 Firms’ Wage Setting
This subsection focuses on the nature of equilibrium wage dispersion. We first show that
wage dispersion is a necessary feature of any equilibrium with γ2 > 0. We then show that
this leads to exactly two wages being offered in equilibrium.
Consider the case where γ2 > 0, which implies that v > 0 as otherwise there is no reason
to apply. Before we proceed, we will briefly rewrite firms’ profits in a convenient way.
Consider some (candidate) equilibrium characterized by u1, u2 and w¯, which by proposition
11 characterizes the workers application behavior. We will call firms that end up offering
wages below w¯ as low wage firms, and those offering wage above w¯ as high wage firms. The
problem for each individual firm is to maximize (1−e−µ(w))(1−w) under the constraint that
µ(w) is given by (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13). This is a standard maximization problem. Writing
the profit function as pi(w) = µ(w)p(w)(1−w), we can use the constraint to substitute out
the wage and write profits as a function of the effective queue length
pi(µ) = 1− e−µ − µu1 ∀ µ ∈ [µ, µ¯], (2.14)
pi(µ) = (1− e−µ)(1− u1)− µ(u2 − u1) ∀ µ ∈ [µ¯, µ(1)], (2.15)
where µ¯ = µ(w¯) and µ = 0 = µ(u1). We can interpret this as follows. Firms that offer a
wage below u1 “buy” a queue length of zero and make zero profits. Low wage firms that offer
wages in [u1, w¯] “buy” a queue length according to (2.12) and obtain profits as in (2.14),
while high wage firms with wages in [w¯, 1] “buy” a queue length as in (2.13) and obtain
profits as in (2.15). Since at wages above u1 there is a one-to-one relation between the wage
and the effective queue length, we can view the individual firm’s problem as simply a choice
regarding the preferred effective queue length.
The profit function is continuous, but has a kink at w¯ (respectively µ¯). This is due to the
fact that workers trade off the effective queue length against the wage differently for high
and low applications. At high wages the queue length responds stronger to a wage change
since workers are more ”risky” due to the fallback option at low wages. This kink implies
immediately that it cannot be profitable for any individual firm to offer wage w¯, because
raising the wage induces many additional effective applicantions while reducing the wage
induces only a relatively small reduction in effective applications. Therefore either it is
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profitable to offer a higher wage, or if that is not profitable then it is profitable to offer a
lower wage.
This rules out an equilibrium in which some workers send more than one application but
all firms offer the same wage, because the offered wage would coincide with the cutoff wage
and individual firms would want to deviate.
Proposition 12 There does not exist an equilibrium with γ2 > 0 in which only one wage
is offered, i.e. in which V is a singleton.
We should note that the argument that rules out one-wage equilibria is different from those
in most other papers on wage dispersion with homogenous workers and firms. Usually
there is an appeal to a discontinuity of the following kind: If all firms offer the same
wage, there is a strictly positive probability that a firms’ offer is rejected because the
worker accepts some other equally good offer; so if a devianting firm offers a slightly higher
wage, at least as many workers apply, and all applicants accept an offer for sure. This
yields a jump in profits.21 In this model there is no discontinuity despite the fact that
workers accept an offer for sure at a slightly higher wage. This positive jump in profits
is offset by the fact that fewer workers apply to the deviant.22 Workers internalize that
only effective applications imply competition. At the market wage, only a fraction of the
(other) applications are effective, while at the deviant all applications are effective. If the
deviants’ wage is only slightly higher, less workers apply because otherwise the competition
would make an application unattractive. As a consequence profits change continuously.
Nevertheless, the kink in the profit function induced by a different ”risk-return”-tradeoff of
workers implies wage dispersion.
Next we show that in an equilibrium in which some workers send two applications exactly
two wages will be offered, one strictly below and one strictly above w¯. This immediately
implies that workers with one application send it to the low wage, and workers with two
applications send one to each of the wages.
21This happens e.g. in Burdett and Judd (1983), Burdett and Mortensen (1998), the basic version of
Acemog˘lu and Shimer (2000) and in the model presented in Chapter 1.
22In the introduction we explained ”directedness” as the ability to attract more applications when offering
higher wages. By this we mean more effective applications. As shown here, gross applications do not need
to be higher.
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Proposition 13 In any equilibrium with γ2 > 0, exactly two distinct wages will be offered,
i.e. V = {w∗1, w∗2}. It holds that w∗1 < w¯ < w∗2.
Proof: Since wage dispersion implies that not all wages are zero, u2 > u1 > 0. Individual
firms take u1, u2 and w¯ as given. For low wage firms we can write the profits as a function
of the queue length as in (2.14). The function is strictly concave on [0, µ¯]. Therefore all
low wage firms will offer the same wage. For high wage firms profits can be written as in
(2.15), which is strictly concave on [µ¯, µ(1)]. Therefore all high wage firms will offer the
same wage. Finally, assume one group, say low wage firms, offered the wage w¯. Since there
is wage dispersion, high wage firms will offer w∗2 > w¯. But since their problem is strictly
concave on [w¯, 1], they make strictly higher profits than firms at w¯, which yields the desired
contradiction. A similar argument rules out that w¯ is offered by high wage firms. Q.E.D.
Given that only two wages are offered in equilibrium, we will for notational simplicity index
variables referring to low wage firms by 1 and those referring to high wage firms by 2.23 Let
d1 be the equilibrium fraction of firms offering the low wage, and d2 the fraction offering
the high wage. Then vi = vdi denotes the measure of firms at the respective wage, and
equation (2.3) implies gross queue lengths λ2 = γ2/v2 and λ1 = (γ1+γ2)/v1. At high wages
workers only apply strictly lower, so that µ2 = λ2. At low wages, a fraction γ2/(γ1 + γ2)
applies to the high wage, and so ψ2 = p2γ2/(γ1 + γ2), with p2 = (1 − e−µ2)/µ2. Therefore
µ1 = (1− p2γ2/(γ1 + γ2))λ1. With these notational simplifications we establish
Corollary 1 In an equilibrium with γ2 > 0 profits and wages for high and low wage firms
respectively are given by
pi1 = 1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1 , (2.16)
w∗1 = µ1e
−µ1/(1− e−µ1), (2.17)
pi2 = (1− e−µ2 − µ1e−µ1)(1− e−µ1), and (2.18)
w∗2 = µ2e
−µ2(1− e−µ1)/(1− e−µ2) + e−µ1 . (2.19)
23That is, let pii be the profit, wi the wage, λi the gross queue length, µi the effective queue length, ηi the
hiring probability, pi the probability of getting an offer when applying at a type-i firm, and ψi the probability
that a worker accepts another offer, where i = 1 when we refer to low wage firms and i = 2 when we refer to
high wage firms.
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Proof: We know that neither low wage nor high wage firms are constrained, because the
equilibrium wages are different from w¯, and it is easy to see that w1 > 0 (otherwise workers
would not apply) and w2 < 1 (otherwise high wage firms would make less profits than low
wage firms). Therefore wages are given by first order conditions. For low wage firms, the
first order condition of (2.14) with respect to µ leads to
u1 = e−µ = e−µ1 . (2.20)
The second equality follows since in equilibrium all low wage firms will choose the same
queue length, or rather the wage associated with it. When substituted into (2.14) this leads
to the expression for the profits. By (2.12) we know that w∗1 = u1/p1 and we immediately
get the corresponding wage. For high wage firms, the first order condition of (2.15) implies
u2 − u1 = e−µ(1− u1) = e−µ2(1− e−µ1). (2.21)
Substitution back into (2.15) yields the expression for the profits. By (2.13) we know that
w∗2 = (u2− u1)/p2+ u1, and substitution leads to the expression for the high wage. Q.E.D.
In the the case of a single application (γ1 > 0 and γ2 = 0) the arguments above easily
establish that only one wage is offered according to (2.17), yielding profits given by (2.16).
Obviously in this case the probability that an offer leads to a hire is one, i.e. µ1 = λ1.
This is also the result obtained in Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001). The introduction of
a second application essentially establishes two markets. The profits in each are given by
(1− e−µi − µie−µi)(1− ui−1). In the low market u0 is identical to the workers’ true outside
option of zero, but there is some connection to the high market induced by the strictly
positive probability that an offer is rejected. In the high market the rejection probability
is zero, but u1 is greater than zero as it reflects the workers’ endogenous outside option
induced by the presence of the low market. Apart from these spillovers, each market operates
essentially as a single one-application market.
The findings in the last sections are summarized in figure 2.1. The workers’ indifference
curve IC1 for the low wage applications is given by (2.12). Low wage firms take this into
account and offer a wage w1 such that no individual firm wants to deviate, which means their
isoprofit curve IP1 is tangent to IC1. The indifference curve IC2 for the high application is
by (2.13) steeper than for the low application because of the fallback option due to the low
application. The actual queue length that firms expect is the dashed line. High wage firms
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium behavior. IC1 and IC2: Worker’s indifference curve for the low and high wage,
respectively. IP1 and IP2: Isoprofit curves for low and high wage firms.
take this into account and offer wage w2 in such a way that no firm wants to deviate, i.e.
such that their isoprofit curve IC2 is tangent to IP2. Note that a single wage w1 = w2 = w¯
cannot be an equilibrium, because at the kink of the indifference curves it is impossible to
place the isoprofit curve tangent, and therefore firms would want to deviate. The isoprofit
curves for low and high wage firms have to coincide to provide equal profits for firms. In
the next section we prove that this is possible.
2.2.3 Equilibrium Outcome
In this section we derive the equilibrium outcome. Before we turn to the full equilibrium, it
will be a useful first step to exogenously fix the number of applications that workers send.
We will show existence and uniqueness of an (appropriately adjusted) equilibrium with and
without free entry.24
24Note that the equilibrium definition does not tie down F in case φ = 0 and Gi in case γi = 0. For the
discussion of uniqueness, assume that in these cases the respective distribution takes on some unique form.
As a technical detail, note that here we fix γ but in the Market Utility Assumption the costs still show up.
To ensure consistency, assume that when γ2 = 0 only one application plays a role (e.g. c1 = 0 and c2 =∞)
while when γ2 > 0 both play a role (e.g. c1 = c2 = 0).
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Lemma 4 For given (γ0, γ1, γ2) with γ1 + γ2 > 0 it holds that
1. for given v > 0 there exists unique (F,G) such that equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a)
and 3 hold;
2. with free entry there exists unique (φ, F,G) such that equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b),
2a) and 3 hold.
Proof: We will show part 2 here, part 1 is relegated to the appendix. The effective queue
length µ1 at the low market wage is according to (2.18) determined by
1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1 = K. (2.22)
Since the left hand side of (2.22) is strictly increasing in µ1 and is zero for µ1 = 0 and one
for µ1 →∞, µ1 is unique. The wage is given by (2.17).
If γ2 > 0, the queue length at high wage firms is by (2.18) given by
(1− e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2)(1− e−µ1) = K. (2.23)
Since µ1 is unique, µ2 is unique. The high wage is given by (2.19). Since µ∗1 = (γ1 + γ2 −
γ2p2)/v1 and µ∗2 = γ2/v2, both v1 and v2 are uniquely determined, which characterizes the
equilibrium entry and the randomization over the two wages.
Clearly firms are willing to offer these wages. The wages were determined by the appropriate
first order conditions and therefore no other wage in either the high wage or the low wage
region can offer a higher profit. Since (2.12) and (2.13) were used as constraints to construct
the profits, they remain valid and workers are indeed willing to apply in the prescribed
way. Q.E.D.
Knowing the equilibrium interaction for a fixed number of applications, we can turn to the
analysis of the equilibrium interaction when the number of applications is endogenous. c1
and c2 may take any non-negative values as long as c1 ≤ c2. In analogy to the free entry
conditions (2.22) and (2.23) we will define the following four numbers µ∗1, µ∗2, u∗1 and u∗2
recursively as follows: (1−e−µ∗2−µ∗2e−µ
∗
2)(1−u∗i−1) = K, where u∗i−u∗i−1 = e−µ
∗
i (1−u∗i−1) and
u∗0 = 0. These numbers are uniquely determined by the exogenous parameter K. Moreover,
(2.20) established that the marginal utility of the first application in equilibrium is always
u∗1 whenever at least some workers send out applications, and by (2.21) the marginal utility
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of the second application is u∗2 − u∗1 whenever at least some workers send two applications.
This is independent of the exact structure of γ. We will establish the following proposition,
which is a stronger version of summary 2.2.1 with which we started the section.
Proposition 14 An equilibrium exists. Furthermore
1. For c1 > u∗1 the unique equilibrium has v = 0 and γ = 0.
2. For c1 < u∗1 and c2 > u∗2−u∗1, in the unique equilibrium all workers send one application
and one wage is offered.
3. For c1 < u∗1 and c2 < u∗2 − u∗1, in the unique equilibrium all workers send two applica-
tions, two wages are offered, and each worker applies to each wage.
Proof: In case 1 the marginal utility is too low to induce any worker to send the first
application. Therefore v = 0 and γ = 0. This is consistent with the Entry Assumption.
In cases 2 and 3, the marginal utility is strictly higher than the marginal cost of the first
application. By the Entry Assumption there will be positive entry: At queue length µ′
such that e−µ′ = c and wage w′ = µ′e−µ′/(1 − e−µ′), it holds that U1(w′) = c and profits
pi′ = 1− e−µ′ − µ′e−µ′ > K. Given positive entry, clearly each worker will send at least one
application.
Now we have to analyze if it can be the case that workers only apply once, and firms only
offer one wage. Assume this is the case. For c2 < e−µ
∗
1(µ∗1 − 1 + e−µ
∗
1)/µ∗1 it can be shown
that we get a contradiction, because a worker strictly prefers to apply twice at the unique
market wage than to send only one application. Yet even if c2 is not that small, firms
might not be willing to offer only one wage - despite the fact that the wage is determined
by their first order condition. At high (not offered) wages the queue length might increase
fast because workers would send their high application if these high wages were offered,
which is reflected in w¯ < 1 in the second part of proposition 11. Since the queue length is
continuous, and the offered wage is strictly optimal on [u1, w¯], a firm that is looking for a
profitable deviation has to find the optimal wage in the interior of [w¯, 1]. Since u2 = c2+u1
according to proposition 11, we have by (2.15) the profit pi(µ) = (1−e−µ)(1−e−µ∗1)−µc2 for
a deviant that offers a wage in (w¯, 1). If there is a profitable deviation, it must be profitable
to deviate to µˆ given by the first order condition e−µˆ(1− e−µ∗1) = c2, which implies µˆ < µ∗2
in case 2 and µˆ > µ∗2 in case 3. Substitution leads to an optimal deviation profit of
pi(µˆ) = (1− e−µˆ − µˆe−µˆ)(1− e−µ∗1). (2.24)
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Comparing (2.24) with (2.23) establishes that pi(µˆ) is strictly smaller than K in case 2,
making a deviation unprofitable, and strictly larger than K in case 3, yielding a strictly
profitable deviation (the wage associated with µˆ is indeed above w¯ in case 3). Therefore an
equilibrium with one wage is possible in case 2 and not in case 3.
Finally, it is immediate that in case 2 an equilibrium with two wages cannot exist because by
u∗2 − u∗1 < c2 the marginal utility of the second application is too low, while an equilibrium
with two wages can exist in case 3 since u∗2 − u∗1 > c2. Therefore in case 2 everyone sends
one application to the unique wage, while in case 3 every worker sends two applications,
one to each of the two wages. Uniqueness is then ensured by lemma 4. Q.E.D.
For the case c2 < u∗2 − u∗1 it is worth emphasizing that two wages are offered because firms
anticipate that workers will send an additional application when they offer a high wage (this
is captured by the Market Utility Assumption). If we consider a candidate equilibrium in
which all firms offer a single wage, it is this feature that leads to a high queue length for a
deviant with a high wage and makes such a deviation profitable.
In the case where c1 = e−µ
∗
1 we have multiplicity of equilibria: for any γ1 ∈ [0, 1] and
γ0 = 1−γ1 an equilibrium exists, and workers are exactly indifferent between applying once
and not applying. If c2 = e−µ
∗
2(1− e−µ∗1) an equilibrium exists in which workers randomize
between one and two applications, i.e. it exists for any γ2 ∈ [0, 1] and γ1 = 1− γ2.
2.3 Efficiency
To discuss the efficiency properties of the equilibria just characterized, we will follow Pis-
sarides (2000) and others by using the following notion of constrained efficiency: An equi-
librium is constrained efficient if it maximizes the output minus entry and application costs,
given the frictions in the market. The frictions stem from the requirement that workers and
firms use some symmetric strategies (γ,G) and (φ, F ). Denoting by Υi the set of cumu-
lative distribution functions over [0, 1]i and by 43 the three-dimensional unit simplex, the
strategy spaces of workers and firms are G = 43 × Υ1 × Υ2 and F = [0, 1] × Υ1. Then an
equilibrium {φ, F,γ,G} ∈ F × G is constrained efficient if it maximizes
max
(φ′,F ′)∈F ,(γ′,G′)∈G
M(φ′, F ′,γ ′,G′)− φ′V K − γ′1c(1)− γ′2c(2), (2.25)
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whereM(φ′, F ′,γ ′,G′) = φ′V
∫ 1
0 η(w)dF
′ is the number of matches when η(w) is determined
by (2.3) - (2.7) using the relevant parameters {φ′, F ′,γ ′,G′}.
As discussed in the introduction, efficiency my fail on several dimensions: (1) Search In-
efficiency: For a given vector of applications and a given number of firms the number of
matches is suboptimal. (2) Entry Inefficiency: For a given vector of applications too many
or too few firms enter. (3) Application Inefficiency: Workers apply too much or too little
given the costs. While these inefficiencies arise without recall, we will show that with recall
directed search balances all these margins.25
Shimer (1996) explains the efficiency property for the one-application case roughly as follows:
The workers’ response to a change in the wage yields an implicit price for the desired queue
length, therefore firms can price the queue length of applicants exactly at its marginal cost.
In this model two variables matter: The gross queue length λ(·) and the retention probability
1 − ψ(·). Both have to be adjusted by a single-dimensional wage. This is possible because
for firms and for workers only the combination of both matters. The workers respond to a
change in the wage by changing their applications such that the effective queue length µ(·)
rises to a new level of indifference. Therefore the same logic holds here. The effective queue
length is priced at marginal cost.
Proposition 15 The equilibrium market outcome is constrained efficient.
We will prove the proposition in the next three subsections that are dedicated to different
margins. For a given number of firms and a given vector of applications, we will show that
the search outcome M(φ, F,γ,G) is constrained optimal. Then we show that for a given
vector of applications the constrained optimal number of firms enter, given that subsequent
search is optimal. And finally we will establish that workers send the constrained optimal
number of applications, taking account of optimal entry and search.
2.3.1 Search Efficiency
For a given vector of applications γ = (γ0, γ1, γ2) and firms v, we will show that the search
outcome as characterized in the first part of lemma 4 is constrained efficient. As we will
see, this depends on the ability of the market to generate different wages for low and high
applications.
25See section 2.5.2 for the discussion of restricted recall.
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For γ2 > 0 we start by analyzing a narrower concept that we will call 2-group-efficiency.
We will assume that there are two groups of firms, one preferred over the other, and all
workers who send at least one application send one at random to the non-preferred group,
and workers who send two applications send the second one at random to the preferred
group. This setup corresponds to the equilibrium outcome. Let d ∈ [0, 1] be the fraction of
firms in the preferred group. Search is two-group-efficient if d is chosen optimally given the
assumptions just made.
Lemma 5 For a given v > 0 and γ = (γ0, γ1, γ2) with γ2 > 0, the strategy combination
implied by equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a) and 3 yields two-group-efficient search.
Proof: The optimization problem is given by
max
d∈[0,1]
M(d) = vd(1− e−µ2) + v(1− d)(1− e−µ1), (2.26)
where µ1 = (1 − γ2p2/(γ1 + γ2))λ1, µ2 = λ2 = γ2/(vd), p2 = (1 − e−λ2)/λ2 and λ1 =
(γ1 + γ2)/(v(1− d)). The first derivative is given by
∂M/∂d = v
[
1− e−λ2 − (1− e−µ1) + de−λ2 [∂λ2/∂d]
+
e−µ1
vλ1
[
−γ2[∂p2/∂d]λ1 + (γ1 + γ2 − γ2p2)[∂λ1/∂d]
] ]
.
Noting that ∂λ2/∂d = −γ2/(d2v) = −λ22v/γ2, ∂λ1/∂d = λ21v/(γ1 + γ2), and then ∂p2/∂d =
(1− e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2)v/γ2 we obtain by substitution that the last expression in the first line
equals −λ2e−λ2 and the second line equals e−µ1 [−(1− e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2) + µ1]. This yields
∂M
∂d
1
v
= (1− e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2)(1− e−µ1)− (1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) = 0, (2.27)
where the last equality yields the first order condition. (2.27) coincides with the
equal profit condition between high and low wage firms. By the proof of propo-
sition 4 part 1 we know that this uniquely determines the measure of firms in
the high and the low group. Boundary solutions cannot be optimal because
one application would be waisted (global concavity follows mathematically from
∂2M/∂d2 = −v[λ22e−λ2(1 − e−µ1)/d + e−µ1(1 − e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2 − µ1)2/(1 − d)] < 0).
Q.E.D.
Next we show that the search outcome is constraint efficient. The proof relies on establishing
that two groups are sufficient to obtain the optimal allocation.
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Proposition 16 For given v = φV and given γ, the search process is constrained efficient,
i.e. it holds that
M(φ, F,γ,G) = max
F ′∈Υ1,G′∈Υ1×Υ2
M(φ, F ′,γ,G′),
where {G, F} conform to equilibrium conditions 1a), 2a) and 3.
Finally, we show that two groups are indeed necessary to obtain the optimal allocation when
a fraction of workers send two applications. One group of firms that all have equal hiring
probability is not efficient. This implies that a unique market wage is not able to yield the
optimal allocation.
Proposition 17 For given v = φV and given γ with γ2 > 0, identical hiring probabilities
for all firms cannot be constrained efficient, i.e. if F ∈ Υ1 and G ∈ Υ1 × Υ2 such that
η(w) = η¯ ∀ w ∈ V then (G, F ) /∈ argmaxF ′∈Υ1,G′∈Υ1×Υ2 M(φ, F ′,γ,G′).
In the proof we show that two groups can achieve the same hiring probabilities as a random
process. But the non-preferred group is too small compared to the optimum. All workers
would take a job from a firm in the preferred group. For those that end up taking jobs with
firms in the non-preferred group this is their last chance to avoid unemployment. Increasing
workers’ matching probability in the non-preferred group at the cost of decreasing their
matching probability in the preferred group improves matching for those workers for whom
it is the last option to avoid unemployment at the expense of a lower matching probability
for those who still might have another option.
This result is surprising because with one application different hiring probabilities for firms
are only warranted when there are productivity differences.26 Here the source for different
hiring probabilities is a sorting externality. Figure 2.2 illustrates this. At a unique market
wage representing a random application behavior, the indifference curve IC1 for the low and
IC2 for the high applications cross at the same point as the firms isoprofit curve IC. Since
the actual (dashed) indifference curve is kinked, it is not possible to achieve tangency with
the isoprofit curve. Area A indicates mutual gains for workers and firms from sending the
low applications to firms with different queue length and wage. Similar gains are indicated
26Shimer (2005) analyzes productivity differences when only one application is possible. If workers and
firms are homogenous only one hiring probability would be efficient (similar to our case for γ1 > 0 but
γ2 = 0), and only with heterogeneities of firms or workers different hiring probabilities are efficient.
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by area B for the high applications. The exact choice of w influences which gains are more
prominent, but due to the kink it is never possible to eliminate both. Figure 2.1 shows that
it is possible to achieve tangency with two wages.27
Wage w
Effective 
Queue
Length µ(w)
w
IC2
IC1
IP
A
B
Figure 2.2: Inefficiencies at a unique market wage. Areas A and B indicate mutual benefits for both workers
and firms.
2.3.2 Entry efficiency
We now turn to the efficiency of the entry decision. LetM∗(v,γ) be the number of matches
when there are γ applications and v firms and search is constrained efficient. For given γ we
have determined in the second part of proposition 4 the unique entry in the (appropriately
adjusted) equilibrium. This entry is constrained efficient given the application behavior.
27 Neither the figure nor the intuition apply to the case without recall. Without recall, it is not possible to
graph all relevant aspects in two dimensions, because next to the wage both the gross queue length λ(·) and
the retention probability ψ(·) remain separately important. Regarding the intuition, without recall equal
hiring probabilities for workers mean that the number of workers who have their last option in either group is
the same. Only with recall the rejected positions in the low group become available again for yet unmatched
workers, which induces a proportionally larger number of workers employed without another option in the
non-preferred group, yielding a positive externality when placing relatively more firms in the non-preferred
group.
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Proposition 18 Given γ, entry is constraint efficient. That is
M∗(v,γ)− vK = max
v′∈[0,∞)
M∗(v′,γ)− v′K, (2.28)
where v arises when equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 are fulfilled.
Proof: The number of matches is given by M∗(v,γ) = 1 − γ2
∏2
i=1(1 − pi) − γ1(1 − p1),
where p1 and p2 are the probabilities of getting a job at less preferred and the more preferred
group under two-group-efficient search. If γ0 = 1, then v = 0 arises and is clearly optimal.
If γ0 < 1, clearly v = 0 is not optimal given K < 1. Obviously v → ∞ is also not optimal.
The first order condition to the problem is
K = γ2[∂p1/∂v](1− p2) + γ2[∂p2/∂v](1− p1) + γ1[∂p1/∂v]
= [∂p1/∂v](γ1 + γ2)(1− ψ1) + [∂p2/∂v](1− p1). (2.29)
pi depends on v directly since the measure div of firms in group i depends on v directly. It
also depends on v indirectly since the two-group-efficient fraction di is a function of v. Yet by
the envelop theorem the indirect effect is zero and we can neglect the effect on di. Consider
the first term on the right hand side first. We can write ∂p1/∂v = [∂p1/∂µ1][∂µ1/∂v]. One
can show that [∂µ1/∂v](γ1 + γ2)(1− ψ2) = −d1µ21 − γ2µ1[∂p2/∂v]. Noting that [∂p1][∂v] =
−[(1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1)/µ21][∂µ1/∂v] = −[(p1 − e−µ1)/µ1][∂µ1/∂v] we obtain
[∂p1/∂v](1− p2) = d1(1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) + γ2(p1 − e−µ1)[∂p2/∂v].
Then (2.29) reduces to
K = d1(1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) + γ2(1− e−µ1)[∂p2/∂v]
= d1(1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1) + d2(1− e−µ1)(1− e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2)
= 1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1 ,
where the second line follows by taking the appropriate derivative and the last line follows
as a consequence of two-group-efficient search (see (2.27)). The last line also denotes the
profits of low wage firms in equilibrium. Applying (2.27) again yields a condition equal to
the profits of high wage firms. The first order condition is unique by the same argument
that established that a unique v implies zero profits, and the entry implied by equilibrium
conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 coincides with the entry implied by the first order condition.
Since the first order condition is unique and boundary solutions are not optimal, it describes
the global optimum. Q.E.D.
69
2.3.3 Application Efficiency
The number of applications that workers send in equilibrium is also constrained efficient.
We will account for the associated entry of firms and the search outcome, and therefore also
immediately establish the overall constrained efficiency of the equilibrium as in Proposition
15.
To gain intuition, consider the case of an individual worker who sends one application rather
than none. By the above analysis his marginal benefit is e−µ∗1 − c1. The benefit for society
comprises the cost −c1 and the additional production of one unit of output in the case
that the firm did not have another effective applicant, the probability of which is e−µ∗1 .
Therefore private and social benefits coincide. Similarly, if two wages are offered and a
worker sends a second application rather than only a single one, his private marginal benefit
is e−µ∗2(1 − e−µ∗1) − c2. Additional production arises only if the high firm does not have
another effective applicant but the low firm does, which has a probability e−µ∗2(1 − e−µ∗1).
Again social and private benefits coincide. Note that the marginal benefit is essentially
independent of γ, and therefore the decisions of other workers summarized in γ provide no
externality on other workers. This is due to the fact that any positive externality on firms is
dissipated in free entry, and the entry compensates any negative effects on other workers.28
Let v(γ) be the entry for a given vector γ of applications as implied by equilibrium conditions
1a), 1b), 2a) and 3. Then M∗∗(γ) =M∗(v(γ),γ) denotes optimal number of matches for a
given vector γ of applications given optimal entry and optimal search.
Proposition 19 The equilibrium vector γ of applications is constrained efficient, i.e. γ ∈
argmaxγ′∈43 M∗∗(γ ′)−Kv(γ ′)− γ′1c(1)− γ′2c(2).
Proof: For a given γ we know that equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 yield the
optimal entry and the optimal number of matches. Moreover, under these conditions firms
always receive zero profits and all surplus accrues to workers. Comparing different γ, it
is immediate that each worker always attains a marginal utility of u∗1 − c1 for his first
application, and u∗2−u∗1−c2 for his second application. Clearly the equilibrium conditions in
Proposition 14 specify the socially optimal entry. For the case where c1 = u∗1 (or c2 = u∗2−u∗1)
the privat and social benefits of the first (or second) application are zero, and therefore every
28This argument applies equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3 for different γ, i.e. we compare partial
equilibria for different γ.
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equilibrium for this case is constrained efficient. Q.E.D.
2.4 Generalization to N > 2 applications
In this section consider the case where workers can send any number i ∈N of applications, at
a cost c(i). We retain the assumption that c(0) = 0 and that marginal costs ci = c(i)−c(i−1)
are weakly increasing. We also assume c(i) > 0 for some i ∈N. We will establish existence,
(generically) uniqueness and constrained efficiency of the equilibrium. The analysis in the
preceding sections is a special case for c(i) = ∞ for all i > 2. Since many arguments are
straightforward generalizations of that special case, we focus mainly on the changes that are
necessary to adapt the prior setup. At the end of this section we show convergence to the
outcome of a competitive economy when the costs for applications vanish.
2.4.1 Extended Setup and Main Result
The extension mainly requires adaptations of the workers’ setup, while it remains essentially
unchanged for firms. DefineN as the largest integer such that c(N) ≤ 1. Clearly, it is neither
individually nor socially optimal to send more than N applications. Then the workers
strategy is a tuple (γ,G), where γ = (γ0, γ1, ..., γN ) ∈ 4N and G = (G1, G2, ..., GN ) ∈
×Ni=1Υi. γi denotes the probability of sending i applications, and Gi denotes the cumulative
distribution function over [0, 1]i that describes to which wages the applications are sent. Let
again (w1, ..., wi) satisfy w1 ≤ w2 ≤ ... ≤ wi and let Gij denote the marginal distribution of
Gi over wj . Then we can define W as the union of the support of all Gij with γi > 0. A
worker who applies to (w1, ..., wi) attains in analogy to (2.2) the utility
Ui(w1, ..., wi) =
i∑
j=1
[ i∏
k=j+1
(1− p(wk))
]
p(wj)wj − c(i). (2.2′)
A worker who applies nowhere attains U0 = 0. Instead of (2.3) the relevant condition is now
N∑
i=1
[
γi
i∑
j=1
Gij(w)
]
= v
∫ w
0
λ(w˜) dF (w˜). (2.3′)
To specify ψ(w) in the extended setup, consider a firm at wage w that receives an application
and let Gˆ(w˜|w) denote probability that the sender applied with his other N−1 applications
to wages weakly below w˜. If the sender only sent i < N − 1 other applications, then we
code (only for this definition) the additional N − 1− i applications as going to wage −1. So
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w˜ = (w˜1, ..., w˜N−1) ∈ ([0, 1]∪ {−1})N−1. Let h(w˜|w) count the number of applications sent
to wage w when the worker applies to w˜ and w. Replacing (2.7) we now specify
ψ(w) =
∫ [
1− 1− (1− p(w))
h(w˜|w)
p(w)h(w˜|w)
∏
w˜j>w
[1− p(w˜j)]
]
dGˆ(w˜|w). (2.7′)
The product
∏
w˜j>w
[1 − p(w˜j)] describes the probability that the worker will not take a
job at a strictly better wage. Its multiplier gives the probability that a worker will not
turn down a job offer because of a job at another firm with the same wage, conditional on
failing at higher wages (see the appendix for a derivation). Then the integrand gives the
probability that the worker takes the job at a different firm, which is integrated over the
relevant wages to which workers apply.
The definitions for all other variables, i.e. µ, p and η and pi remain unchanged. The
definition of the Market Utility Assumption now has to take into account the expanded
possibilities of workers. Let U∗i = supw∈Vi Ui(w). Then U
∗ = maxi∈{0,...,N} U∗i denotes the
Market Utility. Let Xi(w) ⊂ [0, 1]i denote the set of i-tuples (w1, ..., wi) with wj = w for
some j ∈ {0, ..., i} and wk ∈ V for all k 6= j. Then we can define Uˆi(w) = supw∈Xi(w) Ui(w)
as the optimal utility if the worker applies to wage w and to i− 1 other offered wages. The
Market Utility assumption then states that for w /∈ V⋃W we have µ(w) > 0 if and only
if U∗ = maxi∈{1,...,N} Uˆi(w). With these adjustments the equilibrium definition extends to
this section.
We are now in the position to extend the result from the previous section. Again we
recursively define µ∗i and u
∗
i as functions of the exogenous parameter K. Let u
∗
0 = 0. For
all i ∈N let (1− e−µ∗i − µ∗i e−µ
∗
i )(1− u∗i−1) = K and u∗i = e−µ
∗
i (1− u∗i−1) + u∗i−1. Note that
u∗i − u∗i−1 is strictly decreasing in i, while ci is weakly increasing. We will show
Proposition 20 An equilibrium exists. It is constrained efficient. Generically it is unique:
if ci∗ < u∗i∗ − u∗i∗−1 and ci∗+1 > u∗i∗+1 − u∗i∗, every workers sends i∗ applications, i∗ wages
will be offered, and every worker applies to each wage.
The proof relies essentially on an induction of the arguments presented in sections 2.2
and 2.3 to higher numbers of applications. The workers again partition the wages into
intervals relevant to each of their applications. The equilibrium interaction in each interval
corresponds to that in the one application case, again with the adjustment that the workers
72
”outside option” incorporates the expected utility that can be obtained at lower wages,
while the queue length incorporates the fact that some applicants are lost to higher wage
firms. Efficiency obtains again for similar reasons, only that now i∗ wages are necessary to
obtain the optimal allocation in the search process.
2.4.2 Convergence to the Competitive Outcome
We will now show that the equilibrium allocation converges to the unconstrained efficient
allocation of a competitive economy when application costs become small. For K < 1 the
competitive outcome has an equal number of workers and active firms, i.e. v = 1, each
active firm and each worker is matched, and the market wage is 1−K and coincides with
the utility of each worker.
We will consider a sequence of cost functions such that the marginal cost of the i’th applica-
tion converges to zero for all i ∈N. Rather than looking at these functions directly, it will
be convenient to simply consider the associated equilibrium number i∗ of applications that
each worker sends.29 Vanishing costs amounts to i∗ →∞. Let v(i∗) denote the equilibrium
measure of active firms, η(i∗) =
∫
η(w)dF and %(i∗) = v(i∗)η(i∗) the average probability of
being matched for a firm and a worker in the economy. Let w(i∗) denote the average wage
conditional on being matched and U∗(i∗) = u∗i∗ − ci
∗
(i∗) the equilibrium utility when i∗
applications are sent, where ci
∗
(·) denotes some cost function that supports an equilibrium
with i∗ applications per worker. We will show that
Proposition 21 The equilibrium outcome converges to the competitive outcome, i.e.
limi∗→∞ v(i∗) = 1, limi∗→∞ η(i∗) = limi∗→∞ %(i∗) = 1 and limi∗→∞w(i∗) =
limi∗→∞ U∗(i∗) = 1−K.
The structure of the proof uses the intuition for the competitive economy: For a given
measure v of active firms the competitive economy implies that (only) the long side of the
market gets rationed and the short side appropriates all surplus. We will show that for small
frictions (i∗ large) this still holds approximately. Then it trivially follows that v(i∗) → 1
because otherwise the firms either generate to much or too little profits to cover entry. Since
nearly all agents get matched, zero profits imply a wage of 1−K.
29For the case of multiple equilibria, consider for simplicity the case where all workers send the same
number of applications.
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2.5 Discussion and Outlook
2.5.1 Discussion of Main Assumptions
The paper builds on a micro-foundation of frictional markets based on coordination problems
between agents. One underlying assumption is that firms treat similar workers alike and
do not condition on applicants’ names, which seems plausible in larger markets. The other
assumption is that workers cannot coordinate to each apply to a different firm. This is
modeled by the requirement that in equilibrium workers use symmetric strategies, which
has the advantage that a worker does not need to know his ”role” in the application process
and can deploy the same strategy as everybody else. That such coordination problems
actually arise even in small groups has been shown experimentally by Ochs (1990) and
Cason and Noussair (2003). A deeper discussion can be found e.g. in Shimer (2005). It
is worth mentioning that anonymity of the worker’s strategy is not a crucial restriction. If
firms do not condition their hiring on workers’ names and workers use symmetric strategies,
than all firms with the same wage have to have the same effective queue length (otherwise
workers could get a higher utility by applying to those firms with the lower queue lengths).
This arises in essentially all papers in this field, and the anonymity assumption saves some
notational complexities in making the point precise.30
When we allow workers to choose their search intensity by sending multiple applications,
new modeling choices arise that are absent in one-application models. After the application
stage every worker is ”linked” to the multiple firms to which he applied. A firm might be
”linked” to multiple workers who applied to it (others might only have one worker or no
worker at all). Since each firm can only hire one worker, and each worker can only work
for one firm, any multiple application model has to specify how matches between firms and
workers are formed given those links. It also has to specify the division of surplus for a given
match.
For the allocation the main novelty in this paper is to allow firms to contact additional
applicants when their offer is rejected. The analysis of this recall process remains tractable
because of the assumption that workers can reconsider their options when they receive a
better offer. This is the case for example when workers receive a job contract and have
30See e.g. Shimer (2005) for the infinite economy case. Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) demonstrate this
property nicely in a finite economy.
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a certain time period to sign and return that contract. If they get a better offer during
this time period, they can switch their future employer essentially costlessly. This has the
convenient feature that it takes most strategic considerations out of the worker’s acceptance
decision in the extensive form matching process.
For the division of the surplus this paper assumes wage commitments. That is, the wage
paid in the final period is the posted wage, and firms cannot counter the proposals of
other firms. This again has the advantage of keeping the matching process tractable.31
It might be a good approximation in environments in which firms are able to make their
offers non-verifiable to other firms in order to avoid counter-proposals. It might also be
reasonable if individual company (or university) rules do not allow more than the allocated
budget for hiring decisions. A final case for this assumption arises in environments in which
market rules require binding job and wage descriptions ahead of the final matching. One
example of such an environment is the market for hospital interns in the United States.
Roth (1984) shows that the algorithm used to match interns with hospitals coincides with
the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm by Gale and Shapley (1962), on which the allocation in
this paper is based. He points out that participating hospitals have to specify wages and
job descriptions way in advance of the actual matching. Similar to the assumption in this
model, the algorithm only matches those hospitals and interns that have established contact
in a preceding application and interview process.
2.5.2 Relation to the Literature
Equilibrium directed search models resemble competitive economies in their assumption
that prices (or wages) are observable to everybody. Yet instead of a Walrasian Auctioneer
that facilitates trade, the agents have to individually try to find a trading partner. This
leads to frictions if agents cannot coordinate their strategies. Coordination frictions were
introduced by Montgommery (1991) and Peters (1991) through the assumption that workers
use symmetric application strategies. The symmetry assumption creates coexistence of un-
employment and unfilled vacancies; the wage offers direct more applications to higher offers.
Most models are restricted to one application per worker. For this case Montgommery al-
ready provides an argument for constrained efficiency induced by the wage announcements,
31Burlow and Levin (forthcoming) make similar assumptions. See section 2.5.2.
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which has been substantiated in subsequent contributions.32 Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001)
provide a detailed derivation of the equilibrium properties in a finite economy with homoge-
nous workers and firms. With one application recall is not an issue because every job offer
generates a match due to the workers’ lack of alternatives. When costs in the model pre-
sented here are such that workers apply only once, our equilibrium reduces to the (limit)
equilibrium in Burdett, Shi and Wright. Even with multiple applications the equilibrium
interaction within each segment induced by the workers’ response resembles the interaction
in the one application model, with some adjustments for the spillovers of one segment onto
the other (see section 2.2.2).
The only other directed search models that allow for multiple applications are Albrecht,
Gautier and Vroman (forthcoming) and the model presented in Chapter 1. Both models
consider a fixed number of applications per worker. The main difference arises in the allo-
cation of workers to firms on the given network. Both models restrict recall. If a firm has
at least one applicant, it makes exactly one job offer to one applicant. If that applicant
takes another job the firm remains vacant.33 This has the immediate feature that in both
models too many applications lead to congestion because too often several firms offer a job
to the same worker and one of the firms remains vacant. Therefore these models cannot
converge to the (unconstrained efficient) competitive outcome with increasing numbers of
applications.
Albrecht, Gautier and Vroman also differ in their assumption regarding the division of
surplus. They assume that firms pay at least the posted wage, but engage in Bertrand
competition if two of them offer a job to the same worker. They consider equilibria with
a single posted wage, and show that the equilibrium wage offer equals the workers’ outside
option. This arises because a higher posted wage does not yield any advantage if the worker
gets two offers. While paid wages are in part higher due to the Betrand competition, the
low offered wage nevertheless leads to excessive entry. This remains even in an extension in
which firms can recall one additional worker.
The model in Chapter 1 is closer to the model considered here in assuming commitment
to the offered wage. Firms make a single offer, and workers take the highest one. Despite
the difference in recall, the equilibrium interaction also features wage dispersion with the
32See the introduction.
33No recall corresponds to T = 1 in the matching stage of this paper.
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number of wages corresponding to the number of applications. While the worker’s problem
is quite different in the way that strategies of other agents translate into the relevant hiring
probabilities, the structural trade-offs for each worker are in fact similar, implying the
separation property (lemma 3) in both models. This suggests a robustness of the equilibrium
structure to the specifics of the recall process. The search process in Chapter 1 is inefficient
because wage dispersion leads to different hiring probabilities, but efficient search would
equalize the hiring probabilities. That is, one wage would be optimal.34
This paper incorporates search costs from the outstart, and introduces a tractable recall
process for models with multiple applications. Constrained efficiency obtains because firms
can ”price” their productive input, which is the queue of effective applications. As explained
in section 2.3, this arises because workers also care about the effective queue length and
adjust it in response to the wage announcements.
Without recall, firms and workers care about different things. Firms are interested in ef-
fective applications. But workers now care about all applications, no matter if these are
effective or non-effective: If another worker applies and gets an offer, the job is lost even
if that worker takes a better position. If a firm raises the wage (keeping the other wages
constant), workers adjust their applications such that the gross queue length reaches a new
level of indifference. Therefore firms can only ”price” the gross queue length, but not the
effective queue length that they really care about.35 The model considered here shows that
a more efficient allocation on the given network translates into efficient market interaction
in earlier stages of entry, wage setting and applying.
The recall process that we specify is a limit version of the deferred acceptance algorithm,
introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) to obtain stable matchings in the marriage market.
Bulow and Levin (forthcoming) also study non-cooperative wage commitments prior to
non-transferable utility matching. Like most papers on the marriage market, they allow
for heterogeneities but neglect limited ”links”. Exceptions are Roth and Perason (1999)
and Immorlica and Mahdian (2005), who consider a random network of links. This study
neglects heterogeneities other than through wages, but treats link formation as an active
34See footnote 27 for the difference in terms of search efficiency.
35This is likely to arise with any finite recall, i.e. finite T : In the final period T , the firm cares about
effective applicants while the workers’ care about all applicants. Since only few firms make offers in the final
period as T becomes large, this effect disappears in the limit.
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choice. The equilibrium wage dispersion leads to a structure on the network that strictly
improves the number of matches over a fully random network.
2.5.3 Conclusion of Chapter 2
This paper incorporates a micro-foundation for search intensity into a directed search frame-
work. Directed search can here be interpreted as strategic but frictional link formation be-
tween workers and firms. Search intensity can be viewed as a choice on the number of links
that the worker wants to obtain. We consider a stable allocation on the network arising from
a process in which firms contact (“recall”) additional applicants if their offer gets rejected.
Firms’ wage announcements price the network efficiently, given the workers’ coordination
problem. Equilibrium wage dispersion turns out to be the optimal response of the market to
the presence of frictions, since it allows for a network structure that minimizes coordination
failure. While other work has shown that multiple applications lead to inefficiencies in a
directed search setting when recall is restricted, we show that constrained efficiency prevails
in the presence of strategic search intensity when recall is allowed.
While we focused our attention on efficiency properties, the relative ease with which search
intensity and recall can be incorporated suggests that the model can be applied to answer
wider questions. In a first step we considered the connection between productivity and search
intensity: Lower search costs (or equivalently higher productivity) imply more search and
in the limit the equilibrium outcome approximates the unconstrained efficient competitive
allocation. Additional interesting questions concern the interaction between simultaneous
and sequential search in a repeated labor market interaction.36 We expect simultaneous
search to dominate in markets with long time-frames between applications and final hiring
decisions. The introduction of heterogeneity is also left for future research. If only firms
are heterogeneous in terms of productivity, it seems likely that higher productivity firms
will offer higher wages, and we expect firms’ wage offers to be clustered with the number
of clusters equal to the number of applications (similar to the mass points in this analysis).
For two-sided heterogeneity the matching process will have to be adapted to account for the
firms preferences over different workers.
36By an approach similar to the extension in Chapter 1 section 1.5.3 one can show that with exogenous
separations the steady-state of a repeated interaction looks similar to the one-shot interaction analyzed here.
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Chapter 3
Strategic Firms and Endogenous
Consumer Emulation
“One very clear impression I had of all the Beautiful People was their prudence. It may be
that they paid for their own airline tickets but they paid for little else.”
James Brady, Press Secretary to Ronald Reagan
From Superchic, Little, Brown 1974
There is a large literature on social learning in which consumers make inferences about
the quality of a good by observing what other consumers have done in the past. Banerjee
(1992) and Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and Welch (1992) analyze the case in which a sequence
of identical individuals consume once and prices are fixed. Bose, Orosel, Ottaviani and
Vesterland (1992a,b) extend the analysis to the case in which a monopoly seller facing a
sequence of identical one-time buyers behaves strategically in setting his price.12 In this
paper we analyze an infinite horizon problem in which a large number of firms with differing
qualities face a large number of repeat buyers who make inferences about the quality of
1Other work on social learning that is less related to the current paper includes Smallwood and Conlisk
(1979) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) who consider information transmission of consumption choices or
consumption outcomes, respectively, between boundedly rational consumers. Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004)
extend this to word-of-mouth communication among rational agents.
2There is research in other fields on the degree to which consumer choice is influenced by other people.
See Rogers (1995) for an overview over the marketing literature and for contributions to consumer research
and reference groups see e.g. Bearden and Etzel (1982), Bearden et al. (1989) and Burnkrant and Cousineau
(1975). In psychology see e.g. Cohen and Golden (1972) and Pincus and Waters (1977).
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firms that other individuals have patronized in the past. Buyers are heterogeneous, and
correct inference of an uninformed individual depends on which buyers are better informed,
which in turn depends on the (endogenous) frequencies of purchase decisions.
We consider a market environment in which consumers are initially uninformed about firms’
qualities, but will know a firm’s quality perfectly after purchasing once. Some individuals
consume more frequently than others, hence are on average better informed about quality.
When uninformed consumers can identify those who are likely to purchase more frequently,
they will optimally emulate a frequent purchaser.3 Because of the follow-on business of these
frequent purchasers, they will (in equilibrium) be rewarded by firms they patronize. This
will happen even though they do not pay more than others, and the price they pay does not
cover the costs of the preferential treatment. Sales to these more frequent purchasers are in
a sense ”loss-leaders”.
In our model consumers are heterogeneous with respect to income, which is assumed ob-
servable. We assume that the good of unknown quality is normal, so the relatively wealthy
consume more frequently, all else equal, and acquire information faster. Each consumer ob-
serves the choices of some other customers in the market. Individuals who have not found a
product of acceptable quality have an incentive to buy from the same firms as the customers
they observe, in the hope that those customers made informed decisions. When wealthier
customers acquire information faster, other customers will follow their decisions rather than
the decisions of poorer customers, if they observe both. Wealthier customers will then at-
tract additional business to the firm they patronize. If the firm can enhance the buying
experience of a customer by providing costly service, it will provide the service to their cus-
tomers who purchase more frequently, both to prevent them from switching to a competitor
or to induce them to consume more frequently. While typically wealthier customers receive
preferential treatment, there may be additional equilibria in which special service is given
to less affluent consumers. This arises because service reinforces the learning process, and
exclusive service to the poorer consumers can lead them to purchase more frequently than
the wealthy. This can only arise if service is sufficiently important.
3The idea that quality might only be varified through purchases and subsequent consumption goes back
at least to Nelson’s (1970) concept of experience goods. He suggests that the pattern of an individual’s
repeated purchases might not be random, but incorporate the information of others, a process he terms
guided sampling. We formalize the idea that this guiding might evolve endogenously with firms strategically
engaged in the guided sampling.
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In the analysis we focus on differences in income as the only source of heterogeneity between
consumers. We will show that in a simple setting this translates into different opportunity
costs in the search process. It will become clear in the analysis that the difference in the
opportunity cost drives the results. Thus, whenever there is consumer heterogeneity that
leads to one group consuming more frequently, uninformed consumers will follow the choices
of members of the frequently-consuming group when possible. If the difference is observable,
our model can be interpreted more broadly as an analysis of the interplay between consumer
search and firm competition in a market with two-sided heterogeneity and service as the
competitive strategic variable.4
We focus on income or wealth as the basis of heterogeneity for two reasons. First, for normal
goods higher income is associated with higher consumption, which is the driving force of
information acquisition in our model. Second, while income or wealth might be difficult
to observe and usually have to be inferred by secondary characteristics, this might still be
easier than to observe somebody’s taste preferences. Observability is crucial in this setup
since it is essential to a consumer’s decision about whom to follow.5
The paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces the model. Section 3
derives the equilibrium. To reduce complexity of the analysis, we postpone interesting but
straightforward discussions of the role of conspicuous consumption, visibility in the market
and relative position as well as some robustness checks to section 4. Omitted proofs and
derivations are provided in the appendix.
3.1 The model
This section sets out the model and the equilibrium concept, followed by a discussion of the
main modelling choices. There is a countably infinite number of periods and a continuum
I of consumers and a continuum J of firms. Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to
their per-period income. Each consumer i ∈ I has a type θi ∈ {p, w}, indicating whether he
4In such a world service can in fact be reinterpreted as a price reduction, leading to price as the competitive
variable. Note also that heterogeneity of opportunity costs in our model is identical to heterogeneity in
valuations for the good.
5We discuss in the last section how conspicuous consumption may arise when wealth must be inferred
rather than being directly observed.
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is poor or wealthy. The proportion of wealthy consumers with income yw is α ∈ (0, 1). The
other consumers have income yp < yw.
Firms are infinitely lived and heterogenous with respect to the quality q ∈ {ql, qh}, ql < qh,
of the otherwise identical good that they produce. We denote the proportion of firms with
quality qh by λ ∈ (0, 1).
Consumers’ types are public information. A firm’s type is initially known only to the firm,
and is fully revealed to a consumer after consumption of the firm’s output. Consumers die
each period with probability (1 − δ); when a consumer dies, a new consumer of the same
type is born; new agents know only the proportion of high quality firms.
The firm’s problem
Each firm j ∈ J supplies an indivisible good, the quality of which is exogenous and unchang-
ing over time. The market price of the good, P > 0, is exogenously given and identical for
all firms.6 Our focus is on firms’ interest in attracting customers, and for simplicity we
assume that the good can be produced costlessly. We assume that the firm chooses whether
to provide service to a given customer, and denote the level of service by s ∈ {0, s¯}, s¯ > 0,
where 0 denotes no service. At the time of service provision, the customer is already locked
in and cannot switch to a competitor for the current period. The cost c(s¯) of providing
service is c and is incurred in the period in which the service is provided. We assume c > P.
There is no cost to the firm if service is not provided, i.e. c(0) = 0.
Firms can commit to any current customer to give service the next time he returns. More
specifically, we model firm j’s choice stj,i in period t for consumer i as representing the firm’s
one-period-ahead service commitment. stj,i is the promise to provide this service level in the
first period τ > t that the customer returns. First period service is zero.
Let Itj(θ) be the set of consumers of type θ consuming products of firm j in period t, and
sˆtj,i firm j
′s service provision to consumer i. Then firm j′s per period profit is
pitj =
∫
i∈Itj(w)
P − c(sˆtj,i)di+
∫
i∈Itj(p)
P − c(sˆtj,i)di.
Firms maximize the discounted present value of per period profits,
∑∞
t=0 β
tEpitj .
The cost of the provision of service is shown in the per period profit expression above while
the benefits are indirect. A firm that promises service to an individual consumer may deter
the consumer from switching to a competitor or may increase the frequency with which he
6We argue in the discussion section that endogenizing the price would not qualitatively affect our results.
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patronizes the firm. Furthermore, the consumer’s choice may affect the future choices of
others. These (potential) benefits to a firm that provides service are reflected in the size
of the set of consumers who consume at the firm in the future. As a tie-breaking rule we
assume that firms offer service when indifferent.
The consumer’s problem
Consumers are heterogeneous with respect to income, but all can afford the product. That
is, yw > yp > P. Income is non-storable. In each period t ∈ T each consumer i ∈ I has
the two choices: Enter the market or not, and if entering the market, from which firm to
consume. If he does not enter, that is, does not purchase the good, he spends his income on
a numeraire good. Since income is non-storable and the price of the numeraire is normalized
to one, the consumer obtains y units of the numeraire in the case that he does not consume
in the market, and y − P units if he does.
At the beginning of each period, before the consumption decision is made, a taste shock
ρ is realized for each consumer that affects the degree to which he enjoys consuming the
indivisible good in that period. We assume this shock is an i.i.d. draw from distribution F
with density f and full support on [ρ, ρ¯], where −∞ ≤ ρ < ρ¯ ≤ ∞. If the consumer decides
to enter the market and consume from firm j in period t his utility in that period is
U t = qj + sˆtj + ρ
t + u(y − P ),
where qj is the quality of firm j, sˆtj is the service that he receives and ρ
t is the current period
taste shock. u(.) denotes the utility derived from the numeraire, which is assumed to be
increasing and strictly concave.
If the consumer is uninformed and chooses a firm randomly, his expected utility is
EU t = Ej [qj ] + ρt + u(y − P ).
If the consumer decides not to consume, his utility for that period is U t = u(y). Consumers
maximize the expected discounted utility
∑∞
t=0 δ
tEU t, where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the probability of
survival.
We assume that observing other consumers’ behavior partially substitutes for an individual’s
initial lack of information about product qualities. After the first time a consumer purchases
the indivisible good, he can costlessly observe at which firm a random wealthy consumer
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and a random poor consumer consumed in the previous period.7 This implies that only
players who participated in the market in the previous period are observable. For ease of
exposition we assume that if a consumer is indifferent between following other participants’
choices observed at different periods, he follows the most recent observation.
Equilibrium
In the spirit of Markov perfection we are interested in equilibria in which firms and consumers
base their decisions only on information that is relevant for their future payoffs. We also
restrict attention to anonymous strategies which condition only on the type (i.e., wealthy
or poor) but not on the name of other players. For firms, the minimal payoff relevant
information is the type of the consumer. We therefore consider equilibrium strategies s(θ)
in which the service commitment of a firm is a function of the consumer’s type. We will
consider symmetric pure strategies, that is, s(θ) is deterministic and the same for firms with
the same type. We denote by sl(·) the strategy for low and by sh(·) the strategy for high
quality firms.
For a consumer, the relevant information is the combination of quality and service he can
obtain; the name of the firm(s) from which he can receive that combination is not impor-
tant. Consequently, a consumer conditions his actions on D ⊆ {ql, qh} × {0, s¯}, where D
denotes the various quality-service combinations he has experienced. If the consumer has
not yet purchased, D = ∅. A strategy for a consumer of type θ ∈ {p, w} is then a tuple
(ρˆθ(D), σθ(D)) for all D. The term ρˆθ(D) denotes a reservation value for the taste shock: If
the taste shock is above ρˆθ(D), the consumer buys the product, otherwise he does not.8 If
he chooses to buy, σθ(D) specifies the choice of firm from which he purchases the good. If
D 6= ∅, then the consumer can return to a firm with quality-service combination (q, s) ∈ D,
he can follow the choice of either a wealthy or a poor player observed in the previous period,
or he can search randomly for a new firm. If D = ∅ only the last option is available, as by
7In section 3.3.2 we discuss alternative signal technologies. Observing more than one player of any type
does not alter any results. Observing only a random selection of N players’ choices each period should not
alter any qualitative results as long as N is sufficiently large.
The specification that newborn players in the market have no information about other players’ choices
prevents a situation in which everybody is following other market participants and no player is searching
randomly. The specification that only players who have consumed at least once in the market can observe
other players simplifies the analysis.
8In the appendix we show that reservation strategies are indeed optimal in our environment.
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assumption the consumer must search on his own in the first period of consumption.
Let nθ,t(D) denote the measure of type θ consumers with information D at time t, where
the law of motion is determined by the strategies of consumers and firms. With this we
can define a stationary equilibrium encompassing stationary distributions (1), consumer
optimality (2) and firm optimality (3):
Definition 5 (Stationary Equilibrium) A stationary equilibrium is a tuple S =
(sl, sh, (ρˆw, σw), (ρˆp, σp), nw, np) such that
1. nθ,t(D) = nθ(D) ∀t ∀D ∀θ.
2. For each consumer of type θ, strategy (ρˆθ, σθ) is optimal in the continuation game
for all D, when the consumer takes as given the strategies and fractions of the other
players as summarized in S.
3. For each high (low) quality firm sh (sl) is optimal given S.
Discussion of modelling assumptions
We will briefly discuss the modelling choices. A discussion of alternative assumptions and
their impact on our results is relegated so section 3.3.2.
Firms. We allow one-period-ahead commitment in order to eliminate implausible equilibria.
In particular, without commitment there is always an equilibrium in which a firm does not
provide service because the firm cannot convince the customer that he will also get service
in the future. In that case, giving service today is costly while it does not change the
future behavior of the customer, which implies that it is unprofitable to provide service
today. Therefore, even if the firm would like to give service to deter the customer from
switching to a competitor or to encourage the customer to consume more frequently, it
omits service because it cannot affect the customer’s belief about future service through
current period action. This arises no matter how profitable the business with this customer
is. We restrict attention to time-independent firm strategies to focus on the effects of
information transmission and to abstract from repeated game effects. Without commitment,
this implicitly restricts the beliefs of the consumer to be unaffected by current period actions,
rendering current period service an ineffective tool to change consumer behavior. Limited
commitment power, i.e., commitment only for the next time in which the customer returns,
provides a tool by which a customer’s beliefs about future service can be altered. This allows
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firms to provide service if the business with the consumer is sufficiently profitable. In the
last section we argue that the equilibrium with commitment will also be an equilibrium of
the game without commitment when we allow for non-Markovian strategies.
The assumption that no service is given during the first period of consumption at a firm
is also due to our restriction to Markovian strategies. If firms have a choice to give more
service than promised, they would not do so since they cannot influence the consumer’s
future behavior. Since there is no commitment to service in the first period, they would not
provide any service.
Taking prices as exogenously given allows us to focus on private information that is not fully
revealed through prices. That prices do not reveal all relevant information about products
is widely accepted. Strong restrictions on pricing behavior are therefore common in models
of this sort to preclude revelation of too much information (see, for example, Wolinsky
(1990)). On the other hand we can, with slight modification, interpret the service as a price
reduction. In this sense we do allow for price competition. We discuss the possibility of
price competition further in section 3.3.2.
Consumers. The combination of the numeraire good as an alternative to market con-
sumption and the taste shock together explicitly capture the idea that the good under
consideration is a normal good. The opportunity cost of going into the market is
u0 := u(y)− u(y − P ),
that is, the opportunity cost of foregone consumption of the numeraire good. Denote this
opportunity cost uw0 for the wealthy and u
p
0 for the poor. The strict concavity of u(·) then
implies that uw0 < u
p
0, that is, the wealthy have a lower opportunity cost of consumption than
the poor.9 Without service the wealthy will therefore consume at lower values of the taste
shock than the poor. Thus, on average the wealthy consume more often, which establishes
our version of the normal goods assumption.10
9Players get in each period y−P units of the numeraire for sure, independent of their current period choice.
Therefore wealthy players consumption-independent level of the numeraire is higher. Only the additional
amount that they might get, i.e. their opportunity cost, is lower. The term u(y − P ) in the utility function
will be dropped for all subsequent calculations as it only reflects a constant.
10Heterogeneity in the opportunity costs of consumption (rather than the heterogeneity in terms of income)
can be taken as primitive to allow for more general interpretations of the model. See section 3.3.1 for a
discussion.
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The taste shock also allows firms to encourage the customer to consume more frequently.
The timing of when to consume in the market is not exogenously fixed, but rather depends
on the current period taste shock and the utility of consumption. By promising service, the
firms can raise the utility of consumption and can thus encourage a consumer to consume
more frequently.
Our results are most interesting when c > P. In this case no consumer will receive service
only because of his own consumption at a firm. Firms will only provide service because a
consumer brings in additional customers who follow his lead. Consequently, this case clearly
highlights the effects of information transmission in the market.
Equilibrium. The equilibrium concept requires optimality in the continuation after a
deviation to ensure that the firms’ service promises affect behavior.
3.2 Optimal Behavior
As a first step to characterizing the stationary equilibria of this game, in the following
subsection we describe the optimal consumption behavior of a single consumer. Toward
this end, we consider a partial problem in which the service provision by firms and the
information in the market is exogenous. In the next subsection we endogenize the market
information, still under the assumption that firms service provision is exogenously given.
The subsequent subsection analyzes the behavior of the firms. Finally, we integrate the
parts in the analysis of the equilibria.
3.2.1 Consumer Search
Consider a consumer with opportunity cost u0 who has entered the market at least once,
that is, he will observe other participants in the market. Suppose all high quality firms offer
identical service s (either s¯ or zero) to this consumer in every period, and low quality firms
do not offer more service than high quality firms.11 If the consumer has not found a high
quality firm and chooses to purchase from a firm that he hasn’t previously frequented, there
is a probability which we denote γ that that firm will be of high quality. We take for now
as exogenous the process by which this consumer chooses a new firm, and hence γ.
11We will later show that it is always profitable for a high-quality firm to provide service if it is profitable
for a low-quality firm to provide service. Therefore this specification will be the relevant case.
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We are interested in the optimal decision rule of the consumer. The problem is a standard
search problem with one exception – the consumer does not search in every period. Rather,
the choice to enter the market is endogenous and depends on the taste shock, where high
taste shocks imply that he enjoys consumption of the uncertain good relatively more than
when the taste shock is low. It also depends on the qualities and service promises of the
firms he has encountered, as well as on his beliefs about the service he will be promised by
firms he has not yet encountered. The decisions about how frequently to search and how
to choose firms given the frequency of search are interlinked: a higher frequency of search
effectively implies a higher discount factor in the choice of firms. Higher quality or higher
service imply a higher value of consumption, thus increasing the frequency of consumption.
Using standard techniques, appropriately modified to this setting, we derive cutoff levels ρˆl
and ρˆh for the taste shock as functions of the quality of the best firm encountered so far,
for which the consumer is indifferent between consuming in the market and not consuming.
When the consumer has only experienced low quality firms, he will enter the market only if
his taste shock ρ exceeds the cutoff ρˆl, and his frequency of consumption is thus (1−F (ρˆl)).
If the customer has experienced at least one high quality firm, his relevant cutoff is ρˆh and
his frequency becomes (1− F (ρˆh)). Both ρˆl and ρˆh depend on the service strategies of the
firms.
To ensure that a cutoff exists that leads to this indifference, we make the following as-
sumption on the support of the taste shock that we will retain throughout: (ρ, ρ¯) ⊃
[uw0 − qh − s¯, up0 − ql]. This implies that ρ + qh + s¯ < uw0 , i.e., even in the most advan-
tageous situation of high quality and high service, there are taste shocks sufficiently low
such that not consuming is preferable. Similarly, it implies that ql + ρ¯ > u
p
0, so that even
in the most disadvantageous situation some taste shocks still induce the consumer to enter
the market. Requiring the support to be sufficiently large avoids the discussion of boundary
cases. Note that we consider different ranges for s¯ in some of our statements. If a range
conflicts the first inequality, it is vacuous by assumption. Yet for any shock distribution
that has unbounded lower support, i.e. ρ = −∞, the inequality above does not restrict s¯ in
any way and all ranges that we consider are possible.
Before stating the results on the consumer’s search behavior, it should be noted that the
consumer might not search for high quality firms if all firms offer service since the consumer
does not receive service in his first period of consumption at a firm. If he returns to a low
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quality firm, he will receive service immediately, while he will not receive any service if he
continues searching for a high quality firm until he consumes at least twice at such a firm.
However, if service is not too important, or the consumer is sufficiently patient, he will
search for high quality firms rather than remaining with a low quality firm. We summarize
this in the following lemma, which is proven in the appendix.
Lemma 6 If all firms offer service, there exists δ ∈ [0, 1) such that for δ ≥ δ the consumer
searches for high quality. If s¯ < γ(qh − ql), consumers always search for high quality firms,
i.e. δ = 0.
The following lemma describes the optimal service strategy for the consumer. Recall that
s denotes the service promised by high quality firms to this consumer, which is assumed
weakly larger than the service promised by low quality firms. Let
ρˆl = u0 −Eγ(q)− δγ1− δ
∫ ρˆl
u0−qh−s
[1− F (ρ)]dρ (3.1)
where Eγ(q) = γql+ (1− γ)qh. Let the state variable q be the best quality yet encountered.
Then we obtain:
Lemma 7 If δ ∈ (δ, 1) and high wage firms offer weakly higher service, then the consumer’s
optimal decision rule has the following structure:
If q = ql, sample a new firm if current period shock ρ ≥ ρˆl, otherwise don’t consume. If q =
qh, then return to the firm with high quality if the current period shock ρ ≥ ρˆh = u0− qh− s,
otherwise don’t consume.
Intuitively these cutoffs are easy to understand. At high qualities the consumer either gets
u0 or qh+s+ρ, and he chooses the higher one. At low qualities the trade-off is similar, except
that consumption yields only the average quality Eγ(q). On the other hand the frequency of
consumption in the future will be higher, because of the possibility of finding a high quality
firm. This is reflected in the increment in terms of frequency in the last term on the right
hand side of (3.1).
The primary interest in the lemma stems from its implications for the behavior of wealthy
consumers, i.e., those with the lower opportunity cost, relative to the behavior of poorer
consumers. To compare the two groups, consider a setting where high quality firms promise
service sh(p) to poor consumers and sh(w) to wealthy consumers, and low quality firms offer
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at most this level of service: sh(·) ≥ sl(·). Let ρˆpl and ρˆph be the threshold levels for a poor
consumer, and ρˆwl and ρˆ
w
h be the threshold levels for a wealthy consumer. The following
lemma compares these cutoff values:
Lemma 8 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1) and sh(·) ≥ sl(·).
1) If sh(w) ≥ sh(p), then the wealthy consume more frequently than the poor: ρˆwl ≤ ρˆpl
and ρˆwh ≤ ρˆph.
2 a) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ < up0 − uw0 , still ρˆwl < ρˆpl and ρˆwh < ρˆph.
2 b) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ > up0 − uw0 , then ρˆwh > ρˆph.
There exists unique ξγ > u
p
0 − uw0 such that ρˆwl < ρˆpl if s¯ < ξγ and ρˆwl > ρˆpl if s¯ > ξγ.
Proof: The result for the cutoff ρˆh follows directly from ρˆθh = u
θ
0−qh−sh(θ), θ ∈ {p, w}. For
ρˆl, rewrite (3.1) as ρˆθl −uθ0+Eγ(q) = − δγ1−δ
∫ ρˆθl
uθ0−qh−sh(θ)
[1−F (ρ)]dρ and observe that the left
hand side is increasing in ρˆθl and decreasing in u
θ
0 and the right hand side is decreasing in ρˆ
θ
l
and increasing in uθ0−sh(θ). For 1) and 2a) the wealthy have lower uθ0 and uθ0−sh(θ), therefore
their cutoff ρˆwl must be lower for the equality to hold. For 2b), if u
p
0 − sh(p) ≈ uw0 − sh(w),
then ρˆwl < ρˆ
p
l since u
w
0 < u
p
0. Since ρˆ
p
l is by (3.1) strictly increasing and unbounded in s¯
when sh(p) − sh(w) = s¯ but ρˆhl is constant, there exists a unique ξγ such that ρˆwl = ρˆpl if
s¯ = ξγ . Q.E.D.
If wealthy and poor consumers are treated equally by firms, this result simply restates our
formulation of the normal goods assumption. The wealthy consume more frequently both
in the search phase and after they have found a high quality firm. The explicit formulation
allows us to compare the frequency of consumption even in the cases where consumers are
treated differently by firms. As long as the service benefit does not outweigh the differences
in the opportunity costs of consumption, wealthy consumers still consume more frequently
even if poor consumers are treated preferentially. If the impact of service outweighs the
difference in the opportunity costs, the frequency of consumption at high quality firms
becomes larger for the poor than for the wealthy. This does not necessarily translate into a
higher frequency of consumption at low quality firms. As long as consumers are searching
they do not obtain service, and without service the wealthy have a stronger incentive to
consume. Only if the service at high quality firms is sufficiently attractive, poor consumers
search more frequently for high qualities than the wealthy. Otherwise it still means that
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wealthy consumers find high quality firms relatively faster, even if service outweighs the
exogenous difference in opportunity costs.
We turn next to endogenizing the probability γ.
3.2.2 Consumers’ stationary behavior
In equilibrium, both high and low quality firms decide whether to provide service to each
of the two types of consumers. Before examining the full model, we take the firms’ choices
regarding service as fixed and examine consumers’ behavior in steady state as they choose
optimally, given firms’ choices. We will again consider the case where all high quality firms
offer weakly higher service than low quality firms.
In this case all consumers, wealthy and poor, will sample in a way that gives the highest
probability of identifying a high quality firm. Thus, both the uninformed wealthy consumers
and the uninformed poor follow the same group. The probability of drawing a high qual-
ity firm, γ, when following consumers of this group (which we will call ”leaders”) is now
endogenous. γ depends on the particular stationary equilibrium we are looking at.
We note that following any consumer, wealthy or poor, is preferable to searching randomly.
At worst, that consumer who is followed has not found a high quality firm yet, in which
case the firm he or she purchased from is as likely to be high quality as a randomly sampled
firm. In addition, there is positive probability that the consumer who is being mimicked has
found a high quality firm and purchases only from that firm. Hence, it is strictly better to
follow any other consumer than to sample randomly; thus, in any equilibrium γ ≥ λ. Due
to this inequality δ in lemma 6 can be established independent of the exact value of γ, and
long-lived consumers indeed search for high qualities.
An individual who follows the leaders sees only those who have consumed in the previous
period. The probability that this individual will find a high quality firm is the proportion
γ of the leaders who have identified a high quality firm and who consumed in the previous
period. When the wealthy identify high quality firms with probability γ when following the
leaders, a fraction γw of the wealthy who consume in any given period will purchase from a
high quality firm. We will first show how γw is determined. If the wealthy themselves are
the leaders, we then have to show that γ = γw, i.e. that a fixed point exists. Given also that
the poor follow the leaders, a fraction γp of the poor who purchase in any given period will
do so from a high quality firm. If the poor are the leaders, the fixed point will be γ = γp.
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The goal of this section is to establish conditions under which γw > γp and vice versa. This
will determine which group is being followed, since an uninformed consumer will follow the
group with the higher γθ.
To calculate γθ, θ ∈ {p, w}, we will consider each group individually. We will focus on the
wealthy, but the derivations for the poor are analogous when replacing w with p. In the first
period in which a wealthy person consumes, he samples a firm randomly and has probability
λ of drawing a high quality. In every period thereafter he draws a high quality firm with
probability γ whenever he searches. To derive the stationary distribution we must keep
track of the proportion of wealthy consumers whose best quality encountered so far is ql, qh
or ∅ respectively, where ∅ stands for those who have not yet consumed. In period t denote
these by nw,tl , n
w,t
h and n
w,t
∅ .
The relevant flow equations can then be constructed as follows: In period t + 1 consumers
who have not tried any product include all newborns and those consumers who had not yet
consumed at the beginning of period t, did not consume a product in period t and survived:
nw,t+1∅ = (1− δ) + δF (ρˆw∅ )nw,t∅ , (3.2)
where F (ρˆw∅ ) > 0 is the probability that a wealthy person who does not yet observe other
market participants does not consume in the market. The cutoff ρˆw∅ is analytically compli-
cated,12 but our specification that in addition to the newborn, all consumers prior to their
first purchase lack information about other market participants, eliminates F (ρˆw∅ ) in the
derivation of γw.
Wealthy consumers in t+1 who have state variable ql include those without information at
the beginning of period t who consumed a product in t, drew quality ql and survived; those
who had not found a satisfactory quality before t, drew quality ql in t and survived; and
those survivors from the prior period who did not consume a product and had experienced
12For a given γ, the taste shock ρˆw∅ is characterized by the indifference of the customer between
going into the market and sampling a random firm vs. taking his outside option. If he goes into
the market, his continuation payoff EVρ′(q, ρ
′) is given in the appendix in (A.44) and (A.46). Let
X = λ [(1− δ)qh + δEVρ′(qh, ρ′)] + (1 − λ) [(1− δ)ql + δEVρ′(ql, ρ′)], then ρˆw∅ ∈ (ρ, ρ¯) is characterized by
[1− δF (ρˆw∅ )][(1− δ)ρˆw∅ +X] = (1− δ)uw0 + δ
[
(1− F (ρˆw∅ ))X +
∫ ρ¯
ρˆw∅
ρdF (ρ)
]
.
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quality ql before:
nw,t+1l = δ
[
1− F (ρˆw∅ )
]
(1− λ)nw,t∅ (3.3)
+δ [1− F (ρˆwl )] (1− γ)nw,tl
+δF (ρˆwl )n
w,t
l
The cutoff ρˆwl is given by (3.1) under the opportunity cost u
w
0 .
Finally, the people who have state variable qh constitute
nw,t+1h = δ
[
1− F (ρˆw∅ )
]
λnw,t∅ (3.4)
+δ [1− F (ρˆwl )] γnw,tl
+δnw,th
which is similar to (3.3) except for the last line: Since at qh people return to the same firm,
their state variable is qh regardless of whether they consumed last period.
Stationarity is characterized by nw,t
′
ω = n
w,t
ω = nwω for all t and t
′ and ω ∈ {∅, l, h}. We can
use equations (3.2) to (3.4) to get
nw∅ =
(1− δ)
1− δ + δAw , (3.5)
nwl =
δn∅Aw(1− λ)
1− δ + δγBw , (3.6)
and
nwh =
1
1− δ
δn∅Aw[(1− δ)λ+ δγBw]
1− δ + δγBw , (3.7)
where Aw ≡ [1 − F (ρˆw∅ )] represents the frequency of consumption for a wealthy consumer
who has never consumed the product before, and Bw ≡ 1−F (ρˆwl ) represents the frequency
of consumption for a wealthy consumer who has only experienced low quality firms. Since
γw represents the fraction of wealthy consumer who consumed in a period who have found
a high quality firm, we must find the measure of consumers who actually consume in any
given period. Denote by ϕwl (ϕ
w
h ) the measure of wealthy consumers who consume at low
quality (high quality) firms in any given period in the steady state.
In any period the consumers who consume at ql are all the uninformed players nw∅ who
consume with probability Aw = [1−F (ρˆw∅ )] and draw a low quality with probability (1−λ),
plus all informed players who have not found a high quality firm, nwl , who consume with
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frequency Bw = [1− F (ρˆwl )] and draw a low quality firm with probability (1− γ). Thus we
have
ϕwl = n
w
∅ A
w(1− λ) + nwl Bw(1− γ). (3.8)
For ϕwh , we have similar terms for the uniformed and unsatisfied players, plus an additional
term reflecting those people who had already found a firm of satisfactory quality in the past,
nwh , times their frequency of consumption C
w ≡ [1− F (uw0 − qh − sh(w))]. Therefore
ϕwh = n
w
∅ A
wλ+ nwl B
wγ + nwhC
w.
Since γw = ϕ
w
h
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
we get
1− γw = ϕ
w
l
ϕwl + ϕ
w
h
=
nw∅ A
w(1− λ) + nwl Bw(1− γ)
nw∅ A
w + nwl B
w + nwhC
w
, (3.9)
where again Aw, Bw and Cw represent the frequencies of consumption for those wealthy
consumers who have not consumed from any firm before, those who have only experienced
low quality firms and those who have previously experienced a high quality firm, respectively.
Substituting the value for nw∅ , n
w
l and n
w
h from equations (3.5) to (3.7) and rearranging yields
an expression for γw that is independent of the initial frequency Aw, i.e.
γw = 1− [1− δ + δB
w] [1− λ]
1− δ + δ(1− λ+ γ)Bw +
[
δλ+ δ21−δB
wγ
]
Cw
(3.10)
for a given ρˆwl , which is implicitly defined in equation (3.1) in lemma 7.
The proof of the following lemma, which is left to the appendix, shows that there is a fixed
point γw = γ.
Lemma 9 There exists a fixed point γw = γ, γ ∈ (λ, 1), in equation (3.10) such that
equation (3.1) is also satisfied.
We argued above that it is always better to follow some group than to sample randomly.
Therefore in a stationary equilibrium, γ = γw or γ = γp, where γp is constructed analogously.
While an uninformed consumer does better by following any other consumer than searching
randomly, one should expect that it is better to follow a wealthy consumer than a poor
consumer. Suppose that the level of service offered to wealthy consumers is at least as large
as the service offered to poor consumers. Then while uninformed, the wealthy will consume
more frequently than the poor, and hence, will discover a high quality firm more quickly.
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While this argument is appealing, it is not trivial. The wealthy search more often at low
quality firms in any period, diluting the visibility of the wealthy who have identified a
high quality firm. Partial differentiation of (3.10) reveals that ∂γw/∂Bw > 0 if γ > λ,
and therefore the dilution effect does not outweigh the greater frequency with which they
consume. If the frequency of consumption while searching for a high quality firm increases
for either group, this unambiguously increases the quality of their signal. Nevertheless,
the visibility induced through the frequency of consumption is important: If the poor is
the group that receives service (which we will show is only possible if service is sufficiently
valuable), then it is possible that the poor consume less frequently prior to identifying a
high quality firm than the wealthy, but it is nevertheless better to follow the poor. The
reason is that the poor consume much more frequently at high quality firms, and therefore
those who have identified a high quality firm are a greater proportion than the proportion
of wealthy who have identified a high quality firm.
We summarize this in the following proposition the proof of which is left to the appendix.
Recall that ξγ was introduced in lemma 8 as the threshold on service below which the poor
search less frequently at low qualities even if they are the ones that receive service.
Proposition 22 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1) and γ ∈ (λ, 1) Consider a candidate stationary equilibrium
with sh(·) ≥ sl(·). Then there exists ξˆγ ∈ (up0 − uw0 , ξγ) such that
1) If sh(w) ≥ sh(p), then γw > γp > λ.
2 a) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ < ξˆγ , still γw > γp > λ.
2 b) If sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ > ξˆγ , then γp > γw > λ.
Parts 1) and 2a) of the proposition provide conditions on the service level that imply that
all consumers will want to follow wealthy consumers. Only if these conditions do not obtain
could it be possible that it is preferable to follow the poor.
3.2.3 Firms’ behavior
We next analyze service provision by the firms. We establish that it is profitable for the
firm to provide service to consumers in a group if they are followed by sufficiently many
consumers of the other type. We also prove that high quality firms will always provide at
least as high a service level as low quality firms, which we have so far taken as exogenous.
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A key observation for this result is that in any stationary equilibrium, if a high-quality firm
promises in any period service s¯ to a consumer, then the consumer will return to this firm
the next period he enters the market, regardless of his expectations about future service.
The intuition behind this observation is that accepting the optimal per-period outcome of
high quality and high service and searching thereafter for a new firm yields higher utility
than searching immediately. Therefore, high-quality firms can always ensure the return of
a consumer by promising him service. The question in this section is when this will be
profitable.
Our first result concerns the equilibrium profit contribution of a customer. In a stationary
equilibrium, a consumer who purchases from a firm has the same expected number of fol-
lowers in every period. Thus, the benefit to a firm of a single visit of a particular customer
is the following: He pays price P , potentially receives service at cost c > P , and induces the
expected discounted lifetime equilibrium profit that the firm generates from his next-period
followers. Call this benefit Π. Π is an equilibrium object that depends on the strategies of
the firm in question as well as the strategies of other firms and consumers. If a firm deviates
and promises s′ instead of the equilibrium promise s, the benefit of the next return visit is
Π−(c(s′)−c(s)). Since in a stationary equilibrium after a one shot deviation the continuation
game is unchanged once the customer returns, only the immediate cost of service changes
from c(s) to c(s′). In particular, the behavior of the customer once he returns as well as
the behavior of the followers is unchanged.13 For example, promising no service instead of
service in any period changes the benefit of the next visit of the consumer from Π to Π+ c,
as the firm saves the service costs next time. Yet it might delay the consumer’s return, as
now consumption is less valuable compared to the opportunity cost of consumption. If the
consumer switches to a competitor, Π + c will in fact never be realized.
Consequently, if a particular consumer generates sufficient indirect profit it will pay a firm
to promise that consumer service to induce him to purchase more frequently. In addition,
Proposition 22 provides conditions under which it is optimal to follow consumers of type θ.
13This is a consequence of the assumption of markov perfection which is embedded in the requirement
that the equilibrium service strategy does not depend on past histories. In the situations that we analyze
the consumer is not indifferent between his choices of searching for a new firm or returning to a previous
firm. Furthermore, the decision situation is effectively unchanged compared to on the equilibrium path play
once he returns after a one-shot deviation. Taken together, this implies that his continuation strategy once
he returns will be his on-the-equilibrium-path strategy.
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If the fraction of this leading group is not too large, the spillover benefits of the followers
will make it profitable for high quality firms to provide service to the leaders. We state this
formally in the next proposition.
Moreover, we establish that it is indeed optimal for high quality firms to outbid low quality
firms in their pursuit of valuable customers. We show that if it is profitable for a low
wage firm to provide service to a consumer, it is also profitable for a high wage firm to
provide service in order to keep the business of this consumer. In Lemma 6 we showed
that if consumers are sufficiently long-lived, that is, δ ∈ (δ, 1), they will continue to search
for a high quality firm rather than return to a low quality firm. This was derived under
the assumption that high quality firms offer at least weakly more service. The result here
establishes that this assumption is indeed fulfilled. We summarize this in the following
proposition, the proof of which is relegated to the appendix. For more compact notation of
the proposition, let αw = α and αp = 1− α.
Proposition 23 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1).
i ) Suppose all uninformed consumers follow consumers of type θ. Then there exists α¯ > 0
such that for αθ < α¯, in any stationary equilibrium sh(θ) = s¯.
ii) In any stationary equilibrium, either sh(θ) ≥ sl(θ) for θ ∈ {p, w}; or sh(θ) < sl(θ) but
type θ consumers nevertheless do not return to low quality firms.
We should point out that two forces can lead to high-quality firms’ willingness to provide
service. One is competitive pressure. If other high-quality firms offer service, then if a single
firm does not provide service, the consumer might not return, preferring to search for another
firm that provides service. The second is the encouragement effect, that is, the consumer
returns more frequently when he is offered service. In our model the encouragement effect is
important to sustain a high-service equilibrium. That is due to the Markovian assumption
on the firms’ strategies which implies that service provision only depends on the consumer
type, and not on the firm’s own or other players’ past actions. In an equilibrium in which
the high-quality firms are supposed to promise service, the firm’s strategy specifies offering
service again in the continuation game even if it deviated for a period and did not offer
service. After a deviation a consumer will therefore still expect to get a service promise the
next time he consumes there (even though he will not get any actual service provided in
that period) and it is better for him to return than to search for a new firm in which he
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also will not receive any service in the first period of consumption, but might draw a low
quality. Therefore, the consumer would return even if service is not provided for one period.
The motivation for high quality firms to offer service then comes from the encouragement
effect. If we impose less stringent assumptions on the equilibrium (in particular, dropping the
restriction to Markov strategies), the competitive forces can be very important. If consumers
believe that they will not be promised service by a firm ever again if it does not promise
service in a given period, then service provision can be sustained by the competitive threat
that consumers search for new firms that do offer service, which seems intuitively appealing.
With these results on optimal strategies for consumers and firms and the steady state
derivations we now turn to the stationary equilibria of the game.
3.2.4 Equilibria
We first provide a necessary condition for equilibria when the value of service is not too
large. In any such equilibrium, the poor follow the wealthy, and if service is provided, it
is provided only to the wealthy. This is driven by the fact that the wealthy accumulate
information faster than the poor.
Proposition 24 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1). There exists ξ > up0 − uw0 such that for s¯ < ξ in any
stationary equilibrium all uninformed consumers follow wealthy consumers after their initial
purchase. If service is provided in equilibrium, it is only provided to the wealthy.
Proof: By proposition 23 higher quality firms provide weakly higher service. In combination
with lemma 6 we know that all consumers search for high quality firms. That is, all con-
sumers, wealthy and poor, will in equilibrium follow the distribution that places the highest
weight on high quality firms. By Proposition 22 s¯ < ξˆγ ensures that all consumers will follow
the wealthy, even if the poor receive the service. Since P < c service is only provided (i.e.,
promised and then delivered) to players who have followers. Therefore, in equilibrium only
the wealthy can receive service. While ξˆγ depends on γ, one can show that it is bounded
away from up0 − uw0 for all γ ≥ λ. Q.E.D.
Whether stationary equilibria with or without service exist depends on the profit generated
by the followers that a consumer has. Since P < c service will only be provided when
the profit generated by one’s followers is sufficiently large. We establish existence and
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uniqueness separately for the cases when there are many or few poor.14 With many poor
people, the wealthy arise unambiguously as the leaders and will be provided with service
to further encourage their search externality. With few poor people there still is always
an equilibrium in which everybody follows the wealthy, but no service is provided. Only
if service sufficiently outweighs the difference in the opportunity costs can the poor receive
service and be the leaders.
When analyzing the equilibria, we will discuss cases where a consumer is followed mainly
by consumers of his own type. It is therefore important to understand whether this induces
service or not. Consider the case where there is only one group of consumers. Consumers
without followers do not receive service, since the price of the good is lower than the cost
of providing service. If consumers do not die, i.e., δ = 1, there cannot be a steady state in
which a non-trivial fraction of consumers has not found a high quality firm. Therefore in
any steady state equilibrium, consumers do not search for new firms, and thus consumers
do not have followers. Therefore no firms will find it profitable to provide service to any
consumer, independently of the service provided by other firms. By continuity, there exists
δ∗ < 1 such that this holds for all δ ∈ (δ∗, 1), where δ∗ is a function of the price P and the
cost c.15 That is, there exists a value δ∗ such that for survival rates greater than δ∗, no firm
would find it profitable to provide service to consumers who are only followed by consumers
of their own type, independent of the service promises of the other firms.
The following proposition establishes the existence of equilibria in an environment when the
ratio of poor to wealthy consumers is sufficiently large. All equilibria exhibit service only
for the wealthy customers if the survival rate is sufficiently high or service is lower than the
threshold ξ in Proposition 24.
Proposition 25 Fix δ ∈ (δ, 1) and s¯ > 0. There exists α∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for α ≤ α∗ the
following holds:
14We have not shown that the fixed point distribution when the rich follow themselves is unique. Also,
service by low quality firms might make no difference to the consumers’ search. Therefore equilibria might
not be unique, but all exhibit the properties we want to establish.
15This can also be seen by considering equation (A.51) with Np = 0 and Nr = 1 − γ, where γ is the
fixed point to equation (3.10). Since 1 − γ converges to 1 and 1−γ
1−δ to
1
1−F (ur0−qh−s¯)
for δ converging to 1,
Πrh ≈ (P − c) < 0 for δ large. The argument can be extended to low quality firms and poor consumers,
and to the case where other firms do not provide service. It remains valid even when β = δ, i.e., the firms’
discount factor is also large.
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1) There exist stationary equilibria in which all consumers follow wealthy consumers while
searching. Consumers stop searching only when they find a high quality firm, and high
quality firms offer service to the wealthy and not to the poor. Low quality firms may
offer service but do not attract repeat business.
2) All stationary equilibria are of this form if s¯ < ξ or δ > δ∗ and α∗ sufficiently small.
Proof: Assume all players follow the wealthy when searching. Then the poor will never
be promised service by any firm that expects repeat business, as by P < c the firm would
make a loss. The wealthy will be promised service by all high quality firms. These firms
can induce the consumer to return by offering service. For α∗ small enough Proposition 23
establishes that this will be the only choice that does not have a profitable deviation. By
lemma 6 low quality firms are never repeatedly visited by a wealthy player. It is immediate
that all players have an incentive to follow the wealthy: since sh(w) ≥ sh(p) by Proposition
22 γw > γp > λ, and following the wealthy is better than following the poor or sampling
randomly.
For s¯ < ξ no other equilibria exist, as by Proposition 24 all players follow the wealthy and
the assumption of the prior paragraph is fulfilled. If δ > δ∗, then it is not profitable to
provide service to the poor if they are followed only by other poor consumers. If α∗ is
sufficiently small, then each poor consumer can only have a negligible number of wealthy
followers, and providing service to the poor remains unprofitable even if all consumers follow
the poor. If the poor do not receive service, they prefer to follow the wealthy, and again the
assumption of the prior paragraph is fulfilled. Q.E.D.
The proposition shows that firms indeed support the learning process when the service
can be concentrated on sufficiently few wealthy people who achieve a high visibility in the
market. For all consumers the outcome is clearly preferred to a world in which service is
absent. Wealthy consumers benefit directly from the service and indirectly because they
obtain high qualities faster. Poor customers benefit also, but only indirectly through the
improved search externality provided by the wealthy. High quality firms benefit, because
consumers find high quality firms faster. Yet their cost of providing service might outweigh
this benefit. Low quality firms unambiguously loose compared to a world without firms’
ability to interference with the consumers search process. Service increases the informational
externality between consumers, and a newborn consumer tries on average fewer low quality
firms before finding high quality.
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As a comparison we analyze the case in which the ratio of wealthy to poor players is reversed.
If there are few poor people, there is still always an equilibrium in which everybody follows
the wealthy. Only if service is sufficiently important is there also a second equilibrium in
which everybody follows the poor.
Proposition 26 Fix δ > max{δ, δ∗} and s¯ > 0. There exists α∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that for
α ≥ α∗∗ the following holds:
1) There exist stationary equilibria in which all consumers follow wealthy consumers while
searching. Consumers stop searching only when they find a high quality firm. High
quality firms do not offer service to any consumer. Low quality firms may offer service
but do not attract repeat business.
2) If s¯ < ξ these are the only equilibria. There is ξ′ > up0 − uw0 such that there also exist
equilibria in which all consumers follow poor consumers while searching. Consumers
stop searching only when they find a high quality firm. High quality firms offer service
to the poor and not to the wealthy. Low quality firms may offer service but do not
attract repeat business.
3) There do not exist stationary equilibria with other properties.
Proof: Assume all consumers follow the wealthy. Since δ > δ∗ the wealthy do not receive
service due to wealthy followers, and α∗∗ small enough assures there will not be sufficient
poor followers to warrant service.16 Also the poor do not get service. Proposition 22 then
establishes γw > γp > λ, and indeed everybody wants to follow the poor. By Proposition
24, for up0 > u
w
0 and s¯ < ξ there cannot be any other stationary equilibria in which the
wealthy are not being followed.
Consider a stationary equilibrium in which the poor do not follow the wealthy. It must then
be the case that the wealthy follow the poor. If the wealthy did not follow the poor, the
poor would not receive service, and everybody would follow the wealthy as in the previous
paragraph. If the wealthy follow the poor, then by lemma 23 high quality firms would indeed
want to provide service to the poor. Yet the wealthy will only follow the poor if γp ≥ γw.
By Proposition 24 this only happens for s¯ ≥ ξˆγp . Since γp is bounded away from one for all
16The contribution by the poor is δ
ϕ
p
l
ϕw
l
+ϕw
h
1−α
α
P
[
1 + δβ
1−δβ (1− F (up0 − qh))
]
. Since for a given δ the term
ϕ
p
l
ϕw
l
+ϕw
h
is bounded from above and independent of α, the expression converges to zero as α converges to one.
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s¯ since some newborns are always searching, it is easy to see that ξˆγp is bounded. Therefore
there exists ξ′ such that s¯ ≥ ξ′ implies γp ≥ γw. Q.E.D.
Proposition 26 reveals the natural advantage that the wealthy possess in information gath-
ering. Following the wealthy is always an equilibrium, as in the absence of service it is best
for everybody to follow them. Only if service is very attractive will the poor search enough
such that following them can be worthwhile for the wealthy. As discussed in the context of
Proposition 22, service has to sufficiently outweigh the opportunity cost, but does not need
to be so high that poor consumers actually find high qualities faster than wealthy consumers.
It is worth noticing that in the case where both types of equilibria coexist, consumers are all
better off in the equilibrium where consumers follow the poor and the poor obtain service.
Propositions 25 and 26 establish that it is the information that is revealed in the choices
of the wealthier players that makes them valuable to other players and, by extension, to
firms. If there are sufficiently many consumers who value this information, the wealthy are
in a unique position to profit from this if service is not too valuable. Poor consumers are
not substitutes for the wealthy as their actions reveal less information than those of the
wealthy, even if the visibility of the poor is much better when there are fewer of them. Note
that we have effectively ruled out trigger strategies in the analysis.17 Hence, firms’ decisions
are primarily influenced by the per period contribution of a customer. Thus, it is not the
frequency of consumption per se that allows wealthier consumers to command service, but
rather the induced information that is valued by other consumers, and in turn by the firms.
3.3 Discussion
The mechanics of our model are sufficiently transparent to allow the discussion of additional
social components such as conspicuous consumption, visibility and the importance of relative
position in society. We discuss these in the next subsection. We discuss the robustness of
our results to various changes in the model assumptions in the following subsection and then
conclude.
17These would have allowed richer customers to impose harsher punishment on firms, as their overall
lifetime consumption is higher and their effective discount factor is higher due to more frequent consumption.
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3.3.1 Social Interaction
Our interpretation of the different opportunity costs uw0 and u
p
0 has been derived from
differences in income that affect the consumers’ budget constraints. For the analysis, uw0
and up0 could be taken as primitives that result from heterogeneity with respect to something
other than income. They could, for example, reflect differences in tastes. If you look for
a Swedish restaurant, Swedes might have a greater preference than the average consumer,
that is, have lower u0. For running shoes, runners will consume more, and good jazz places
are likely most likely discovered by following jazz enthusiasts. While our analysis can easily
handle exogenous differences, our focus on income differences stems from two observations.
For normal goods income differences will induce higher consumption for the wealthy. More
importantly, in many situations income differences might be easier to infer than differences
in taste. If taste heterogeneity is similar for different income categories but only income
differences are observable, then the firms’ treatment decisions and the consumers’ decisions
on whom to follow will be based on the observable characteristic.
The ability to distinguish between wealthy and poor is important in this context. Typically
this must be inferred from some attribute, for example from the suit one wears or the
car one drives, suggesting a rational basis for conspicuous consumption.18 A standard
signalling argument would explain why those who would like to consume more frequently
would rationally choose to spend the money for a Rolex watch if it lead to greater service
while less frequent purchasers would not. It is interesting to note that the inefficiencies
associated with the excess spending on such items is at least partially offset by the increased
efficiency in the search process made possible by the conspicuous consumption.
Our results also highlight the importance of visibility in the marketplace. Given our signal
technology, a consumer of the group that is relatively small is most visible. Therefore it is
the small group that can receive service, as service is tied to a sufficient number of followers.
This can obviously be extended to a setting in which consumers in the same income category
have different visibility in the market.19 Again those with higher visibility are more likely
to receive service.
18Fang (2001) analyses conspicuous consumption as a way to mediate informational free-riding in a labor
market context; Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1995) investigate this in a matching setting.
19Assume e.g. two subgroups of wealthy players, and each consumer sees a member of the first subgroup
for sure but a member of the second only with probability smaller than one.
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As a final point it should be noted that our concept of wealthy vs. poor is one of relative
comparison. Being materially better off then others is important, as this results in a ”leader”
status. The absolute level is not crucial for this. Thus, even in market settings relative
comparisons can be important.20 This provides an understanding of how some groups
can enjoy leadership status even when there is only slight heterogeneity in society. The
actual market outcome in terms of consumption might be quite different even though the
underlying heterogeneity is small, because firms may interact with the search process in
ways that magnify intrinsic heterogeneity.
3.3.2 Robustness
We will discuss some of the modelling choices we have made and the robustness of our results
to changes in these assumptions. One of the features of our model that deserves discussion
is the validity of the commitment. We assumed that firms promise some service level and
always honor their promise when the customer returns. This commitment assumption is
a shorthand way of introducing reputational considerations that allow for service provision
even in Markov-perfect equilibria, i.e., it allows us to rule out equilibria in which service is not
provided because firms cannot convince consumers that they will get service in the future.
In the analysis we have not considered whether firms would want to renege on their promise
(as we assumed that this is not possible). Commitment is not necessary to support this
equilibrium in a world without commitment if we allow non-Markovian (trigger) strategies:
incentive compatibility of the commitments can be ensured. Equilibria without service as
in Proposition 26 can trivially be supported by out of equilibrium beliefs that no firm will
provide service in the future, even if it provided service in the current period. Providing
service in any period thus only induces costs to the firm without altering future benefits.
Equilibria with service such in Propositions 25 and 26 can be supported if consumers believe
to never receive service again from a firm that deviates from equilibrium service provision.
If players are sufficiently long-lived and patient, the loss of the consumers business or the
slowdown of his visits still warrant service provision. Obviously, uniqueness claims do not
apply to such a non-restricted environment.
20Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (1992) and Mailath and Postlewaite (forthcoming) provide a rationale
for relative comparisons in a model where benefits of higher relative standing arise from more attractive
matching opportunities. Samuelson (2004) attributes relative comparisons to evolutionary pressure.
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In the equilibrium analysis we have established existence for small and large fractions α of
wealthy consumers. Due to our restriction to pure markovian strategies we cannot ensure
existence for intermediate α for arbitrary parameters c, s¯ and F (·). If service is provided, the
signal is better and consumers search more efficiently, which reduces the number of followers.
Therefore with service the number of followers might be too small to warrant service, while
without service the number of followers might be large and service is profitable. In these
cases mixed or non-markovian strategies would be necessary for existence.
We also limit attention to two quality levels. This assumption is not entirely innocuous. If
there were three qualities ql < qm < qh with associated population fractions λl, λm and λh,
it is possible that wealthy consumers search only for qh firms, while poor consumers stop if
they found a medium quality firm as their lower frequency of consumption acts similarly to
a lower discount factor. Following the wealthy then implies a high probability of drawing a
high quality firm, but also a relatively high probability of finding a low quality firm since
the wealthy do not settle on a medium quality firm should they find one, and hence may
search for a long time. Following the poor reduces the risk of finding a low quality firm if
they searching when they identify either a medium or high quality firm. This can lead to
the wealthy following the wealthy to obtain high quality, and the poor following the poor to
find medium or high quality firms. Nevertheless, modified versions of our results hold if the
survival rate δ is sufficiently large, since in that case both poor and wealthy will continue
searching until they find a high quality firm.
We also restricted attention to only two levels of service. This simplifies the analysis,
but the model could accommodate multiple levels of service s1, ..., sn at costs c1, ..., cn. In
Proposition 25 the level of service to the poor would be small even if they are followed,
because the number of followers is small. Therefore they would nevertheless search less
frequently, only the wealthy are followed and substantial service is only given to the wealthy.
In Proposition 26 the equilibrium in which the wealthy are followed continues to exist,
because without followers the poor receive little service and the wealthy consume more
often. In this case all consumers receive little service. There will also be an equilibrium
in which everybody follows the poor, as they then have many followers. Many followers
will induce firms to provide top service, and high quality firms outbid low quality firms.
This also happens if service is a continuous choice s ∈ [0, s¯].21 cn > P or c(s¯) > P would
21If the service is unbounded, there are parameter constellations for which low quality firms provide service
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again insure that maximum service is not simply given due to individual consumption. Yet
individual consumption could warrant a service level above zero.
We have assumed a simple signal structure in which each consumer can observe one wealthy
and one poor consumer in every period. All results hold if a consumer can observe multiple
wealthy and multiple poor consumers each period. Since there is a continuum of firms,
the probability of observing two or more consumers who choose the same firm is zero.
Therefore several consumers of the same type are as informative as a single consumer, and
an individual simply decides to follow either one of the wealthy or one of the poor. On
the other hand we could have assumed that each consumer simply sees the choices of N
randomly chosen consumers who purchased last period. This assumption is closer to models
such as those analyzed by Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2003).
While analytically much more complicated, we do not think that it changes the flavor of the
results as long as N is sufficiently large given the fraction of wealthy people. The reason is
that a consumer only cares about observing at least one poor or at least one wealthy person,
depending on whom he wants to follow. For sufficiently large N, the probability is virtually
one that one poor and one wealthy consumer is in the observed set.
Some of the social learning literature assumes some private information by agents. If we
assume that agents receive in each period a signal that indicates a firm which is with
probability ψ of good and with 1− ψ of average quality, this would change the probability
of finding a high quality firm when sampling independently to λ′ = ψ + (1 − ψ)λ, rather
than simply λ, leaving the results qualitatively unchanged.
We took the price as being exogenously set, and identical across firms regardless of quality.
We argued above that it seems unrealistic that even if prices differed across firms, they
would perfectly convey the quality of firms, and there would remain the possibility that
social learning of the sort in our model would still play a role. It is worth discussing what
the equilibria of a model such as we have laid out would look like if prices were a strategic
variable rather than exogenously set. Suppose that there were a symmetric equilibrium in
which all low quality firms set one price and all high quality firms set a possibly different
so high as to prevent the leaders from continued search for high qualities and a pure strategy equilibrium may
not exist. The reason is that low quality firms are willing to give up the full surplus to retain the customer,
while high quality firms are only driven by the encouragement effect of more frequent consumption due to
the markovian restriction.
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price. If the difference in quality between the high and low quality firms is small, there
may be a separating equilibrium in which the prices of the two types of firms are not very
different, and wealthy people go to high quality firms while the poor go to cheaper, low
quality firms. Suppose, however, that there was no value to the low quality firm; that is,
even if the price were zero, all consumers would prefer the high quality firm. There clearly
cannot be a separating equilibrium then since low quality firms could profitably charge the
same price as high quality firms. If all firms charge the same price, whether any single
firm has an incentive to deviate depends on consumers’ beliefs when they see an out-of-
equilibrium price. Trivially, beliefs that it is a low quality firm that deviates will support
equal pricing.22 Hence, if our model were extended so that pricing was endogenized, one
would get the equal pricing that we assumed.
3.3.3 Conclusion of Chapter 3
We have presented an equilibrium model of social learning in which heterogenous consumers
search for an experience good of high quality. Consumers also value service. Information
can be obtained through personal consumption or through the observation of other players’
choices. One group arises endogenously as the leading group whose actions are emulated
by other consumers in the market, leading to the possibility that firms can manipulate the
learning process through differential service provision. High quality firms outbid low quality
firms in their pursuit of customers, and therefore even in the presence of service, consumers
will not be induced to consume at low quality firms. If service is not too valuable, wealthy
consumers arise unambiguously as the leading group because they consume more frequently
and on average gather more information. If they have sufficiently many followers, they
receive service and capture some of the benefits of the search externality they generate.
As service induces them to search more frequently, and consequently learn more quickly, it
strictly increases the welfare of all consumers. If service is sufficiently important, the poor
can arise endogenously as the leading group because service can induce them to consume
22For low quality firms only new customers are important. These firms want to pool on any price above
marginal cost if they otherwise get no new customers. High quality firms obtain profits from new customers,
but also from existing customers. Analogous to the Diamond Paradox, existing customers face switching
costs and a high quality firm can extract rents from them. In equilibrium high quality firms must charge a
price such that a deviation does not increase the profits from existing customers beyond the loss of sales due
to absence of new customers.
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sufficiently frequently that they learn more quickly than the wealthy. While service to
the poor must sufficiently outweigh the difference in opportunity costs of search, it is not
necessary that the poor identify a high quality firm more quickly. If service induces them to
consume much more frequently at high qualities than the rich, their informed customers are
more visible, which can outweigh the slower rate of information accumulation. Nevertheless,
even in this case there exists another equilibrium in which everybody follows the wealthy.
The mechanics of the model are sufficiently transparent to shed light on social components
such as the role of relative position in society and the role of conspicuous consumption.
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Appendix
A.1 Appendix to Chapter 1
Proof of Proposition 2.
Assume an equilibrium exists such that all firms post the same wage w∗. The expected profits
are given by pi(w∗) = q(w∗) (1−w∗) (1−ψ(w∗)), where ψ(w∗) > 0 since a worker turns down
a firm with positive probability in the case of multiple offers. Proposition 1 implies that
w∗ = w¯ when trembles are sufficiently small, since otherwise all workers send an application
to one of arbitrarily few noise firms. Therefore ψ(w) = 0 in the limit for all w > w∗. Since
the queue length (and q(w)) is increasing in w, the profits of a firm that posts a wage just
above w∗ are equal to limw↘w∗ pi(w) = q(w∗) (1−w∗) > q(w∗) (1−w∗) (1−ψ(w∗)) = pi(w∗).
Therefore offering a wage just above w∗ is a profitable deviation.
If all firms post w∗ = 1 they make zero expected profits. Equation (1.9) implies that
there is some w˜ close enough to w∗ with strictly positive queue length in the unperturbed
game. A firm posting w˜ could then hire a worker with positive probability and receive
strictly positive expected profits. This offers a profitable deviation. Last, if w∗ = 0 workers
receive zero expected utility and so for any positive trembles they send both applications
to positive wages. As the trembles become smaller the hiring probability of a firm with a
positive wage converges to one and since q(0) (1− ψ(0)) < 1 posting a wage slightly above
zero increases the firm’s profits. QED
Proof of Proposition 3.
The proposition is proved in two stages. The problem of the high wage firms is solved first
and that of the low wage firms follows. As shown in section 3, the maximization problem
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of the high wage firms is given by
max
w∈[w¯,1]
(1 − e−λ(w)) (1− w) (A.1)
s.t. p(w) w + (1− p(w)) u1 = u2. (A.2)
Using the constraint we can solve for w = (u2 − u1) λ/(1 − e−λ) + u1 and substitute that
expression into the objective function. The maximization problem can be rewritten with
respect to λ as maxλ≥λ¯ 1−u1−λ (u2−u1)− e−λ (1−u1) where λ¯ = λ(w¯). This problem is
strictly concave in λ since u1 < 1 and hence it has a unique solution λ∗2, which corresponds
to some w∗2. Note that we proceeded as if ψ(w¯) = 0 which is not necessarily the case.
However, if w∗2 > w¯ then the value of ψ(w¯) is irrelevant; if w∗2 = w¯ then proposition (2)
shows that low wage firms cannot post w¯ in equilibrium and hence ψ(w¯) = 0. Therefore the
maximization problem is specified correctly.
There are two candidate solutions for w∗2. If the constraint does not bind, the wage is
determined by the first order conditions of the problem, wˆ2. If the constraint does bind then
w∗2 = w¯. We show that high wage firms enjoy strictly higher profits than low wage firms
when w∗2 = wˆ2. Setting the derivative of the problem to zero yields u2−u1 = e−λ
∗
2 (1−u1).
Substituting this expression back into the profit function and rearranging gives the following:
pi(wˆ2) = (1− e−λ∗2) (1− u1) (1− λ
∗
2 e
−λ∗2
1− e−λ∗2 ). (A.3)
The profits of a low wage firm that posts w1 and has expected queue length λ1 = λ(w1) are
given by
pi(w1) = (1− e−λ1) (1− w1) (1− 1− e
−λ∗2
λ∗2
), (A.4)
where the first term is the probability of getting at least one applicant, the second term is
the margin of the firm, and the last term is the probability that the chosen applicant does
not have an offer from a high wage firm.
Comparing the two equations term by term it is easy to see that the profits of high wage
firms are strictly higher: firms offering a higher wage have longer queues, so λ∗2 > λ1 which
means that 1 − e−λ∗2 > 1 − e−λ1 ; u1 = p(w1) w1 which implies that u1 ≤ w1; to prove the
the third term we need to show that λ e−λ/(1 − e−λ) < (1 − e−λ)/λ for any λ > 0. This
expression can be rearranged as λ2 e−λ < (1− e−λ)2 or λ2 eλ − e2 λ +2 eλ − 1 < 0. Denote
the left hand side by H1(λ) and note that H1(0) = 0. If H ′1(λ) < 0 for all λ > 0 we have our
result. But, H ′1(λ) = (2 λ+ λ2 + 2− 2 eλ) eλ and H ′1(0) = 0. Call the term in the bracket
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H2(λ) and note that H2(0) = 0. Then H ′2(λ) = 2 (1 + λ− eλ) which is negative for λ > 0.
Therefore, w∗2 = w¯ is a necessary condition for any equilibrium.
Turning to low wage firms, they solve
max
w
(1− e−λ(w)) (1 − ψ(w)) (1− w) (A.5)
s.t. p(w) w = u1. (A.6)
As argued above, ψ(w) = p(w∗2) for w ∈ [0, w¯)∩W, i.e. for all wage levels that are actually
posted. We solve the maximization problem as if ψ(w) is the same for all w, whether posted
or not, which is the case when, for instance, workers randomize independently inside each
of the two intervals. We then show that this simplification is innocuous. Using equation
(A.6), we can solve for w = u1 λ/(1− e−λ) and substitute it into the profit function to get
maxλ (1− e−λ − λ u1) (1− p(w∗2)). The term in the second bracket has no marginal effect
so the problem is strictly concave and therefore it has a unique solution λ∗1. The first order
conditions imply u1 = e−λ
∗
1 and hence w∗1 = λ∗1 e−λ
∗
1/(1− e−λ∗1).
We now consider the case where the worker strategies are such that ψ(w) takes different
values in [0, w¯). An example of why this could happen is the following. Suppose that
one of the pairs of wages that the workers randomize over in response to every perturbed
distribution is (w˜1, w˜2) where w˜2 ≈ 1. If workers applying to w˜1 send their high wage
application to w˜2 only, then the retention probability at w˜1 is very high since w˜2 being
close to one implies that p(w˜2) has to be very low. As the trembles become smaller, the
probability that this particular pair is chosen converges to zero, however ψ²(w˜1) remains
equal to p(w˜2) and so it converges to a relatively high value. This would be troublesome if
a different equilibrium could be supported in the way described. Suppose that there is such
an equilibrium in which low wage firms post some w˜ 6= wˆ1. For w˜ to be posted it needs
to provide the highest possible profits, implying in particular that pi(w˜) ≥ pi(wˆ1). The last
inequality can only hold if ψ(wˆ1) > ψ(w˜) since {wˆ1} = argmax(1−e−λ(w)) (1−w). However,
the fact that w˜ is actually posted means that ψ(w˜) = p(w∗2). Moreover, w∗2 = w¯ implies that
p(w) ≤ p(w∗2) for all wages w that high firms can post and hence ψ(w˜) = p(w∗2) ≥ ψ(wˆ1),
yielding a contradiction. Therefore no other equilibrium can be supported.
This completes the proof of proposition 3. QED
Proof of Propositions 4 and 8.
We show that there is a sequence {di}Ni=1 such that when w∗i is posted by di firms (call these
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type i firms), there is no profitable deviation for any type of firm. Afterwards, uniqueness
is proven for the N = 2 case.
First, consider deviations within the same type. Since w∗1 = wˆ1 it is immediate that type
1 firms cannot profitably deviate within their type. For type i ≥ 2 firms, w∗i = w¯i−1 is a
necessary condition for equilibrium. w¯i−1 is the profit maximizing wage within type i only
if w¯i−1 > wˆi, i.e. when then wage derived from the first order condition is not feasible.
We show that profits can be equalized across types only if the above condition holds. The
previous proposition proved that if type i firms post wˆi then they necessarily make higher
profits than type i− 1 firms, or pi(wˆi) > pi(w∗i−1). If w¯i−1 < wˆi, and if all type i firms post
w¯i−1 they make higher profits than if they all posted wˆi. This happens because they receive
the same number of applications (one per worker) but pay them less (however, each firm
could individually increase its profits even more by posting wˆi). As a result, pi(w¯i−1) > pi(wˆi)
and profits cannot be equalized across types i and i− 1. If, on the other hand, w¯i−1 > wˆi,
then pi(w¯i−1) < pi(wˆi). Therefore, if profits can be equalized across types, then w¯i−1 is the
profit maximizing wage of type i firms.
The next step is to prove that profits can be equalized across types of firms. To simplify
notation let pii = pi(w∗i ), pi = p(w
∗
i ), p˜ii = pii/(1−ψi), and λ∗i = b/di. For equal profits across
types it is sufficient to show that pii = pii−1 for all i, which is the same as p˜ii = (1− pi) p˜ii−1
since the term (1− ψi) is common to both sides. We show that given a di−1 we can find a
di in (0, di−1) such that ∆pii(di|di−1) ≡ p˜ii−1 − p˜ii/(1− pi) = 0. This allows us to construct
a sequence of dis such that all firms make the same profits for an arbitrary initial d1. We
then show that the di’s sum up to one.
It is useful to recall the following two equations (for i ≥ 2).
ui−1 = pi−1 w∗i−1 + (1− pi−1) ui−2 (A.7)
ui−1 = pi w∗i + (1− pi) ui−2. (A.8)
Equation (A.7) holds by the definition of ui−1. Equation (A.8) holds because w∗i = w¯i−1
and hence the i firm has to provide the same utility as w∗i−1 if it is used for the i− 1 lowest
application.
Note that the queue lengths are the same when di = di−1, which means that pi−1 = pi,
w∗i−1 = w
∗
i , and p˜ii−1 = p˜ii leading to ∆pii(di−1; di−1) < 0. On the other hand, λi ≈ ∞
when di ≈ 0 which means that pi ≈ 0 and therefore equation (A.8) requires a very large w∗i
leading to p˜ii < 0 (this occurs because the firm is assumed to post w¯i−1). ∆pii(di|di−1) > 0
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when di ≈ 0, and there is a di(di−1) such that type i and i− 1 firms make the same profits.
Moreover, the solution di(di−1) is unique because
∂∆pii
∂di
= −p˜ii ∂(1/(1− pi))
∂di
− 1
1− pi
∂p˜ii
∂di
< 0. (A.9)
When di increases the queue length decreases and hence the probability of getting a job
increases. Therefore the first partial is positive and the first term as a whole is strictly
negative. The second partial is non-positive since ∂p˜ii/∂λi ≤ 0. Recall that when i = 1 the
first order conditions are equal to zero because w∗1 = wˆ1. Furthermore, when i ≥ 2 the firm
would like to post a lower wage when profits are equalized (i.e., w∗i = w¯i−1 > wˆi) which
implies that the first order conditions with respect to λ are strictly negative. This proves
that equation (A.9) is strictly negative.
Therefore, for a given d1 the rest of the sequence d2(d1), d3(d1)...dN (d1) can be uniquely
constructed such that all types of firms make the same profits. To find the sequence whose
elements sum up to one define S(d1) ≡
∑N
i=1 di(d1) and note that it is continuous since all
of its components vary continuously with d1. Moreover, S(1/N) < 1 since di(di−1) < di−1
and S(1) > 1 so there is some d∗1 such that S(d∗1) = 1 and an equilibrium exists for any N .
To prove the uniqueness of equilibrium when N = 2 we show that d1 and d2(d1) are
positively related along the isoprofit curve, and hence there is a unique pair that sums up
to one. Implicit differentiation of d2 with respect to d1 while keeping profits equal yields
∂d2/∂d1 = −(∂∆pi2/∂d1)/(∂∆pi2/∂d2). The denominator is positive by (A.9). A little alge-
bra shows that the numerator is given by ∂∆pi2/∂d1 = (∂λ∗1/∂d1) e−λ
∗
1 (λ∗1 − λ∗2/(1− p2)),
which is positive since the queue length is inversely related to the number of firms and
λ∗1 < λ∗2. This proves that the equilibrium is unique when N = 2. QED
Proof of Proposition 5
We first define an equilibrium of the perturbed game and then show that, as the trembles
disappear, there is a sequence of such equilibria in the perturbed games that converges to our
equilibrium of the non-perturbed game. Furthermore, there is no sequence that converges
to a different limit. Let F˜ be distribution from which noise firms post. Let FNT² denote the
distribution that non-trembling firms post, which is a response to both noise and equilibrium
firms. The distribution of posted wages is then defined by F²(w) = (1−²) FNT² (w)+² F˜ (w).
The best response of workers is given by G(F²). The outcomes can be determined as in
section 2 using F² and G(F²). Given F˜ we can define an equilibrium.
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Definition 6 An equilibrium of the perturbed game is FNT² and G(F²) such that
1. pi(w) ≥ pi(w′) for all w ∈ suppFNT² and w′ ∈ [0, 1].
2. U(w) ≥ U(w′) for all w ∈ suppG(F²) and w′ ∈ [0, 1]N .
We now prove that there is an equilibrium in the trembling game that converges to our
candidate equilibrium. Then we show that there is no sequence that converges to a different
equilibrium.
Note that, under trembles, the worker’s problem is identical to the one described in
section 1.2.1. When (non-trembling) firms choose which wage to post, they take into
account the presence of the noise firms. High wage firms, however, solve exactly the same
problem as in section 1.2.2 since they face ψ(w) = 0. This implies that, for small enough
trembles, they all post w¯. Low wage firms have to consider the possibility that they
may lose a worker to a noise high wage firm. Suppose all workers send their applications
independently to the two intervals of firms. This is obviously an equilibrium strategy.
Then, the retention probability of a low wage firm does not depend on the actual wage
that it posts. As a result, the low wage firms’ optimization problem corresponds to that
in section 1.2.2 and they post a unique wage that is derived by their first order condition.
Existence can then be proved in the same way as in section 1.2.3. These trembling
equilibria clearly converge to our candidate equilibrium. Finally, consider the possibility
that workers follow different (equilibrium) strategies. The same logic that we used at the
end of the proof of proposition 3 shows that no different equilibrium can be supported. QED
Proof of Proposition 7.
To generalize (3) to any N it is sufficient to show that unless type i ≥ 2 firms post w¯i−1
they make strictly higher profits than firms of type i−1. After using the constraint to solve
for the wage, and taking the first order conditions, the profits of a type i firm are
pi(wˆi) = (1− e−λ∗i ) (1− ui−1) (1− λ
∗
i e
−λ∗i
1− e−λ∗i ) (1− ψi). (A.10)
The profits of a type i− 1 firm are given by
pi(wi−1) = (1− e−λi−1) (1− wi−1) (1− 1− e
−λ∗i
λ∗i
) (1− ψi), (A.11)
and they are lower for the same reasons as before. QED
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Proof of Proposition 2.
For given worker-firm ratio b and given fraction d1 of type one firms, we can find a unique
sequence db(d1) = {d1, d2, d3...dN} such that there is no profitable deviation for firms when
wage w∗i is posted by exactly di firms (see proof of proposition 8). Let Sb(d1) = d1 +
d2 + ... + dN for di ∈ db(d1). Let D(b) be the set of all sequences db(d1) that sum up to
one. Given any b and b′ let d′i = (di b
′)/b, λi = b/di, and λ′i = b
′/d′i. Then λi = λ
′
i and
therefore db(d1) ∈ D(b) if and only if db′(d′1) ∈ D(b′). Furthermore, Sb(d1) = 1 if and only
if Sb′(d′1) = 1. If Sb∗(d1) is strictly increasing for some b∗, then there is a unique d∗1 such
that Sb∗(d∗1) = 1 and hence there is a unique equilibrium. This means that the equilibrium
is unique for any b. QED
Proof of Proposition 9.
The planner solves the following problem: maxd∈[0,1] m(d) = p1+p2−p1 p2. If the problem
has an interior solution, the first order conditions yield
∂p2
∂d1
(1− p1) + ∂p1
∂d1
(1− p2) = 0. (A.12)
Recalling that λ1 = b/(1 − d) and λ2 = b/d it is easy to see that ∂pi/∂d = −∂λi/∂d (1 −
eλi − λi e−λi)/λ2i , ∂λ1/∂d = b/(1− d)2 = λ21/b, and ∂λ2/∂d = −b/d2 = −λ22/b, so equation
(A.12) can be rewritten as
(1− e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2)(1− 1− e
−λ1
λ1
) = (1− e−λ1 − λ1e−λ1)(1− 1− e
−λ2
λ2
). (A.13)
It is immediate that one extremum occurs when λ1 = λ2, or d = 1/2. The second derivative
is given by
∂2m
∂d2
= 1
b2
(1− e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2)(1− e−λ1 − λ1e−λ1)− 1b2λ32e−λ2(1− p1)
1
b2
(1− e−λ2 − λ2e−λ2)(1− e−λ1 − λ1e−λ1)− 1b2λ31e−λ1(1− p2). (A.14)
Substitution of (A.13) and dividing by (1− p1)(1− p2)/b2 establishes that at any candidate
extreme point the sign of the second derivative is given by sign(∂2m/∂d2) = sign(f(λ2) +
f(λ1)), where
f(λ) =
(1− e−λ − λe−λ)2
(1− (1− eλ)/λ)2 −
λ3e−λ
1− (1− eλ)/λ. (A.15)
Therefore, we want to show that there is no b > 0 such that there exists d ∈ (1/2, 1) where
(A.13) holds and
f(
b
d
) + f(
b
1− d) ≤ 0. (A.16)
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Figure A.1 shows f(λ) for λ ≥ 0. The function is strictly decreasing on (0, a1), strictly
increasing on (a1, a4), again strictly decreasing on (a4,∞) and converges to 1 for λ → ∞.
The only roots of the function are 0 and a2. We will discuss this function in order to establish
the result. Note that for any b, the specific value of d defines λ1 = b/d and λ2 = b/(1− d).
Note that for λ2 > a3 it is not possible to fulfill (A.16), where a3 is such that f(a3) = −f(a1).
Therefore we will restrict the discussion to λ2 < a3. This also implies that we do not have
to discuss any b where 2b > a3. For d = 1/2 we know that λ1 = λ2, and therefore the first
order condition holds and sign(∂2m/∂d2) = signf(2b).
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Figure A.1: f(x) for x ≥ 0.
CASE 1: b ≥ a2/2. Then at d = 1/2 we have 2f(2b) ≥ 0. Starting from d = 1/2, i.e.
λ1 = λ2, we will increase d and thus spread λ1 and λ2 apart. We will show that there does
not exist d > 1/2 such that (A.16) holds. Assume that (A.16) holds for the given b at some
d > 1/2. Then for any b′ ∈ [a2/2, b) there exists a d′ > 1/2 such that (A.16) holds. This is
easy to see if there exists d′ > 1/2 such that λ1 = b/d = b′/d′ = λ′1. Then f(λ1) = f(λ′1).
Since λ2 = b/1− d) > b′/(1− d′) = λ′2, f(λ2) > f(λ′2). But then f(λ1) + f(λ2) ≤ 0 implies
f(λ′1)+f(λ′2) < 0. If for some b′ ∈ [a2/2, b) no such d′ > 1/2 exists, we reach a contradiction:
There is some b′′ ∈ [b′, b) such that at d′′ = 1/2 it holds that λ1 = b/d = b′′/d′′ = λ′1. By the
prior argument f(λ′′1)+ f(λ′′2) < 0, but this violates 2f(2b) = f(λ′′1)+ f(λ′′2) ≥ 0. Therefore,
if we know that (A.16) does not hold at b˜ = a2/2, then we know that (A.16) does not hold
for any b > a2/2. Figure A.2 shows f(a2/2d) + f(a2/(2(1 − d))) for all d ≥ 1/2, which is
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strictly positive for all d > 1/2. Therefore, (A.16) does not hold for any b ≥ a2/2.
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Figure A.2: f(a2
2d
) + f( a2
2(1−d) ) for d ∈ [0, 1].
CASE 2: b < a2/2. In this case we have at d = 1/2 that 2f(2b) < 0, i.e. we are in a
local maximum. If there exist any other local maxima at d > 1/2, there has to be some
d′ ∈ (1/2, d) that constitutes a local minimum. Therefore, if for some d conditions (A.16) and
(A.13) hold simultaneously, then there exists 1/2 < d′ < d such that f(b/d′)+f(b/1−d′) > 0.
At d′ it has to hold λ′2 = b/(1−d′) > a2, otherwise f(λ′1)+f(λ′2) > 0 would not be possible.
We also know that λ′1 < b/2 < a2. Since d′ < d, we know that λ1 < λ′1 and λ′2 < λ2. Now
consider a d′ at which f(λ′1) + f(λ′2) > 0. If we increase d to values above d′, the derivative
of f(λ1) + f(λ2) is
∂(f(λ1) + f(λ2))
∂d
= f ′(λ1)
∂λ1
∂d
+ f ′(λ2)
∂λ2
∂d
(A.17)
=
1
b
[−f ′(λ1)λ21 + f ′(λ2)λ22]. (A.18)
If the term in square brackets is positive, then f(λ1) + f(λ2) is increasing as we increase
d further. So if we can show that the part in the square brackets is positive for all
(λ1, λ2) ∈ [0, a2] × [a2, a3], then it is not possible to increase d starting from any d′ and
achieve a negative value of f(λ1) + f(λ2) (which we would need to arrive at another
maximum). Since max[0,a2]f
′(λ)λ2 ≤ min[a2,a3]f ′(λ)λ2, as can be seen in figure A.3, it is
not possible to have another local maximum in the interior apart from d = 1/2. QED
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Proof of Proposition 10
The measure of workers who are employed at wage w∗i is given by b (1 − ψi+1) pi ≡ Ei.
Moreover, Ei−1 = b (1−ψi) pi−1 = b (1−ψi+1) (1−pi) pi−1. For the density to be declining,
Ei < Ei−1 has to hold for all i which happens if and only if pi < (1− pi) pi−1. Equal profits
imply that q(w∗i ) (1− w∗i ) = q(w∗i−1) (1− pi) (1− w∗i−1) or pi λi (1− w∗i ) = pi−1 λi−1 (1−
pi) (1− w∗i−1) yielding the condition λi (1− w∗i ) > λi−1 (1− w∗i−1). Using the equilibrium
conditions w∗i = (ui−1−ui−2)/pi+ui−1 and w∗i−1 = (ui−1−ui−2)/pi−1+ui−1 the inequality
becomes λi(1−x/pi) > λi−1(1−x/pi−1) where x ≡ (ui−1−ui−2)/(1−ui−2). Therefore, the
empirical distribution is decreasing if g(λ) ≡ λ (1−λ x/(1−e−λ)) is increasing with respect
to the queue length. The first derivative yields ∂g/∂λ = (1−e−λ) (1−e−λ−2 λ x)+λ2 x e−λ
which is positive if λ x is small. Noting that λi x = (1− e−λi) (w∗i − ui−2)/(1− ui−2) and
that the right hand side goes to zero for b large enough the result is established. QED
A.2 Appendix to Chapter 2
Properties of the extensive form matching process:
We consider the following matching process. There are T substages. In the first substage,
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all firms that have at least one applicant choose one and make an offer. We assume firms
choose their applicant at random. Workers can accept at most one offer and reject the
others. We assume they accept the most attractive offer weakly larger than zero. In every
subsequent period, any firm who do not have an offer that is currently accepted can make a
new offer. We assume that only those firms that have at least one applicant whom they did
not yet make an offer choose one of these applicants at random and make them an offer (the
others remain vacant). Workers can accept either one of the new offers or keep accepting a
non-rejected offer from an earlier period. We assume they accept the highest offer weakly
greater zero.
First observe that the assumed behavior about the firm’s decision to make an offer and the
worker’s decision to accept or reject is individually optimal given the other agents’ behavior.
Since workers are identical and we have assumed that workers use symmetric application
strategies, choosing at random about whom to make an offer next is an optimal strategy for
firms. It is also optimal for workers to always accept higher offers over lower offers: It does
not affect the offer decisions of firms with even higher wages, and so does not preclude any
chance of receiving an even better offer in the future.
To discuss convergence, consider some network that formed from the agents strategies
{φ, F,γ,G} (for this notation see section 2.1.2 and section 2.4.1). Let N be the maxi-
mum number of applications that workers send (N = 2 in the basic setup, some finite
N ∈ N in the extended setup). The focus on workers strategies that are symmetric and
anonymous significantly simplifies the analysis. It implies that gross applications are ran-
domly distributed to firms at a given wage. Together with the assumption that the agent
space is sufficiently large such that each choice is undertaken by a continuum of agents leads
in our specification to a Poisson distribution of gross applications to firms at each wage
level. It also allows us to apply the law of large number convention to each wage level, i.e.
at each wage the population share of currently matched and unmatched firms and workers
develop deterministically. Moreover, note that the process ”rolls forward”, i.e. the exact
end date does not influence the evolution of the system.
We will show that the process converges to a solution in which almost all agents are matched
stably. We call a firm stable at the beginning of a given period if one of two conditions
holds: Either it is currently matched to a worker whose other applications are with firms
that offer a weakly lower wage or that offer a higher wage but are currently matched; or it
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is unmatched and already offered the job to all its applicants. We call the measure of stable
firms at the beginning of subperiod t st. Similarly, we call workers stable if they have not
applied to any firm with a strictly higher wage that is currently vacant (unemployment is
coded as wage zero), and call their measure at the beginning of period t swt . We will show
convergence in the following sense: st → v = φV and swt → 1. Note that our notion of
stability is a local concept involving only the immediate partners in the interaction. Yet
the convergence implies that we attain (weak) stability globally if we remove a small (and
in the limit measure zero) set of agents from the economy.
To provide some intuition, consider first the case where only a discrete set of wages is offered
by workers. At the highest wage let λH be the ratio of gross applications to firms. Then the
fraction of highest wage firms that are stable at the beginning of the first period is 1−e−λH ,
as they did not receive any applications. The other highest wage firms make an offer. They
either get matched (and then stay matched), run out of applicants or keep proposing the
job to additional applicants. If each worker only sends one application to the highest wage,
all high wage firms are stable after the first subperiod. Even if not, the fraction of highest
wage firms that are not stable in period t is bounded above by 1 −∑tτ=1(λτHe−λH/τ !) by
Poisson matching (as this is the fraction that has applicants left even if no worker ever
accepts). This fraction converges to zero. Since for t large nearly all firms at the highest
wage are stable, at the second highest wage those firms that are matched are with very
high probability stable (because only the highest wage firms could attract the worker away,
and most of them are stable). And those second-highest-wage firms that are unmatched
propose until they run out of applicants or get matched themselves. If each worker sends
at most one application to each of the highest two wages, all firms at the second highest
wage are matched after the second subperiod. In any case the fraction of non-stable firms
at this wage goes to zero because they exhaust their applicants or get matched with a stable
worker. By induction this applies to all offered wages.
Induction does not work with a continuum of offered wages. Nevertheless we can show
convergence. It is still straightforward to show that the measure of proposals per period
converges to zero. Let S¯t be the set of currently unmatched firms at the beginning of
period t that still have applicants to whom they did not propose yet, i.e. the set of firms
that propose in period t. Denote its measure by γt. Since there are less applications than
proposals, i.e.
∑∞
τ=1 γτ ≤ N , we have
∑∞
τ=t γτ →t→∞ 0 and γt → 0. Let at denote the
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measure of new acceptance in period t. Since there are less new acceptances than offers, we
also have
∑∞
τ=t aτ →t→∞ 0 and at → 0.
That means that almost all unmatched firms have no applicants left to propose to when t
becomes large. We will show that this implies st → v. Assume not, i.e. st 9 v. Then there
exists δ > 0 and subsequence {tm}∞m=1 such that sm := v−stm > δ ∀m ∈N, where we denote
by sm the measure of unstable firms. Of these firms only the subset S¯tm is unmatched. Since
their measure γtm converges to zero, the measure of unstable but matched firms has to be
greater than δ for all m > M for some M ∈N, and all these firms have positions filled with
unstable workers who also applied to firms in S¯tm and would rather take a job there. Call
the set of these workers S¯1m. We will show a contradiction because all these workers apply
to the few firms in S¯tm , therefore firms in S¯tm get matched quickly and therefore a large
fraction of the S¯1m workers (who were unstable before) then become permanently stable.
Call the set of applications which make the S¯1m workers unstable ”unstable applications (in
tm)”. The measure of unstable applications in tm is obviously larger than δ for all m > M .
Let S¯2m ⊆ S¯tm denote the subset of firms that hold at least one of the unstable applications
(in tm). These firms hold on average some number, say xm, of unstable applications. Let
S¯3m ⊆ S¯2m be the subset of firms that hold at least xm/2 unstable applications. Note that any
fraction α of the firms in S¯3m receives at least αδ/2 unstable applications. Of these S¯
3
m firms,
we consider the half which have the least gross applications and call it S¯4m. They receive
at least δ/4 unstable applications. Of these S¯4m firms, we consider the half which have the
highest probability of hiring an S¯1m worker permanently, conditional on making an offer to
him, and call it S¯5m. Firms in S¯
4
m (and thus in S¯
5
m) have a probability of making an offer to an
S¯1m worker of at least (δ/4)/(2N), since each fraction α
′ of these firms have at least (δ/4)α′
unstable applications and at most 2Nα′ other applications (otherwise the firms in S¯3m\S¯4m
would hold a measure of unstable applications greater than N , but at most a measure of
N applications is sent). Let M satisfy
∑∞
τ=M aτ ≤ δ/8. A firm in S¯5m that makes an offer
to a worker in S¯1m has a probability larger than 1/2 that its offer is accepted permanently.
Therefore at least a fraction δ/(16N) of S¯5m firms gets matched permanently in period tm.
Since each fraction α′′ of S¯5m firms receives at least (δ/8)α′′ unstable applications, at least
(δ/8)(δ/(16N)) unstable applications are no longer unstable because they are now with firms
that are permanently matched. Since in each period tm, m > M , we permanently ”loose”
a strictly positive measure of unstable applications, we would need an infinite measure
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of unstable applications to sustain stm > δ ∀m > M , yielding the desired contradiction.
Therefore st → v.
Similarly, swt → 1, because otherwise we would again have a set of unstable workers similar
to S¯1m that applies to the few firms in S¯tm , and the same argument applies.
This establishes convergence. In the limit this implies that almost all firms get matched
only when the higher wage firms to which their applicants applied are matched, i.e. we can
remove firms ”top-down” from the market. Since the random application and offer process
at each wage implies that all firms at a given wage have equal chance of being the first to
propose to a worker that applied to both, the process works as if we select one at random
to make the offer first.
Proof of Proposition 11:
For wages strictly below u1 the result is immediate because the Market Utility cannot be
obtained. At wage w = u1 µ(w) > 0 would imply that the Market Utility cannot be
reached. Wages strictly above u1 have µ(w) > 0, as otherwise p(w)w = w > u1 and workers
would receive more than the Market Utility when applying there.
We have shown that it is optimal to send low applications to wages below w¯, which implies
that (2.9) has to hold for all wages in (u1, w¯] in order to provide the Market Utility. u1 ≡
supw∈V p(w)w since the optimum has to be obtained at some wage that is actually offered.
For γ2 > 0, it is optimal to apply with the high application to wages above w¯, and the
effective queue length is therefore governed by (2.10). Again the optimum is attained for
wages that are actually offered. The effective queue length has to be continuous at w¯, as
otherwise the job finding probability p(w) for workers would be discontinuous and some wage
in the neighborhood of w¯ would offer a utility different from the Market Utility. Therefore
w¯ is determined as the wage where both (2.9) and (2.10) hold.
For γ2 = 0, all wages above u1 that are in the offer set V have to conform to (2.9) because
they receive single applications. So w¯ ≥ supV. But if a higher (not offered) wage would
be offered, workers might prefer to send a second application there rather than relocating
their first one. Assume the queue length would be governed by (2.9) for all wages in
(u1, 1]. If p(w)w+ (1− p(w))u1 − c2 ≥ u1, workers would like to send a second application.
Therefore w¯ is the smallest wage for which that inequality holds (but at most 1). At
higher wages the inequality would be strict, i.e. workers would get a utility higher than
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the Market Utility by sending a second application. To fulfill the Market Utility Assump-
tion the additional utility of the second application has to equal its cost, so u2 − u1 = c2
has to hold at high wages and the effective queue length is again governed by (2.10). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 12:
Proof: Consider a (candidate) equilibrium in which all active firms offer wage w∗ ∈ (0, 1).
Almost all applications are sent to w∗ because of (2.3) and worker optimality 2b). w∗ > 0
then implies u1 = p(w∗)w∗ > 0. Moreover w∗ = w¯. If not, i.e. w¯ > w∗ or w¯ < w∗, then
a mass of applications would be sent strictly above or below the offered wage, yielding a
contradiction. Then profits for wages above w∗ are given by (2.15), for wages in [p(w∗)w∗, w∗]
by (2.14), and for wages below p(w∗)w∗ profits are zero.
The left derivative of the profits with respect to the queue length at µ¯ = µ(w∗) is obtained by
the differentiating (2.14) to get pi′−(µ¯) = e−µ¯−u1, and the right derivative by differentiating
(2.15) which yields pi′+(µ¯) = e−µ¯(1 − u1) − (u2 − u1). In equilibrium it needs to hold
that firms will neither want to increase their wage nor decrease their wage. This leads to
pi′+(µ¯) ≤ 0 ≤ pi′−(µ¯). But pi′+(µ¯) ≤ pi′−(µ¯) implies
−e−µ¯u1 − (u2 − u1) ≤ −u1. (A.19)
For a single market wage it holds that u2 = u1+(1− p¯)u1 with p¯ = 1−e−µ¯µ¯ . We can therefore
write u2 − u1 = (1− p¯)u1. Then (A.19) reduces to
(1− e−µ¯ − µ¯e−µ¯)u1 ≤ 0. (A.20)
We know that u1 > 0. It is easily shown that the term in brackets is strictly positive for
any µ¯ > 0, yielding the desired contradiction.
For the extremes, consider w∗ = 1 first. At w∗ = 1 firms make zero profits. Since the
effective queue length at wages close to 1 is positive by (2.12), wages below one provide
profitable deviations. Now consider w∗ = 0. Equilibrium profits are strictly smaller than
one because not all firms get matched. (2.13) implies that at wages w′ > 0 firms can hire
for sure, i.e. the effective queue length at wages above zero is infinity. Therefore, small
increases in the wage are profitable. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4, part 1:
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Instead of equations (2.22) and (2.23), we now have
1− e−µ1 − µ1e−µ1 = pi∗, (A.21)
(1− e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2)(1− e−µ1) = pi∗, (A.22)
for some endogenous profit pi∗. Consider pi∗ as a free parameter. For a given pi∗ (A.21) and
(A.22) uniquely determine the measure vˆ1 and vˆ2 of firms in the low and high group. That
is, pi∗ is supported by a unique measure vˆ = vˆ1 + vˆ2 of firms. We want to show that there
is only a single pi∗ that is supported by vˆ = v, which then establishes uniqueness v1 and v2
(and thus of F as in part 2). By (A.21) µ1 strictly increases in pi∗. Equal profits at high
and low wage firms implies
1− e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2 = 1− µ1e−µ1/(1− e−µ1), (A.23)
which implies that µ2 is strictly increasing in pi∗, since µ1e−µ1/(1 − e−µ1) is strictly de-
creasing in µ1. Since µ2 = γ2/vˆ2, vˆ2 is strictly decreasing in pi∗. We have proven the lemma
if we can show that also vˆ1 + vˆ2 is decreasing in pi∗. Since µ1 = (γ1 + γ2 − γ2p2)/vˆ1 we get
∂µ1/∂pi
∗ = −[µ1/vˆ1][∂vˆ1/∂pi∗]− (1/vˆ1)(1−e−µ2−µ2e−µ2)[∂vˆ2/∂pi∗]. By the prior argument
this derivative has to be strictly positive, which together with µ1 > 1 − e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2
implies ∂vˆ1/∂pi∗ + ∂vˆ2/∂pi∗ < 0. µ1 > 1 − e−µ2 − µ2e−µ2 holds because it is by (A.23)
equivalent to µ1 > 1 − µ1e−µ1/(1 − e−µ1), which is equivalent to 1 > (1 − e−µ1)/µ1. The
latter is true for all µ1 > 0. Since for pi∗ → 0 we have vˆ → ∞ and for pi∗ → 1 we have
vˆ → 0, there is exactly one pi∗ supported by a measure vˆ = v of firms. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 16:
For γ0 = 1 or v = 0, the result is trivial as matches are always zero. When workers send one
application (γ2 = 0), one group of firms with equal hiring probability is optimal because of
strict concavity of the matching probability 1−e−λ (this is a special case of Shimer (2005)).
For γ2 > 0 we will prove that two groups of firms of which one receives all high applications
and the other all low applications will be sufficient to achieve the same number of matches
as any other optimal wage setting and application behavior {F,G}.
Take {F,G} as a starting point. Consider some wage w ∈ V ∪W with queue length µ(w)
(other wages do not contribute to the matching). By assumption a continuum of firms offer
this wage, and all face the same queue length. We will split the firms at this wage into
two subgroups, and reshuffle the application behavior of the workers that send applications
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to this wage, such that their high application is randomly sent to some firm in the first
and their low applications to some firm in the second subgroup. Workers that send both
applications to w send one to each group, and accept offers from the first over offers from the
second. We leave the application behavior towards other wages unchanged. We will show
that for an appropriate choice of the relative size of the subgroups the overall matching is
unchanged. Let λh(w) denote the ratio of workers that only send their high application
to wage w to firms offering w under {F,G}. Let λb(w) denote the worker/firm ratio for
workers that send both applications to w. Let (1 − ψ¯)λl(w) be the ratio of worker/firm
ratio for workers who send their low or single application to w and do not get a strictly
better offer. If {F,G} is optimal, then neither of these ratios is infinity, and not all of them
are zero (except possibly for some wages that attract a zero measure of agents, which we
can neglect without loss of optimality). If only λh(w) (respectively (1− ψ¯)λl(w)) is strictly
positive, then we can trivially avoid to change the matching by having a zero fraction of the
firms in the second (resp. first) subgroup. Therefore consider the case where at least two of
the ratios are strictly positive.
First, we will show that if the two subgroups of firms face some identical effective queue
length µ′, then µ′ = µ(w). In this case we clearly have not changed the overall matching in
the economy. The prove is by contraposition: Assume µ′ > µ(w). That means that strictly
more firms then before get matched at wage w. On the other hand it becomes strictly harder
for workers to get an offer, and since we did not change the application behavior at other
wages, strictly less workers get matched at wage w. Since workers and firms are matched in
pairs, this yields the desired contradiction. Similarly µ′ < µ(w) can be ruled out.
Next, we will show that we can indeed equalize the effective queue lengths for both sub-
groups. Let the fraction of firms in the first subgroup be d. Then the effective queue length
for these firms is µh(d) =
λh(w)+λm(w)/2
d , because all applications are effective. For those
firms in the second group it is µl(d) =
(1−ψ¯)λl(w)
1−d +
1
2
1−e−µh(d)
µh(d)
λb(w)
1−d . For d close to zero
µh(d) > µl(d), while for d close to 1 µh(d) < µl(d). By the intermediate value theorem it is
possible to equalize both at some d(w).
This shows that for any wage we can conceptually split the firms into some that only receive
high and some that only receive low applications without altering the overall matching.
Doing this for all wages, we are left with a group of firms comprising all subgroups that only
receive high applications (and have d(w) > 0), and a group of firms comprising all subgroups
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that only receive low applications (and have d(w) < 1). This resembles two-group matching
except for the fact that firms in the same group but from different subgroups may still face
different ψ’s and λ’s.
Consider low (or single) application firms first. Consider two subgroups, one with matching
probability 1 − e−(1−ψ)λ, and one with 1 − e−(1−ψ′)λ′ . From the larger of the subgroups
select a subset of firms with equal size to the smaller subgroup. We will show that in an
optimal allocation both have the same queue length by shifting firms from one group to the
other while leaving the applications that each group receives the same. Let d be the fraction
of firms in the first subgroup, and γ and γ′ the gross queue length per group. Then the
average matchings across both groups is given by
d(1− e−(1−ψ) γνd ) + (1− d)(1− e−(1−ψ′)
γ′
ν(1−d) ). (A.24)
Since both subgroups have a strictly positive effective queue length, it cannot be optimal
to place all firms in only one subgroup (as otherwise few firms placed in the other would be
matched nearly for certain). Therefore, to achieve optimal matching d is characterized by
the first order condition
ν[(1− e−µ)− (1− e−µ′)− µe−µ + µ′e−µ′ ] = 0, (A.25)
where µ = (1− ψ) γνd and µ′ = (1− ψ′) γ
′
ν(1−d) . Since 1− e−µ − µe−µ is strictly increasing in
µ (and similar for µ′), we have µ = µ′ in the optimal allocation of firms. That means that
almost all low or single application firms have the same effective queue length. Reshuffling
all effective applications randomly over all firms in the group that receive low or single
applications without changing the applications to other firms does therefore not change the
overall matching, and we have for this group matching as for the non-preferred group under
two-group search.
By this construction, for low and single application firms only the average matching prob-
ability at high application firms matters. If we keep the size of low and single application
firms constant and leave the gross queue length for them unchanged, but match more work-
ers already at high wage firms, this clearly improves the matching (despite some negative
externality on the low or single application firms). By the strict concavity of 1 − e−λ the
average matching probability at high wage firms is maximized if the gross queue length (and
thus the effective queue length) is identical for all of them. Therefore the optimal allocation
can be achieved by having one group of high wage firms to which workers randomly send
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their high application, which corresponds to the preferred group in two-group-search.
By the two-group-efficiency of the equilibrium matching, the equilibrium matching is
constrained efficient. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 17:
Given v and γ with γ2 > 0, consider two tuples {F ′,G′} and {F ′′,G′′} that lead to equal
hiring probabilities η′ respectively η′′ for all firms. Similar to the argument in the previous
lemma η′ = η′′ = η¯, since otherwise one tuple would match more workers but fewer firms
than the other.
We can again split the firms into two groups, called first and second, all work-
ers send their high application to the second and their low or single application
to the first, and accept offers from the second over those from the first. Let
d be the fraction of firms in the second group. Again µ2 = λ2 = γ2/(vd) and
µ1 = [1− γ2p2/(γ1+ γ2)]λ1 = [γ1+ γ2− γ2(1− e−λ2)/λ2]/(v(1− d)). Since for d ≈ 0 clearly
µ2 > µ1 and for d ≈ 1 µ2 < µ1, there exists a dˆ such that effective queue length and thus
the hiring probability of both groups is equalized. It is easy to show that µ1− µ2 is strictly
increasing in d around µ2 ≈ µ1, so that dˆ is unique. This two-group process has µ1 = µ2,
but the optimal two group process fullfils (2.27), which requires µ1 < µ2, i.e. a strictly
smaller preferred group. Q.E.D.
Explanation to equation (2.7′):
Consider a particular worker who applies to h firms that offer wage w. For simplicity
assume he applies to no other firms. Conditional on the fact that a firm makes an offer
to the worker sometime during the recall process, we want to determine the probability σ
that this firm hires the worker. The unconditional probability that the worker does not
get any offer is (1 − p(w))h, and so the unconditional probability that he gets an offer is
ς = 1− (1− p(w))h. The unconditional probability of getting an offer from any specific firm
is ς/h. This unconditional probability can also be written as the probability of hiring con-
ditional on making an offer multiplied by the unconditional probability of making an offer.
So we have σp(w) = ς/h, or σ = [1− (1− p(w))h]/[hp(w)], which explains the formula used
for equation (2.7′). The argument is based on insights from Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
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Proof of Proposition 20:
We start out by fixing γ and denote by iˆ the highest integer for which γi > 0; i.e. iˆ is the
maximum number of applications that workers send. By straightforward extension of the
analysis of the workers’ best response in section 3 it can be established that the workers’ best
response to a wage offer distribution is now given by iˆ intervals such that every worker sends
exactly one application to each interval. More specific, let the utility from sending the first
i applications optimally be defined recursively by ui ≡ maxw∈[0,1] p(w)w + (1 − p(w))ui−1
for all i ∈ {1, 2, ...ˆi}, with u0 ≡ 0. Then for any wage offer distribution the effective queue
length is characterized by (u1, .., un, w¯0, ..., w¯N ) such that
p(w) = 1 ∀w ∈ [0, w¯0], and (A.26)
p(w)w + (1− p(w))ui−1 = ui ∀w ∈ [w¯i−1, w¯i] ∀i ∈ {1, ..., N}, (A.27)
where w¯0 = u1 and w¯N = 1. The indifference implies w¯i = ui−1+ [ui− ui−1]2/(2ui− ui−1−
ui+1) for intermediate i ∈ {1, ..., iˆ}. Clearly w¯iˆ ≥ supV, because any wages that are actually
offered receive applications from workers that at most send iˆ applications. At higher (not
offered) wages, workers might start sending additional applications. The Market Utility
Assumption implies that they cannot receive more than the Market Utility, which implies
that ui − ui−1 = ci for i > iˆ. The indifference then yields w¯i = ui−1 + [ui − ui−1]2/(ui −
ui−1 − ci+1). If this is in [0, 1] then this gives the appropriate boundary, otherwise w¯i = 1
and workers would strictly refrain from sending this many applications.
Using (A.27), we can rewrite the profit function for a firm who offers a wage w ∈ [w¯i−1, w¯i]
with w¯i−1 < 1 as
pi(µ) = (1− e−µ)(1− ui−1)− µ(ui − ui−1), (A.28)
where µ = µ(w). The logic is similar to (2.15). If w¯i−1 = 1 the profit is trivially zero.
Proposition 12, stating that there exists no equilibrium in which only one wage is offered,
can now easily be shown with similar techniques whenever γi > 0 for some i > 1. By a
similar argument it is straightforward that at least i wages have to be offered in equilibrium
whenever γi > 0. Given that (A.28) is strictly concave, it is also immediate that all firms
within the same interval will offer the same wage, yielding exactly iˆ wages when workers
send at most iˆ applications.
We call the group of firms that ends up offering the i’th highest wage as group i and will
index all their variables accordingly. It will be convenient to denote by Γi =
∑iˆ
k=i γk the
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fraction of workers who apply to at least i firms. Then at wage i the probability of retaining
an applicant is (1−ψi) =
∑iˆ
j=i
γj
Γi
[
∏j
k=i+1(1−pk)], since a fraction γj/Γi of applicants sends
j applications and does not get a better job with probability
∏j
k=i+1(1− pk). The effective
queue length at wage i is given by µi = (1−ψi)λi, where λi = Γi/vi is the gross queue length.
For i < iˆ the unique offered wage in [w¯i−1, w¯i] is obtained by the first-order-conditions of
(A.28), which are given by
ui − ui−1 = e−µi(1− ui−1). (A.29)
Therefore (A.28) can be rewritten as
pii = (1− e−µi − µie−µi)(1− ui−1). (A.30)
Free entry implies that pii = K, which together with (A.29) implies that µi = µ∗i and
ui = u∗i as defined above. By a similar argument as for (2.22) and (2.23) the condition
pii = K defines for a given vector γ of applications the unique measure vi of firms in each
group, and the wage wi = u∗i−1+(u
∗
i −u∗i−1)/pi that each group of firms offers (when i < iˆ).
Note that the equal profit condition pii = pii−1 together with (A.29) implies
1− e−µi − µie−µi = 1− µi−1e
−µi−1
1− e−µi−1 , (A.31)
which corresponds to (A.23).
To determine the equilibrium, only γ has to still be determined. Recall that i∗ denotes the
number of applications for which ci∗ < u∗i∗ − u∗i∗−1 and ci∗+1 > u∗i∗+1 − u∗i∗ . Consider first
the case where γ is such that iˆ < i∗. Since profits are determined by first order conditions,
there cannot be any wage in [0, w¯iˆ] that offers higher profits. Therefore a deviating firm has
to consider a deviation within (w¯iˆ, 1). In this region the effective queue length is (at least)
given according to p(w)w+ (1− p(w))u∗
iˆ
= u∗
iˆ
+ ciˆ+1 (it may even be larger if workers send
two or more additional applications to not-offered high wages). Therefore the profit for a
deviating firm is (at least) pi(µˆ) = (1 − e−µˆ − µˆe−µˆ)(1 − u∗
iˆ
), where µˆ is given by the first
order condition ciˆ+1 = e
−µˆ(1 − u∗
iˆ
). Since ciˆ+1 < e
−µ∗
iˆ+1(1 − u∗
iˆ
), we have µˆ > µiˆ. This
implies pi(µˆ) > (1− e−µ∗iˆ+1 − µ∗
iˆ+1
e
−µ∗
iˆ+1)(1− u∗
iˆ
) = K, where the equality follows from the
definition of µ∗
iˆ+1
. The optimal deviating wage can indeed be shown to lie above w¯iˆ and
therefore the deviation is profitable.
Clearly also iˆ > i∗ cannot be an equilibrium, because for workers who send iˆ applications
the marginal costs of the last application do not cover its marginal benefit.
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For the case where iˆ = i∗ all workers want to send exactly i∗ applications. We will show that
w¯i∗ = 1, which implies that firms do not have a profitable deviation, which establishes the
existence and uniqueness result. If w¯i∗ = 1, it means that the queue length in [w¯i∗−1, 1] is
determined by p(w)w+(1− p(w))u∗i∗−1 = u∗i∗ . Note that is implies p(1) = [u∗i∗ −u∗i∗−1]/[1−
u∗i∗−1] = e
−µ∗
i∗ , where the second equality follows from the definition of µ∗i∗ . Determining the
effective queue length this way is in accordance with the Market Utility Assumption if and
only if it is not profitable to send an additional application. If an additional application is
sent, by a logic similar to lemma 3 it is optimal to send it to the highest wage. The marginal
benefit would be p(1) + (1− p(1))u∗i∗ − u∗i∗ , or e−µ
∗
i∗ [1− u∗i∗ ]. Since ci∗+1 < e−µ
∗
i∗+1 [1− u∗i∗ ]
and µ∗i∗+1 > µ
∗
i∗ it is not profitable for workers to send another application to a deviant
firm. Therefore w¯i∗ = 1 is indeed the correct specification.
By similar arguments it is easy to see that for ci∗ = u∗i − u∗i−1 equilibria exist if and only if
γ has γi∗ + γi∗−1 = 1, γi∗ ∈ [0, 1]; i.e. workers randomize over i∗ and i∗ − 1 applications.
To show constrained efficiency, we will first consider search efficiency for given γ and v. Let
iˆ still denote the maximum number of applications that workers send. Consider iˆ groups of
firms, with div firms in each groups, which are ordered by their attractiveness for workers.
That is, a worker who applies to i firms applies once to each of the lowest i groups and
accepts an offer from a higher group over an offer from a lower group. We call an allocation
of firms across groups that leads to the maximum number of matches iˆ-group-efficient.
Compare two adjacent groups i and i− 1 with total measure ν = vi + vi−1. We show that
the only efficient way of dividing this measure up between the two groups is the equilibrium
division. The maximal total number of matches within these groups is given by
max
d∈[0,1]
M(d) = νd(1− e−µi) + ν(1− d)(1− e−µi−1). (A.32)
It can be shown that a boundary solution cannot be optimal, as it means that one application
is waisted. Noting that (1 − ψi−1) = γi−1/Γi−1 + (1 − ψi)(1 − pi)Γi/Γi−1 we can write
µi = (1 − ψi)λi and µi−1 = [γi−1/Γi−1 + (1 − ψi)(1 − pi)Γi/Γi−1]λi−1. The first derivative
is then
∂M(d)
∂d
1
ν
= 1− e−µi − (1− e−µi−1) + e−µid(1− ψi)∂λi
∂d
+ e−µi−1(1− d)
[
(1− ψi−1)∂λi−1
∂d
− Γi
Γi−1
(1− ψi)∂pi
∂d
λi−1
]
We can use similar substitutions as for (2.27), with the adjustment that now ∂µi/∂d =
130
−µi/d = −νµ2i /[(1−ψi)Γi], to show that the last term in the first line equals −µie−µi , and
the second line reduces to e−µi−1 [µi−1 − (1− e−µi − µie−µi ]. Therefore we again have
∂M(d)
ν∂d
= (1− e−µi − µie−µi)(1− e−µi−1)− (1− e−µi−1 − µi−1e−µi−1) = 0. (A.33)
The first order condition implies equality with zero. For given ν this uniquely characterizes
the optimal interior d, since similar substitutions as above yield ∂2M/∂d2 = −ν[µ22e−µ2(1−
e−µ1)/d+ e−µ1(1− e−µ2 −µ2e−µ2 −µ1)2/(1− d)] < 0. It is straightforward to show that for
a given measure v of firms there exists an iˆ-group efficient allocation across all iˆ groups. A
similar construction as in the proof of proposition 16 shows that iˆ groups are sufficient to
achieve the constrained optimal search outcome. A similar construction as in proposition
17 shows that the outcome of a random process (i.e. one wage) could also be achieved with
iˆ groups, but the division of firms across groups would not be optimal. More generally,
such an argument establishes that the optimal allocation cannot be achieved with less than
iˆ wages given the number of applications summarized in γ.
It is very tedious to analyze whether (A.33) - which coincides with profit equality as in
(A.31) - determines the allocation of firms to the iˆ groups uniquely for any v. Therefore we
will not consider the efficiency of search in the case without free entry. We will establish
that the overall entry of firms and the measure of firms in each group under equilibrium
conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3) yields optimal entry and optimal search simultaneously,
taking γ as given. The important insight from the previous analysis of constrained optimal
search is that (A.33) has to hold in the optimal search outcome for all i ∈ {2, ..., iˆ}, and
that we can apply the envelop theorem. Let d(v) = (d1(v), d2(v), .., diˆ(v)) be the fraction
of firms in each of the iˆ groups under constrained optimal search given v and γ. Again let
M∗(γ, v,d(v)) denote the constrained efficient number of matches given v and γ. Similar
to (2.28) the objective function is given by maxv≥0M∗(γ, v,d(v))− vK. When iˆ > 0, then
K < 1 ensures that the optimal solution is in the interior of [0, V ]. We will show that
the first order condition uniquely determines the solution and corresponds to the free entry
condition.
By the envelope theorem the impact of a change of the fraction di(v) of firms in each group
on the measure of matches can be neglected, i.e. ∂M
∗
∂di
∂di
∂v = 0 at the iˆ-efficient di. We get
as first order condition
∂M∗(γ, v,d)/∂v = K, (A.34)
131
where d = d(v). Writing M∗(γ, v,d) = [1−∑iˆi=1[γi∏ij=1(1− pj)] we have
∂M∗(γ, v)
∂v
=
iˆ∑
i=1
[
γi
i∑
j=1
[∂pj
∂v
∏
k≤i
k 6=j
(1− pk)
]]
=
iˆ∑
i=1
[
∂pi
∂v
Γi(1− ψi)
∏
k<i
(1− pk)
]
, (A.35)
where the second line is obtained by rearranging the terms for each ∂pi/∂v. To simplify
notation, define the partial sum
ξi′ =
N∑
i≥i′
[
∂pi
∂v
Γi(1− ψi)
∏
k<i
(1− pk)]. (A.36)
Since piˆ = (1 − e−µiˆ)/µiˆ we have ∂piˆ/∂v = −(1/µ2iˆ )(1 − e−µiˆ − µiˆe−µiˆ)(∂µiˆ/∂v). Since
µiˆ = γiˆ/(diˆv), we have ∂µiˆ/∂v = −γiˆ/(diˆv2) = −diˆµiˆ/γiˆ. So we get ∂piˆ/∂v = −diˆ(1 −
e−µiˆ − µiˆe−µiˆ)/γiˆ. Noting that Γiˆ(1− ψiˆ) = γiˆ, we have established that
ξiˆ = diˆ(1− e−µiˆ − µiˆe−µiˆ)
∏
k<iˆ
(1− pk). (A.37)
By induction we can establish the following lemma, which we will prove subsequently
because it would distract from the argument at this point.
Lemma A1 For all i it holds that
ξi = (
N∑
k=i
dk)(1− e−µi − µie−µi)
∏
j<i
(1− pk). (A.38)
This implies that ξ1 = 1 − eµ1 − µ1e−µ1 . The first order condition ξ1 = K uniquely
defines µ1, and corresponds to the free entry condition of the lowest wage firms. By (A.33)
(or respectively by (A.31)) it also determines µi uniquely for all i ∈ 2, ..., iˆ, which in turn
determines vi uniquely for all i ∈ 1, ..., iˆ. Thus, the measure of firms in each group under
equilibrium conditions 1a), 1b), 2a) and 3) coincides with the measure of firms in each group
implied by the first order conditions for optimal entry (incorporating optimal subsequent
search). Since there is only one allocation fulfilling the first order conditions, and boundary
solutions are not optimal, this again characterizes the global maximum. Thus equilibrium
entry and search is constrained optimal given γ.
Finally, when we endogenize γ, again note that the number of applications of other workers
in equilibrium is not important for the marginal benefits of each individual worker, which
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are always u∗i − u∗i−1. Therefore again the decision on the number of applications is
constrained efficient, establishing constrained efficiency overall. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma A1:
We are left to show that the following holds for all i ∈ {1, ..., iˆ− 1}:
ξi+1 = (
iˆ∑
k=i+1
dk)(1− e−µi+1 − µi+1e−µi+1)
∏
j<i+1
(1− pk). (A.39)
It clearly holds for i = iˆ − 1 by (A.37). Now assume it holds for some i. We will consider
ξi. We know that
ξi = ξi+1 + Γi(1− ψi)∂pi
∂v
∏
k<i
(1− pk). (A.40)
The second summand can be written as
∂pi
∂v
∏
k<i
(1− pk) = −1− e
−µi − µie−µi
µ2i
[
∂µi
∂v
∏
k<i
(1− pk)] (A.41)
Since µi = λi(1 − ψi) = λi(
∑iˆ
j=i
γj
Γi
(
∏j
k=i+1(1 − pk))) we can write the term in square
brackets in (A.41) as
∂µi
∂v
∏
k<i
(1− pk) = −Γi(1− ψi)
div2
[∏
k<i
(1− pk)
]
+ ξi+1
λi
Γi(1− pi)
= − diµ
2
i
Γi(1− ψi)
[∏
k<i
(1− pk)
]
+ ξi+1
λi
Γi(1− pi) .
Observing that 1µi (1− e−µi − µie−µi) = pi − e−µi , we can substitute the prior equation into
(A.41) and multiply by Γi(1− ψi) to get
Γi(1− ψi)∂pi
∂v
∏
k<i
(1− pk) = pi − e
−µi
1− pi ξi+1 + di(1− e
−µi − µie−µi)
∏
j<i
(1− pj).
We can substitute this into (A.40), and use (A.39) and the property of iˆ-group-efficient
search in (A.31) to obtain
ξi = (
N∑
k=i
dk)(1− e−µi − µie−µi)
∏
j<i
(1− pk). (A.42)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 21:
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First we show that for i∗ → ∞ the (weakly) shorter side of the market gets matched with
probability approaching 1. Since equilibrium search is always more efficient than a process of
random applications and acceptances, we will show this for the latter. As i∗ →∞ it cannot
happen that workers and firms both are matched with probabilities bounded away from one.
If that were the case, than some fraction α > 0 of firms would always remain unmatched.
But then the chance that a worker applies to such a firm with any given application is α,
so that the probability that he applies to such a firm with at least one of his applications
converges to 1, yielding a contradiction. With unequal sizes it is obviously the shorter
side whose probability of being matched converges to one; with equal sizes the probability
of being matched is the same and agents from both sides get matched with probability
converging to one.
For the next arguments, recall that the marginal utility gain (excluding the marginal appli-
cation cost) of the i∗’th application, given by u∗i∗ − u∗i∗−1, converges to zero as i∗ →∞. We
will use this to establish the limit for the average wage if firms are either on the long or on
the short side of the market.
Case 1: We will show that w(i∗) → 0 if firms are strictly on the short side of the market.
Assume there exists a subsequence of i∗’s such that v(i∗) < 1− ² for all i∗ and some ² > 0.
That implies %(i∗) < α for some α < 1. If w(i∗)9 0, then there exists a subsequence such
that w(i∗) → ω > 0 and pi(i∗) → 1 − ω (since η(i∗) → 1). Now consider a deviant firm
that always offers wage w′ = ω/2. As workers send more applications, the hiring probability
for the deviant has to converge to 1. This is due to the fact that for workers the marginal
utility of sending the last application converges to zero, which implies that the probability
of getting the job at the deviant firm has to become negligible as otherwise each worker
would like to send his last application there to insure against the 1 − α probability of not
being hired. With the hiring probability approaching 1 the profit of the deviant converges
to 1− ω/2, i.e. the deviation is profitable. Thus it has hold that w(i∗)→ 0.
Case 2: We will show that w(i∗) → 1 if firms are strictly on the long side of the market.
Assume there exists a subsequence of i∗’s such that v(i∗) > 1+² for all i∗ and some ² > 0. In
this case η(i∗) < α for some α < 1 and all i∗. If w(i∗)9 1, then there exists a subsequence
such that w(i∗) → ω < 1 and pi(i∗) → pi < α(1 − ω). Consider a firm that always offers
wage w′ ∈ (ω, 1) such that 1 − w′ > α(1 − ω). Again the hiring probability of the deviant
converges to 1, because if there were a non-negligible chance of getting the job at w′ worker’s
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would rather send there last application to this higher than average wage. But then the
deviant’s profit converges to 1− w′ and the deviation is profitable. So w(i∗)→ 1.
This immediately implies that v(i∗)→ 1. Otherwise a subsequence of i∗’s according either
to case 1 or to case 2 has to exist, but in case 1 profits are above entry costs and in case 2
they are below entry costs, violating the free entry condition. Finally, since v(i∗) → 1 and
firms get matched with probability close to one, pi = K implies that the average paid wage
w(i∗) has to converge to 1−K. This directly implies that u∗i∗ → 1−K.
To show that the individual search effort converges to zero, i.e. that also U∗(i∗) = u∗i∗ −
ci
∗
(i∗)→ 1−K, rewrite the workers’ utility as U∗(i∗) =∑i∗i=1[u∗i − u∗i−1− ci∗i ] =∑Ii=1[u∗i −
u∗i−1 − ci
∗
i ] +
∑i∗
i=I+1[u
∗
i − u∗i−1 − ci
∗
i ] for some I ≤ i∗, where ci
∗
i = c
i∗(i) − ci∗(i − 1) again
denotes marginal costs. For a given i the difference u∗i−u∗i−1 is simply a number independent
of i∗ (and the associated cost function). It converges to zero for large i, which entails that
u∗i∗ − u∗i∗−1 →i∗→∞ 0. Moreover ci
∗
i ≤ ci
∗
i∗ ≤ u∗i∗ − u∗i∗−1 for all i ≤ i∗, which only restates
that that we consider changing cost functions with ci
∗
i →i∗→∞ 0. Therefore the partial sum∑I
i=1[u
∗
i − u∗i−1 − ci
∗
i ] →i∗→∞
∑I
i=1[u
∗
i − u∗i−1] for any fixed I ∈ N. On the other hand we
have 0 ≤ ∑i∗i=I+1[u∗i − u∗i−1 − ci∗i ] ≤ ∑∞i=I+1[u∗i − u∗i−1], but ∑∞i=I+1[u∗i − u∗i−1] →I→∞ 0
since
∑∞
i=1[u
∗
i − u∗i−1] ≤ 1. Therefore limi∗→∞ U(i∗) = limI→∞ limi∗→∞[
∑I
i=1[u
∗
i − u∗i−1 −
ci
∗
i ] +
∑i∗
i=I+1[u
∗
i − u∗i−1 − ci
∗
i ]] =
∑∞
i=1[u
∗
i − u∗i−1] = limi∗→∞ u∗i∗ = 1−K. Q.E.D.
A.3 Appendix to Chapter 3
It will be convenient to prove lemma 7 prior to lemma 6.
Proof of Lemma 7: We consider first the case where the consumer is promised the same
service s ∈ {0, s¯} from every firm in every period. Having characterized the consumer search
behavior for this case, it is straightforward to extend it to the case where low-quality firms
promise less. We will work with average discounted payoffs. The functional equation for
sampling with recall, given that the best quality the consumer has yet encountered is q, and
given the current shock ρ, can be written as
V C(q, ρ) = max{(1− δ)(q + s+ ρ) + δEρ′V C(q, ρ′), (A.43)
(1− δ)(Eq|γ(q) + ρ) + δEq˜|γEρ′ max{V C(q, ρ′), V C(q˜, ρ′)},
(1− δ)u0 + δEρ′V C(q, ρ′)},
where the first line describes the utility from returning to a known firm with quality q,
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the second line describes random sampling and the last line consumption of the numeraire.
Ex denotes the expectation operator with regard to variable x. x = q|γ refers to variable
q when the probability of a high quality is γ.23 We drop the decision-irrelevant constant
u(y−P ). The right hand side of (A.43) defines an operator T : Z → Z. If [ρ, ρ¯] is bounded,
Z = {ν : {ql, qh} × [ρ, ρ¯]→ <|ν is continuous and bounded} and it is easily checked that T
fulfills Blackwell’s (1965) sufficient conditions for a contraction. Therefore, a solution to the
problem exists and is unique. For ρ¯ =∞ note that for all ρ > ρ¯′ = u0− ql+ δ1−δ (qh+ s¯− ql)
the consumer will consume the indivisible good, because even if he loses high quality and
high service forever (and only gets ql now instead of u0) the taste shock today outweighs the
forgone benefits. Therefore we do not alter his decision problem if we restrict [ρ, ρ¯] to [ρ, ρ¯′]
and assume a distribution F ′(ρ) = F (ρ) for all ρ < ρ¯′ and F ′(ρ) = 1 for all ρ ≥ ρ¯′. Similarly
we can bound the support from below by ρ′ = u0− qh− s¯− 11−δ (qh+ s¯− ql) without altering
the consumer’s choice. On the restricted problem the contraction property establishes that
(A.43) has a unique solution, and so the unrestricted problem has a unique solution.
From (A.43) note that V C(q, ρ) is weakly increasing in q. Therefore for q = qh the first
line in the max-operator is larger than the second. Thus, whenever a consumer with state
variable qh enters the market, he will return to the firm with quality qh rather than sample a
new one. He enters the market if the taste shock is high enough, i.e., higher than ρˆh ∈ (ρ, ρ¯)
that makes the player indifferent between not consuming (line 3 in equation (A.43)) or going
into the market (line 1), so that
(1− δ)(qh + s+ ρˆh) + δEρ′V C(qh, ρ′) = (1− δ)u0 + δEρ′V C(qh, ρ′)
or ρˆh = u0 − qh − s.
Then in any given period the ex ante probability that this player will enter the market is
[1−F (u0−qh−s)], while the ex ante probability of not consuming is F (u0−qh−s). Knowing
this, the expected average discounted payoff is
Eρ′V
C(qh, ρ′) =
∫ ρ¯
ρ
max{qh + s+ ρ, u0}dF (ρ) (A.44)
= F (u0 − qh − s)u0 + [1− F (u0 − qh − s)](qh + s) +
∫ ρ¯
u0−qh−s
ρdF (ρ)
= u0 +
∫ ρ¯
u0−qh−s
[1− F (ρ)]dρ.
23We used the shortcut γ for q|γ in the main body of the text.
136
The second equality is simply the probability of not consuming times the opportunity cost,
plus the probability of going into the market times the value from quality and service of
doing so, plus the expected value of the taste shock when going into the market. The last
line follows by integration by parts.
Now consider q = ql. Assume that searching for a higher quality firm is preferable to
staying at the low quality firm and obtaining service in the next period. (We will show in
the subsequent proof of lemma 6 that this is indeed optimal). The threshold ρˆl for the taste
shock is now given by the equality of line 2 and 3 in (??), so that
(1− δ)(Eq|γ(q) + ρˆl) + δ(1− γ)Eρ′V C(ql, ρ′) + δγEρ′V C(qh, ρ′) = (1− δ)u0+ δEρ′V C(ql, ρ′),
or
δγ
1− δ
[
Eρ′V
C(qh, ρ′)−Eρ′V C(ql, ρ′)
]
= u0 −Eq|γ(q)− ρˆl. (A.45)
Taking ρˆl as given, we can express the expected value as
Eρ′V
C(ql, ρ′) = F (ρˆl)[(1− δ)u0 + δEρ′V C(ql, ρ′)]
+[1− F (ρˆl)](1− δ)
[
Eq|γ(q) + Eρ′(ρ′|ρ′ ≥ ρˆl)
]
+[1− F (ρˆl)]δ
[
γEρ′V
C(qh, ρ′) + (1− γ)Eρ′V C(ql, ρ′)
]
.
The first line weights the opportunity cost of consumption by the probability F (ρˆl) of not
consuming. The term [1 − F (ρˆl)] in the second and third line reflects the probability of
entering the market. The utility from doing so is comprised of two components. Line 2
reflects the instantaneous expected value from entering the market due to quality and taste
shock, while line 3 represents the expected continuation value after encountering a firm with
high or low quality respectively. After rearranging terms we have
Eρ′V
C(ql, ρ′) = F (ρˆl)u0 + [1− F (ρˆl)]Eq|γ(q) +
∫ ρ¯
ρˆl
ρdF (ρ)
+[1− F (ρˆl)] δγ1− δ
[
Eρ′V
C(qh, ρ′)− Eρ′V C(ql, ρ′)
]
.
Inserting (A.45) and rearranging gives
Eρ′V
C(ql, ρ′) = u0 − [1− F (ρˆl)]ρˆl +
∫ ρ¯
ρˆl
ρdF (ρ) = u0 +
∫ ρ¯
ρˆl
[1− F (ρ)]dρ. (A.46)
Substituting (A.46) and (A.44) into (A.45), we obtain an implicit function characterizing
the threshold shock value ρˆl ∈ (u0 − qh − s, u0 −Eq|γ(q)) :
ρˆl − u0 +Eq|γ(q) +
δγ
1− δ
∫ ρˆl
u0−qh−s
[1− F (ρ)]dρ = 0. (A.47)
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By the intermediate value theorem there is a solution to this equation, and the solution is
unique as the left hand side is strictly increasing in ρˆl.
Finally, note that when both firms offer service s = s¯, the customer will not return to a low
quality firm (see lemma 6). Since service is not provided in the first period, the customer
will never experience service from any low quality firm, even if it promises to provide service
should the customer return. Therefore the results also hold for the case where only high
quality firms promise service s¯, while low quality firms may not. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 6: Consider a consumer of type θ with opportunity cost uθ0 who has
experienced only low quality firms. If low quality firms do not offer service, the consumer
would search for a high quality firm, as nothing is lost by doing so.
If both types of firms offer service, the cost of searching consists of the forgone service (recall
that first period service at a new firm is zero). Assume searching for a high quality firm is
not optimal, given that the best firm encountered so far is low quality and all firms offer
service. In other words a consumer always returns to the first firm he encounters. Similar
to a derivation as in equation (A.44), the expected value at q = ql is then Eρ′V C(ql, ρ′) =
uθ0 +
∫ ρ¯
uθ0−ql−s¯
[1 − F (ρ)]dρ. The condition under which returning to the low quality firm
rather than searching is optimal is then
(1− δ)(ql + s¯+ ρ) + δEρ′V C(ql, ρ′)
≥ (1− δ)(Eq|γ(q) + ρ) + δEq˜|γEρ′ max{V C(ql, ρ′), V C(q˜, ρ′)},
or
(1− δ) (ql −Eq|γ(q) + s¯) ≥ δγ [Eρ′V C(qh, ρ′)−Eρ′V C(ql, ρ′)] .
Substitution and division by γ yields
(1− δ)
(
ql − qh + s¯
γ
)
≥ δ
∫ uθ0−ql−s¯
uθ0−qh−s¯
[1− F (ρ)]dρ. (A.48)
Since
∫ uθ0−qh−s¯
uθ0−ql−s¯
[1− F (ρ)]dρ > 0 and independent of δ, and γ > 0, there exists δθ such that
for δ > δθ condition (A.48) cannot hold, where δθ is defined as the survival probability
that solves (A.48) with equality. For s¯ < γ(qh − ql), δθ ≤ 0. If δ > δ ≡ max{0, δw, δp},
all consumers will search for high quality firms. This establishes lemma ??. Note that for
γ ≥ λ a bound δ can be established independently of the exact value of γ by finding the
fixed point of the equality in (A.48) when γ is replaced by λ. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 9 : Consider the mapping τ : [λ, 1]× [uw0 − qh − s¯, up0 − ql]→ [λ, 1]× [uw0 −
qh − s¯, up0 − ql] such that τ(γ, ρˆ) =
 τ1(γ, ρˆl)
τ2(γ, ρˆl)
. Similar to equation (3.10) let τ1(γ, ρˆl) be
defined as
τ1(γ, ρˆθl ) = 1−
[
1− δ + δBθ] [1− λ]
1− δ + δ(1− λ+ γ)Bθ +
[
δλ+ δ21−δB
θγ
]
Cθ
, (A.49)
with Bθ ≡ 1− F (ρˆθl ) and Cθ ≡ 1− F (uθ0 − qh − s). When the wealthy follow other wealthy
consumers, θ = w. However, the analysis holds similarly for the poor following other poor,
i.e., θ = p. For γ ∈ [λ, 1] the multiplier of (1−λ) is strictly smaller than 1 and so τ1(γ, ρˆθl ) > λ.
Clearly τ1(γ, ρˆθl ) < 1. Similar to equation (3.1), let τ2(γ, ρˆ
θ
l ) = τ2(γ) be implicitly defined by
τ2(γ) = uθ0 − Eq|γ(q)−
δγ
1− δ
∫ τ2(γ)
uθ0−qh−sh(θ)
[1− F (ρ)]dρ. (A.50)
The function τ is continuous. For τ1 this is easy to see. For τ2, note that in (A.50) γ as
a function of τ2 is continuous and strictly monotone. Therefore τ2(γ) is also continuous.
Domain and codomain of τ are identical, and they are compact subsets of <2. By Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem there exists a fixed point of τ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 22: Consider θ ∈ {p, w}. For γ ∈ (λ, 1) we have γθ > λ (see discussion
in proof of lemma 9, where τ1(γ, ρˆθl ) corresponds to γ
θ). To compare γw and γp consider
the general form of (3.10) with w replaced by θ, where θ ∈ {p, w}. Some algebra reveals
that (∂γθ/∂Bθ) > 0 iff (γ − λ)δ(1 − δ) + δ2(γ − λ)Cθ > 0, which holds since γ ∈ (λ, 1).
Clearly (∂γθ/∂Cθ) > 0. Therefore γw > γp if Cp < Cw and Bp < Bw, which is by lemma
(8) the case for sh(w) ≥ sh(p) or s¯ < up0 − uw0 . By the same lemma sh(p)− sh(w) = s¯ > ξγ
implies Cp > Cw and Bp > Bw, which in turn implies γw < γp. In the intermediate case of
sh(p)−sh(w) = s¯ ∈ (up0−uw0 , ξγ) we have Cp > Cw but Bp < Bw. If sh(p)−sh(w) ≈ up0−uw0 ,
then Cp ≈ Cw but Bp < Bw and therefore γw > γp. If sh(p)−sh(w) ≈ ξγ , then Cp > Cw but
Bp ≈ Bw and therefore γw < γp. If sh(p)−sh(w) = s¯ ∈ (up0−uw0 , ξγ) an increase in s¯ increases
Cp and Bp but leaves Cw and Bw unchanged, and there exists unique ξˆγ ∈ (up0−uw0 , ξγ) for
which sh(p)− sh(w) = ξˆγ implies γw < γp. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 23: To illustrate how Π is calculated, consider the following candidate
stationary equilibrium: All consumers follow the wealthy, the wealthy are promised service
by high quality and not by low quality firms, and no firm promises service to the poor. In this
case, the benefit of a wealthy consumer to a high quality firm, denoted Πwh, comprises the
wealthy consumer’s own contribution P − c, plus the life-time contributions of his followers.
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The expected number Nw of wealthy followers in the next period is given by the number of
consumers who are searching in that period divided by the number of all wealthy who are
consuming, i.e., Nw =
ϕwl
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
= 1−γ. In subsequent periods they consume with probability
1 − F (uw0 − qh − s¯) conditional on surviving. They generate benefit Πwh every time they
visit. These followers do not get service on their first visit to the firm, and finally, there are
Np =
ϕpl
ϕwl +ϕ
w
h
1−α
α poor consumers who follow in the next period. In every subsequent period
they consume with probability 1−F (up0− qh) if they survive. They generate benefit P each
time they consume. Thus, the contribution of a wealthy consumer is given by
Πwh = P − c +βNwΠwh
[
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
w
0 − qh − s))
]
+ βNwc (A.51)
+βNpP
[
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
p
0 − qh))
]
.
The proof of the proposition is divided into three lemmata. The following lemma establishes
that a leader’s benefit to a firm can be arbitrarily high if he is followed by sufficiently many
customers of the other type.
Lemma 10 Fix M > 0. Assume type θ customers are being followed by consumers of the
other type θ¯ 6= θ. Assume the type θ¯ consumers do not receive service. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1)
there exists α¯ > 0, such that for all αθ ∈ (0, α¯) the benefit Π of a type θ customer to a firm
is greater than M (independent of the service strategies toward type θ consumers).
Proof: Since the type θ¯ followers do not receive service by assumption, they will search for
high quality firms. The value of next-period type θ¯ followers to any firm due to a visit by a
leader is at least
(1− δ)αθ¯[1− F (uθ¯0 − ql)]2(1− λ)δ
1
αθ
Pβ, (A.52)
where αw = α and αp = 1− α. In every period there will be (1− δ)αθ¯ newborn followers of
type θ¯ who go into the market with probability greater than [1−F (uθ¯0− q)] > 0, do not find
a sufficiently good firm with probability (1 − λ), survive another period with probability
δ, and consume again with probability of at least [1 − F (uθ¯0 − ql)]. This time they follow
a leader who was in the market the previous period, of whom there are at most αθ. They
pay price P, and since they follow a period later than the visit of the leader, their value is
discounted by β. The expression goes to infinity as αθ going to zero.
The firm might incur service costs for the leader, but these are easily offset by his immediate
type θ¯ followers. The leader might also have followers of his own type, which themselves
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bring a benefit larger than M in the period after and will therefore increase this consumers
benefit even more. Q.E.D.
Recall that a high quality firm can induce a customer to return by promising service. The
following lemma shows that a high quality firm will provide service when the customer’s
profit contribution is sufficiently large. Let Πθh denote the benefit of one-time consumption
of a type θ consumer for a high quality firm.
Lemma 11 There exists M > 0 such that in any stationary equilibrium with Πθh > M , a
high quality firm will promise service s¯ in any period to type θ consumers.
Proof: Let s be the equilibrium strategy of a high quality firm to a type θ customer that
generates the benefit of Πθh for the firm. Let sˇ 6= s be a one-shot deviation in the service
promise.
If promising sˇ instead of s = s¯ results in the customer searching for another firm and never
returning, then for Πθh > M = c offering the service is optimal, since by offering service the
firm retains the business of this consumer and gains Πθh − c when he returns. As discussed
above, our restrictive equilibrium concept necessitates the discussion of the case where the
consumer would return even if service were not promised for one period.24 For this case the
proof is divided into two parts. The first establishes that increasing (decreasing) the service
promise increases (decreases) the probability with which the consumer returns by a finite
amount. The second provides the lower bound for the profitability of the consumer such
that the threat of a potential time delay warrants service promises.
For the first part we discuss the consumer’s reaction to a deviation. In equilibrium the
customer returns whenever ρ ≥ ρˆθh = uθ0 − qh − s, otherwise he does not consume. Assume
that the customer also chooses the firm rather than random sampling at sˇ ∈ {0, s¯}\{s}. Let
V C (qh, ρ) = V C(ρ) and V F be the flow payoff of this strategy for the customer and the firm
respectively. Consider the customer’s response to a one-shot deviation by the firm. The
value function Vˇ C(ρ) of the customer for the period directly after the deviation is
Vˇ C(ρ) = max{(1− δ)(qh + sˇ+ ρ) + δEV C(ρ), (1− δ)uθ0 + δEVˇ C(ρ)}. (A.53)
24Since the equilibrium strategy of a firm is a function s(θ) independent of the history, after a one-shot
deviation a consumer still expects to get the equilibrium service promise whenever he returns. This belief
makes it hard to sustain an equilibrium at s = s¯ and easy to sustain an equilibrium at s = 0, because the
consumer expects the change for only a single period and reacts little (compared e.g. to the case where he
expects the change to continue forever).
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Let ρˇ be the value for which the first term in the max operator is equal to the second term,
i.e.,
(1− δ)(qh + sˇ+ ρˇ) + δEV C(ρ) = (1− δ)uθ0 + δEVˇ C(ρ). (A.54)
This implies that the customer will return to the firm when ρ ≥ ρˇ, and will not consume
otherwise. Then
EVˇ C(ρ) =
∫ ρ¯
ρˇ
[
(1− δ)(qh + sˇ+ ρ) + δEV C(ρ)
]
f(ρ)dρ+
∫ ρˇ
ρ
[
(1− δ)uθ0 + δEVˇ C(ρ)
]
f(ρ)dρ.
Therefore
(1− δF (ρˇ))EVˇ C(ρ) = (1− F (ρˇ)) [(1− δ)(qh + sˇ) + δEV C(ρ)] (A.55)
+
∫ ρ¯
ρˇ
(1− δ)ρf(ρ)dρ+ F (ρˇ)(1− δ)uθ0.
Substituting (A.55) into the equation (A.54), integration by parts and rearranging yields:
(1− δ)(ρˇ+ qh + sˇ)− δ
∫ ρ¯
ρˇ
(1− F (ρ))dρ− uθ0 + δEV C(ρ) = 0.
The value of EV C(ρ) is given by lemma (7). Substitution leads to
(1− δ)(ρˇ+ qh + sˇ− uθ0) + δ
∫ ρˇ
uθ0−qh−s
(1− F (ρ))dρ = 0. (A.56)
Equation (A.56) has a unique solution. It also reveals that for s = 0 and sˇ = s¯ we have
ρˇ < uθ0− qh, which implies that the frequency of consumption is increased by the deviation.
Let ζs be the probability of returning each period under the equilibrium strategy s, and let ζˇs
be the probability of returning next period after a one-shot deviation in the service promise.
Then ζˇ0 − ζ0 = (1 − F (ρˇ))− (1 − F (uθ0 − qh)) > 0. On the other hand for s = s¯ and sˇ = 0
equation (A.56) reveals that ρˇ < uθ0− qh− s¯, which implies that the deviation decreases the
frequency of consumption. That is, ζˇs¯ − ζs¯ ≡ (1− F (ρˇ))− (1− F (uθ0 − qh − s¯)) < 0. Hence,
a change in service provision changes the frequency of consumption by a finite amount, i.e.
4ζ ≡ min{ζˇ0 − ζ0, |ζˇs¯ − ζs¯|} > 0.
For the second part we discuss the firm’s incentive to deviate. We show that for Π large
enough s = 0 cannot be an equilibrium strategy since a one-shot deviation would be prof-
itable. We also show that s = s¯ is an equilibrium strategy.
Consider first the case where the candidate equilibrium strategy is s = 0, the one-shot
deviation is sˇ = s¯. In this case (ζˇ0 − ζ0) > 0. Note that the effective discount factor for the
firm in this case is δF = δβ because the firm discounts with β and the survival probability
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of the customer is δ. Normalizing profits by (1 − δF ), the equilibrium value to the firm is
V F = ζ0Πθh. The value to the firm from period t + 1 onward after a one-shot deviation in
period t is
Vˇ F = ζˇ0((1− δF )(Πθh − c) + δFV F ) + (1− ζˇ0)δF Vˇ F .
A one-shot deviation is profitable if Vˇ F > V F , or equivalently Πθh > ζˇ0
ζˇ0−ζ0 c. This is fulfilled
if M ≥ 14ζ c.
Consider now the case of s = s¯ and sˇ = 0. In this case (ζˇs¯ − ζs¯) < 0. The equilibrium (flow)
value to the firm is V F = ζs¯Πθh. The flow value to the firm from period t+ 1 onward after
a one-shot deviation in period t is
Vˇ F = ζˇs¯((1− δF )(Πθh + c) + δFV F ) + (1− ζˇs¯)δF Vˇ F .
A one-shot deviation is not profitable if Vˇ F ≤ V F , or equivalently Πθh ≥ ζˇs¯
ζs¯−ζˇs¯ c. This is
fulfilled if M ≥ 14ζ c. Therefore for Πθh > M ≥ 14ζ c the only equilibrium strategies for high
quality firms is s = s¯. Q.E.D.
Finally we show that high quality firms will always outbid low quality firms:
Lemma 12 Let δ ∈ (δ, 1). In any stationary equilibrium, either sh(θ) ≥ sl(θ) for θ ∈ {p, w},
or sh(θ) < sl(θ) but type θ consumers nevertheless do not return to low quality firms.
Proof: Assume sh(θ) < sl(θ) and type θ customers stop searching when they have found
a low quality firm. There are two possibilities: Either they stop searching at the first firm
they encounter, in which case γθ = λ. Or they do not return to high quality firms but keep
searching for a low quality firm. In this case γθ < λ.
Call type θ consumers group Y, and type θ¯ consumers group Z. Group Y consumers must
have some consumers that follow them or service would not be profitable. It cannot be that
every consumer who is searching follows group Y, because group Z would then not receive
service as it has no followers, and would therefore look for high quality firms. If γθ = λ, by
Proposition 22 γ θ¯ > λ and group Z consumers should follow members of their own group.
If γθ < λ, group Z consumers are better off sampling on their own. Therefore either group
Y members are only followed by group Y members, or they are only followed by group Z
members.
In the second case, both groups would have to continue searching for low qualities (plus
service) after finding a high quality firm. Assume group Y did not; then they would stay
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at the first firm they patronize. But then group Z has no followers, thus receives no service
and will look for high quality firms. But then it is not optimal for group Z to follow group
Y. Assume group Z did not leave high quality firms; then they either stay at the first firm
they encounter and do not follow group Y, or they only look for high quality firms, in which
case following group Y is suboptimal. Therefore it must be that group Z searches for low
quality firms, which implies that group Z also receives service from low quality firms. To
receive service, it must be that they are followed by group Y. So both groups receive service
form low quality firms and not from high quality firms. In this case, if the poor are leaving
high quality firms to search for low quality plus service, then the wealthy strictly prefer
to leave high quality firms to receive low quality plus service (as their higher frequency of
consumption is similar to a lower discount factor). Yet by an argument similar to proposition
22, the signal of the wealthy is more informative about finding low quality firms when both
types search for them and get identical service. Therefore the wealthy would not follow the
poor, and this case cannot constitute an equilibrium.
We are therefore left with the case in which each group Y member is, in equilibrium, followed
by some expected number Nθ of other members of its own group (and none of the other
group). The candidate equilibrium profit contribution Πθl that a low quality firm receives
from a group Y customer returning one more time is
Πθl = P − c+ βNθΠθl
[
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
θ
0 − ql − s¯))
]
+ βNθc. (A.57)
The derivation is similar to that of equation (A.51). In the stationary setting
βNθ
[
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F (u
θ
0 − ql − s¯))
]
< 1.
Solving for Πθl yields:
Πθl =
P − c+ βNθc
1− βNθ[1 + δβ1−δβ [1− F (uθ0 − ql − s¯)]]
. (A.58)
For this to be an equilibrium, Πθl ≥ 0. Consider first the case where Πθl > 0, i.e. P − c +
βNθc > 0. In this case high quality firms have an incentive to deviate and also offer service
to group Y consumers, which upsets the equilibrium. To see this, note that for a high
quality firm the candidate equilibrium profit contribution from a group Y consumer is zero
after the first period of consumption, because he does not consume there again. Deviating
and offering service to the customer and all his followers generates the profit contribution
Π′ = P − c+ βNθΠ′
[
1 +
δβ
1− δβ (1− F
′)
]
+ βNθc,
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where 1 − F ′ is the probability with which a customer that is offered service is returning.
Since ρ¯ > uθ0 − qh − s¯, the frequency 1 − F ′ > 0. Since P − c + δNθc > 0, it follows that
Π′ > 0.25 But then high quality firms would offer service.
Consider now the case Πθl = 0, i.e. P − c + βNθc = 0. Therefore, low quality firms
are indifferent between promising service or not. In this case high quality firms are also
indifferent between offering service or not. By the tie-breaking rule we employed, both
types of firms offer service.26 However, consumers then do not search for low quality firms;
consequently high quality firms offer service, and group Y customers would not search for
low qualities. Q.E.D.
25Since this is a deviation from a steady state, βNrΠ
′
[
1 + δβ
1−δβ (1− F ′)
]
might be larger than 1, in which
case the discounted profit from offering service is unbounded.
26This is the only place where we use this tie-breaking rule. The result holds also when we employ the
assumption that firms do not offer service when indifferent. The point is that both types of firms resolve
indifference the same way. Moreover, simple restrictions such as a high survival rate δ, a high cost-price
wedge c− P or a modest service influence s¯ would also guarantee the result, as they rule out indifference.
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